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Practice: A Primer And
Commentary
"In the present state of the criminal justice system, one would have thought
that all approved requirements for valid entry of a guilty plea would be car-
ried out almost as a matter of second nature. Apparently, such is not the case
.... " Shanahan, J., State v. Jost, 219 Neb. 162, 169, 361 N.W.2d 526, 531
(1985).
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On June 2, 1999, Boykin v. Alabama' passed its thirtieth anniver-
sary in the United States Reports, quietly exerting continuing control
over Nebraska practice. In its thirty years, Boykin dramatically
changed Nebraska plea acceptance procedures, the records trial courts
need to create, and the rules applied in direct appeals from convictions
entered on guilty and no contest pleas. Boykin's state court plea pro-
ceeding records mandate has changed in Nebraska practice, precipi-
tated by other United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the
right to counsel. Additionally, the Court's right to counsel cases, oper-
ating both independently of and in concert with Boykin, have also ex-
erted a strong, but less dramatic, influence on Nebraska's
enhancement of penalty procedures and on Nebraska collateral attack
practice relating to plea-based judgments of conviction.
The Nebraska Supreme Court's first attempt at satisfying the
Boykin requirements, State v. Turner,2 remained on the books for
roughly ten years as the ruling Nebraska precedent. But Turner did
not come close to satisfying Boykin. The Nebraska Supreme Court's
second attempt at satisfying Boykin, State v. Tweedy,3 essentially re-
mains good law, despite several refined restatements of its teachings.
The first substantial and refined restatement of Tweedy appeared in
State v. Irish.4 The most recent restatement, with only slight refine-
ment, appeared in State v. Hays,5 and has been reiterated in opinions
released as recently as State v. Louthan6 and State v. Paul.7 Hays
actually only reinvigorated Tweedy after several years of benign neg-
lect. As this article makes apparent, far more becomes involved in the
acceptance of guilty and no contest pleas than Judge Shanahan may
have had in mind when he wrote the words quoted at the top of this
article.8 Plea acceptance, as we shall see, can become complicated. In
1. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The first footnote presents an appropriate place to empha-
size two language points. First, the past tense and the past particle forms of the
verb, 'to plead" are "pleaded" not "pled," no matter what frequent repetition of
the incorrect form "pled" might indicate. Second, defendants tender, offer, prof-
fer, or make their pleas; defendants do not enter their pleas. Courts and judges
accept, reject, and enter defendants' pleas and some court clerks may enter the
defendants' tendered pleas.
2. 186 Neb. 424, 183 N.W.2d 763 (1971).
3. 209 Neb. 649, 309 N.W.2d 94 (1981).
4. 223 Neb. 814, 394 N.W.2d 879 (1986).
5. 253 Neb. 467, 570 N.W.2d 823 (1997).
6. 257 Neb. 174, 595 N.W.2d 917 (1999)(providing precedent that the current Ne-
braska Supreme Court used to revise the approach to collateral attacks on prior
convictions).
7. 256 Neb. 669, 592 N.W.2d 148 (1999)(providing precedent that the current Ne-
braska Supreme Court used to refine direct appeal approach in evaluating ar-
raignment court's procedures).
8. Readers still with me at the end of this article will have no doubt of that.
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addition, the replacement of all of the judges on the state's supreme
court in a very short time also may complicate an already complex
situation and can even change what reasonably should be the "second
nature" part of the plea process. 9
Practitioners need ready access to Nebraska's past and current law
relating to plea-based convictions and challenges to those convictions.
Two types of practitioners could especially benefit from a comprehen-
sive source on the subject. These include practitioners appearing in
Nebraska's state courts and in federal courts who deal with the effect
of Nebraska state court plea-based convictions under the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, or those practitioners challenging Nebraska state
court plea-based convictions in the context of federal collateral at-
tacks. PractitionersiO and judgesi" have not had access to a single re-
9. As of January 1, 1993, four of the seven supreme court judges had been born
during the 1920s, one in 1917, one in 1934, and one in 1945. In 1994, Justice
Wright replaced Justice Shanahan (who became a United States District Court
Judge) and Justice Connolly replaced retiring Justice Boslaugh. In 1995, Justice
Gerrard filled the vacancy created when Justice White became Chief Justice. In
1997, Justice Stephan replaced retiring Justice Fahrnbruch and Justice McCor-
mack replaced Justice Lanphier (who was not retained by the electorate). In
1998, Justice Miller-Lerman replaced retiring Justice Caporale and last, Chief
Justice Hendry replaced retiring Chief Justice White. Justice Wright took office
February 25, 1994 and, by October 1, 1998, had moved up from the most junior
justice to the most senior justice. Chief Justice Hendry took office October 1,
1998. All seven current justices arrived on the court in roughly a 4-1/2 year pe-
riod. Of the seven, only three - Justices Wright, Connolly and Miller-Lerman -
have prior experience as appellate court judges. Only Chief Justice Hendry has
any trial judge experience; he served on the Lancaster County Court from 1995 to
1998. The remaining three came to the supreme court straight from law practice.
See CLERK OF THE LEGISLATURE, NEBRASKA BLUE BOOK 801-808 (1998-99). As of
January 1, 1999, all seven had been born in 1938 or later; five after 1945. In a
sense, an entire new generation of supreme court judges arrived on the scene in
less than five years. They replaced a relatively stable and quite predictable, con-
servative, essentially old guard state supreme court, representing the generation
born before 1935, and dominated by the generation born before 1929. Recall that
Thomas Jefferson believed a period of nineteen years roughly defined a human
generation. Rarely does complete control of a state supreme court change so rap-
idly from one generation to the next. The Nebraska experience of the 1990s
should provide a laboratory for a social science assessment of the effects on state
law that such a rapid, total generational succession may bring into being.
10. The Nebraska County Attorneys' Association has developed some materials in
the area including such works as MARTIN J. CoNBoy, NEBRASKA COUNTY ATroR-
NEys' AssOCIATION DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED/DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE:
A TRIAL PACTICE MANUAL 328 et seq. (1994) and SAMUEL W. COOPER, NEBRASKA
COUNTY AroRNEYs' AssOCIATION, NEBRASKA CRmNAL PROCEDURE (1974).
11. All Nebraska judges have had access to some less comprehensive materials, in-
cluding: Alan G. Gless, Guilty - No Contest Pleas, appearing as Chapter XVII in
the NEBRASKA JUDGES BENCHBOOK (1988 & 1990 rev.). The members of the Ne-
braska County Judges Association also had access to Alan G. Gless, Guilty - No
Contest Pleas (1994 supp.), and the members of the Nebraska County Attorneys'
Association had access to my 1990 revision of the Benchbook chapter and its 1992
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source in which they could locate most of the controlling Nebraska
law. Nor is there a single resource from which they could follow the
development of the various rules affecting plea-based conviction
problems. The availability of a single resource in which to locate the
current rules and the background of currently controlling case law can
provide practitioners and judges with information they can use to de-
velop more effective arguments. This article will lessen the use of ar-
guments from previously rejected positions, effectuate more informed
decision-making by judges, and provide readily available practical in-
formation for new practitioners. This article may also provide aca-
demic lawyers with the initial information for scholarly analysis and
comments on the areas of Nebraska law that remain in need of
clarification.
The purpose of this article is fourfold. Stated in order of relative
importance, this article provides the single resource the Nebraska
practice literature has lacked. The second purpose lies in a re-analy-
sis of Boykin.12 There is ample room to argue Boykin probably re-
quired more than it said, more than generally has been required by
Nebraska's13 appellate courts, and considerably less than many other
state courts have claimed. Third, this article examines other, undevel-
oped, and sometimes inconsistent areas of Nebraska law affecting
plea-based convictions, especially Nebraska law on venue and statutes
of limitations in criminal cases. Out of necessity, the Nebraska Con-
stitution is pulled into the discussion at several places. Finally, this
article suggests a number of considerations to the bench and practic-
ing bar in dealing with plea-based conviction issues, including use of
the state constitution. The article expresses a few thoughts on advo-
cacy approaches for the use of the practicing bar, which should also
provide another pedagogical tool for those academic lawyers attempt-
ing to teach legal method.14
Most of the advocacy ideas are presented throughout this article in
the notes at points where their impact might be maximized, rather
than in a centralized location. The discussion of the basic rules appli-
cable in Nebraska's state courts speaks mainly to the members of the
supplement. The Nebraska Criminal Defense Attorneys Association has devel-
oped precious few similar resources, other than isolated short seminar segments.
The Nebraska bar at large has lacked access to anything relating to plea-based
conviction practice.
12. As well as the other related sub-lines of United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting the validity of plea-based convictions. It will be necessary for the sake
of a clear focus to discuss some of the United States Supreme Court's work prod-
uct in connection with Nebraska law and other parts of the Court's work product
in isolation from the related or resulting Nebraska developments.
13. And most states' appellate courts.
14. Whatever the course title may be. The pursuit of the fourth goal will be inter-




state's practicing criminal bar and bench. The discussion of the unde-
veloped or unclear areas of Nebraska law and the re-analysis of the
federal case law, however, should speak to a larger audience, includ-
ing federal and state judges, federal criminal practitioners, and aca-
demic lawyers as well.15
II. APPELLATE JUSTICE AND THE PRECIPITATION OF
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ACTIVITY
Some brief historical information is necessary to set the stage for
the developments of the 1960s and beyond. Much changed in the
world of appellate justice between 1787 and 1867, not the least of
which was its very creation.16 The first Nebraska Constitution,
adopted in 1866, guaranteed some criminal appeals to the Nebraska
Supreme Court.17 The Nebraska Supreme Court, from its birth in
1867, had habeas corpus jurisdictionls and appellate jurisdiction over
criminal cases, although the court's scope of review on appeal initially
was confined within the procedural limits of error proceedings. 19
15. In short, there should be a little something here for everyone, except civil litiga-
tion specialists and other lawyers who do no criminal work.
16. The United States Constitution has never contained a constitutional provision
creating or guaranteeing a right to appeal in criminal cases. That absence from
the Constitution made eminent good sense when viewed in the context of the
times. There has never been a common law right to appeal, and, with very few
even arguable exceptions, there were no common law appellate courts in 1787.
17. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 18 (1866) provided: "The writ of error shall be a writ of right
in all capital cases and shall act as a supersedeas to stay the execution of the
sentence of death until the further order of the Supreme Court in the premises."
18. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3 (1866), now found at NEB. CoNsT. art. V, § 2.
19. See supra note 17. The drafters of the Nebraska Constitution of 1875 retained
the 1866 concept, but broadened the guarantee to cover "all cases of felony." NEB.
CONST. art. I, § 23 (1875). In 1972, the provision became: "In all cases of felony
the defendant shall have the right of appeal to the Supreme Court." Then, in
1990, to coordinate with the intended caseload reduction for the supreme court
through the creation of the intermediate court of appeals, the guarantee became:
In all capital cases, appeal directly to the Supreme Court shall be as a
matter of right and shall operate as a supersedeas to stay the execution
of the sentence of death until further order of the Supreme Court. In all
other cases, criminal or civil, an aggrieved party shall be entitled to one
appeal to the appellate court ... or to the Supreme Court as may be
provided by law.
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 23.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has said that the right to appeal in misde-
meanor cases is not constitutionally guaranteed and may be restricted by statute.
Further, the review by an appellate court of a final judgment in a criminal case is
not a necessary element of either federal or state due process of law, which allows
the statutory imposition of time limits and other procedural requirements. See
State v. Schroder, 218 Neb. 860, 359 N.W.2d 799 (1984)(regarding misdemean-
ors); State v. Kelley, 198 Neb. 805, 255 N.W.2d 840 (1977)(regarding felonies).
The 1990 state constitutional amendments did not affect those rulings.
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An interesting semantic point in Nebraska law arises in the appli-
cable appellate procedure language. The Revised Statutes of Nebraska
(1866) provided that writs of error in criminal cases were to be
processed under the rules applicable to writs of error in civil cases.20
Then, in 1961, the legislature abolished writs of error and combined
criminal and civil appeal procedures into a single statute.2 1 The con-
solidation does not seem to have altered in any substantial manner
the actual appellate practice, just the language used.22 Error proceed-
ings limited appellate courts to reviewing questions of law and search-
ing only for error appearing on the face of the record.2 3 The idea of
true fact review on appeal in law actions (as opposed to equity ac-
tions), while already developing in some areas of law, lay in the future
and, in reality, never has arrived in the world of criminal appeals.
Only the language appellate courts and legislatures use has
changed.24 A deeper discussion of the development of appellate re-
view lies outside the scope of this article. 25
20. See NEB. CRnM. CODE § 266 (1866).
21. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1912 (Cum. Supp. 1963).
22. See State v. Longmore, 178 Neb. 509, 134 N.W.2d 66 (1965).
23. The action for a writ of error was brought as a new action in a court superior to
the trial court claiming error in law apparent on the trial court record, thus
amounting to more of a collateral attack than an appeal. There is a common law
action for a writ of error in coram nobis that can be used to go outside the record
and reviews alleged errors in fact which were not apparent on the record. But
that action also is a form of collateral attack brought in the trial court that ren-
dered the challenged judgment instead of an appellate continuation of the origi-
nal case. See Hawk v. State, 151 Neb. 717, 39 N.W.2d 561 (1949).
24. On writs of error, the appellate court could not look beyond the face of the record.
A key to the scope of review lay in the meaning of"the record." For example, the
Nebraska record in 1867 meant: "All proper entries made by the clerk, and all
papers pertaining to the cause and filed therein, (except subpoenas, depositions,
and other papers that are used as mere evidence,) are to be deemed parts of the
record." NEB. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 677 (1866). Thus, depending upon the juris-
diction and time period involved, the face of the record could include very little of
importance or usefulness for purposes of appellate review. See, e.g., G.R.Y. RAD-
CLIFFE & GEOFFREY CRoss, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYsTEm (1946); LESTER B.
ORFIELD, CRnNmAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 22-25 (1939); David Rossman, "Were
There No Appeal"." The History of Review in American Criminal Courts, 81 Nw. U.
L. Ruv. 518 (1990); Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5
TEXAs L. REv. 126 (1927).
A statute setting "for errors on the record" as the applicable standard of re-
view in a criminal appeal, as opposed to a criminal writ of error, works only a
very slight change in the procedure, if any real change at all. Such a statute
would also have no real change in appellate approach either, except the option of
noticing plain error.
25. Interested readers may want to examine the authorities cited previously, and
WILFRED J. Rrz, REwRrriNG THE HISTORY OF THE JuDIcIARY AC OF 1789 (Wythe
Holt & L.H. LaRue eds. 1990)(especially Table 3.1 at 45-46, and accompanying
text); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDrMAN, A HISTORY OF AmERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985).
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True appellate review of criminal cases developed only after appel-
late review courts developed, first in the United States and later in
the United Kingdom.26 True appellate review courts, as defined by
Prof. Wilfred J. Ritz, came into being only in the very late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries.
The United States Supreme Court did not obtain appellate juris-
diction over federal trial courts' criminal decisions until 187927 and
did not obtain full appellate jurisdiction in federal criminal cases, in-
cluding those tried in the territorial courts, until 1891.28 Of course,
the Supreme Court had habeas corpus jurisdiction from the beginning,
but the Court's habeas jurisdiction was limited. The permissible scope
of habeas corpus actions in federal court included only those actions
brought by persons detained under the claimed authority of the
United States.29 In 1867, however, Congress extended the bases for
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to include persons claiming to be
held in violation of the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United
States.3O
Actions seeking a writ of habeas corpus constitute a form of collat-
eral attack. As such, the only judgments against which relief tradi-
tionally can be granted by habeas are judgments that are found to be
void. The Supreme Court found a vehicle in its expanded habeas juris-
diction to include state court decisions. This allowed the Court to
search behind the face of the record to reach problems created by "cir-
cumstances attendant upon the trial . . . so repugnant to constitu-
tional ideals of due process in procedure as to void the judgment of the
[inferior] court."31
While it is true that the Supreme Court obtained jurisdiction to
review state court criminal cases by writ of error in section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, the Court held early in its existence that it had
26. See ORIELD, supra note 24; RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 24.
27. See ORFIELD, supra note 24; ERwIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
CoURTs (1987). There was a certification of legal questions procedure available
for the circuit courts (the trial courts composed initially of supreme court justices
riding circuit and sitting as circuit court judges with the local district court
judges). Certification was only available when the judges sitting in circuit court
disagreed on the legal points involved. It was a very limited avenue of relief.
28. See 25 STAT. 655 (1889); 26 STAT. 827 (1891); ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF
THE FEDERAL COuRTs (1987).
29. See Act of September 24, 1789, 1 STAT. 73, 82 (1789).
30. See Act of February 5, 1867, 14 STAT. 385-386 (1867). In Exparte McCardle, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-326 (1868), Chief Justice Chase, while writing for the
unanimous Court and discussing the breadth of the jurisdiction granted in the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, said the act brought "within the habeas corpus juris-
diction of every court and every judge every possible case of privation of liberty
contrary to the National Constitution, treaties, or laws. It is impossible to widen
this jurisdiction."
31. ORFIELD, supra note 24, at 248.
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no appellate jurisdiction to review federal criminal cases.3 2 The fed-
eral question limitation of section 25 and the relative paucity of fed-
eral law/state law conflicts at the time provided the Court with little it
could review in state criminal cases until ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
on July 9, 1868,33 immediately created the possibility that federal due
process claims then could be raised in state court criminal prosecu-
tions34 on a wholesale basis. But federal due process challenges were
not raised in large numbers for quite some time.
Federal due process challenges to state court criminal convictions
began as a trickle only in the late nineteenth century, held steady at
the slow leak level well into the twentieth century, and became an
open floodgate only after the middle of the twentieth century.3 5 It was
not until 1923 that the United States Supreme Court finally in-
structed lower federal courts to inquire into the merits of alleged due
process violations in federal court habeas actions, making federal
habeas corpus a collateral remedy for constitutional errors.3 6 Brown
32. See 1 Stat. 85 (1789). Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) is
frequently cited as deciding whether the Court had appellate jurisdiction over
state court criminal cases brought up by writ of error, but the case dealt with an
appeal from an ejectment action, not even remotely a criminal case in early 21st
century usage. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) dealt with an
error proceeding from a state court decision to "convict" the accused of violating a
state law and imposing a fine. Various counsel argued to the Court about
whether the case was a misdemeanor criminal prosecution or was a civil action
for the recovery of a penalty. The Court did not decide the jurisdictional question
on that point.
The Court held early in its existence that it had no appellate jurisdiction to
review federal criminal cases. See United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 159
(1805); Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38 (1822).
33. Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1868), delivered April 5, 1868,
announced as one holding of the case that the Judiciary Act of 1789, section 25,
did confer upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state court crimi-
nal decisions when brought up by writ of error. Twitchell's other holdings, that
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution did not apply to the
states, simply followed settled law on the point. Had Twitchell come up after
July 9, 1868, we might have had entirely different results, but, of course, we will
never know.
34. Which is a different matter than saying the ratification created an immediate
rush to invoke the possibilities it created. Experienced judges would recognize
the accuracy of the observation that new developments in law generally take
some time to settle into the practicing bar's collective mind before the bar com-
mences very many actions flowing from the new developments. Ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, like adoption of the Constitution itself, needed fer-
mentation time before very many folks started using it in litigation. Using a
written Constitution in litigation was a novel idea in 1787; litigation use of the
Fourteenth Amendment was a novel idea in 1868.
35. See ORELD, supra note 24.
36. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
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v. Allen,37 decided in 1953, has been credited with expanding the
scope of federal habeas corpus from its formerly narrow focus on juris-
dictional error to state prisoners' claims of federal constitutional
error.
38
A. Federalization of Constitutional Criminal Procedure
Generally speaking, all the states' own constitutions, statutes, or
common law included some form of criminal procedural rights, appli-
cable to the pretrial and trial stages of criminal cases. These procedu-
ral rights included the right to confront and cross-examine the
prosecution's witnesses, to receive a copy of the charging instrument
before trial, compulsory process, and freedom from compelled self-
incrimination.
By the 1960s, after less than ninety years of reviewing applications
for writs of error and petitions for certiorari from state criminal con-
victs, and dealing with selected state cases on their merits, it must
have become apparent to the United States Supreme Court that many
of the state courts simply ignored their own state constitutions, as
well as the correlative legal concepts embodied in the United States
Constitution. The Supreme Court could not order state courts to fol-
low their state constitutions nor tell the state courts what their state
constitutions meant. The Supreme Court, however, could federalize
constitutional criminal procedure by applying against the states,
through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, federal con-
cepts of due process and selected provisions of the federal Bill of
Rights.39
The United States Supreme Court can adopt only the minimum
constitutional floors below which the states cannot descend. The
states remain free to adopt higher independent state constitutional
37. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
38. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Reflections on Reform of§ 2254 Habeas Petitions,
18 HoFSTRA L. Rav. 1005, 1008 (1990). Further discussion of the development of
federal habeas corpus/post-conviction relief actions lies outside the scope of this
article. Interested readers may consult the following additional cases for various
of the Court's expansions and restrictions on the use of federal habeas as a start-
ing point for further research. See Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); Butler v
McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1990); Marshall v.
Lonberger, 259 U.S. 422 (1983); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Rose v.
Lundy, 455 U.S. 559 (1982); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Sanders v. U.S.,
373 U.S. 1 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 745 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963); Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
39. The problem has been described as one of "how much does the United States
Supreme Court trust state courts to protect federal constitutional rights of state
criminal defendants" with one potential answer of "more than before, but not
completely." Had the state courts adequately protected even state constitutional
rights of state criminal defendants, the Court's anxiety over the quality of state
courts' work could have been alleviated.
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standards. There is considerable room to doubt the states ever would
have invigorated or re-invigorated their state constitutions' criminal
procedure provisions without authoritative urging from somewhere.
Although slightly overstating, thus was born the federalization of con-
stitutional criminal procedure.40
One major drawback of the twentieth century federalization of con-
stitutional criminal procedure has been the failure of the states to in-
vigorate (or, in the cases of some of the states, to re-invigorate) and
apply their state constitutions' criminal procedural rights. Of course,
a few states have done just that, but only in reaction to a more recent
perceived Supreme Court effort to reduce federal protections.
In reality, the Court started its federalization of constitutional
criminal procedure project in the late nineteenth century in a series of
decisions using a due process approach of fundamental fairness. The
Court continued along that route until it reached the right to counsel,
and then eased its way into selective incorporation of several provi-
sions of the federal Bill of Rights. The Court nearly completed its pro-
ject through a series of 1960s decisions; all preceded and accompanied
by intertwined, yet separate, lines of decisions dealing with other gen-
eral due process matters.
In the 1960s criminal procedure series, the Court applied the
Fourth Amendment's search and seizure protections against the
states, enforced by exclusion of tainted evidence. 41 Next came appli-
cation of the Eighth Amendments prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment.42 Then came the right to appointed counsel in non-capi-
tal felony cases.43 Soon after came application against the states of
the Fifth Amendment's immunity from compulsory self-incrimina-
tion.44 Next, the Court applied against the states the Sixth Amend-
ment's right to confront one's accusers.45 Then came the federal
constitutional rights to a speedy trial46 and to compulsory process. 47
Next, the Court imposed on the states a federal right to trial byjury.48
The last of the 1960s series of criminal procedure cases applied the
Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause against the states.49
40. This article will not explore the development of the incorporation doctrine.
41. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
42. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
43. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The right to counsel had already
been applied to the states under a due process analysis beginning with Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), which upheld a right to counsel in a capital felony
case.
44. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
45. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
46. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
47. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
48. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
49. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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Only in 1970, in a juvenile case, with Chief Justice Warren gone
and Chief Justice Burger at the helm,5 0 did the Court finally declare
specifically that federal constitutional due process of law requires the
states to apply the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in all
criminal cases.5 1 The Court did not rule until 1975 that the right to
present a closing argument or summation to the fact finder, whether
judge or jury, is a right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.52
Of course, the Court needed some mechanism by which it could
monitor the state courts' compliance with its federalization of criminal
procedure. The Court could not simply order state courts to comply
with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court
located its tool and announced its new monitoring system in Boykin v.
Alabama.53 The pleas of guilty and no contest 5 4 had been around for
a long time before 1969,55 but the torrent of American appellate cases
originating in the state courts and presenting plea-related problems
developed only after, and, at least partially, as a direct consequence of
Boykin.56
50. Chief Justice Warren took his retirement from the Court on June 23, 1969, three
weeks after the Court released Boykin. Chief Justice Burger took his oath of
office the same day. See OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 982 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
51. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). If federal due process did not require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases, the Court probably would
have been very hard-pressed to find a constitutional basis upon which to inter-
vene in juvenile court delinquency proceedings. By 1970, no one seriously
doubted the fundamental importance of the standard of proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. It came as a surprise that the Court had not declared proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in criminal prosecutions an element of due process much ear-
lier, probably because so many earlier decisions, all cited in Winship, had re-
solved so many closely related issues, including issues relating to the burden of
proof, without ever declaring the standard of proof a matter of constitutional
substance.
52. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
53. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
54. See, e.g., Edward Lane-Reticker, Nolo Contendere in North Carolina, 34 N.C. L.
REv. 280 (1956); Nathan B. Lenvin & Ernest S. Meyers, Nolo Contendere: Its Na-
ture and Implications, 51 YALE. L.J. 1255 (1942); Patrick W. Healey, Note, The
Nature and Consequences of the Plea of Nolo Contendere, 33 NEB. L. REV. 428
(1954). For a full discussion of the plea of no contest in all the states see C.T.
Drechsler, Annot., Plea of Nolo Contendere or Non Vult Contendere, 89 A.L.R.2d
54 (1963), supplementing, LA. Drechsler, Annot., Plea ofNolo Contendere or Non
Vult Contendere, 152 A.L.R. 253 (1944).
A search for pre-1954 Nebraska cases dealing with no contest pleas will not
produce results. No contest was not a permissible plea in Nebraska until L.B.
135, 65th Sess. (Neb. 1953) took effect.
55. The plea of no contest had been around for roughly 600 years, but has produced
very little case law. See Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926); see also
supra note 54 (citing additional authorities).
56. Neither infractions nor ordinance violations, which carry no possible imprison-
ment as authorized sentences, nor cases processed through the plea by waiver
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B. Right to Counsel Cases on Appeal: Denial of the Right to
Counsel and the Fundamental Fairness Approach
With respect to the role of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
vis-a-vis the validity of criminal convictions, the United States Su-
preme Court has produced two, inextricably intertwined lines of cases
over the years. One line deals exclusively with denial of the right to
counsel, both actual and presumptive denial, and the coordinate line
of cases requires appointed counsel for indigents.5 7 The main policy
consideration involved in all of the right to counsel cases has been the
extent to which convictions entered against defendants following deni-
als of the right to counsel can be considered reliable convictions.
Ensuring equal protection of the law and due process of law, as the
two Fourteenth Amendment clauses relate to the federal constitu-
tional right to counsel, have provided the Court's motivating policy
considerations involved in the appointed counsel for indigents cases.
The primary reason for interest in these lines of cases for purposes of
this article lies in the proposition that compliance with the right to
counsel can be, or is considered, a matter of fundamental importance
and an element of subject matter jurisdiction.
Powell v. Alabama,5 8 a capital rape case,5 9 produced one of the
Court's earliest decisions relating to the right to counsel in a state
criminal case. The state courts had found no violation of their state
constitutional and statutory guarantees of the right to counsel. The
facts surrounding the appointment of counsel and the inordinate rush
system are considered in any depth in this article. Pleas by waiver generally
would not satisfy the minimum standards for imprisonment cases. Pleas by
waiver are not accompanied by a personal examination by a judge nor an explicit,
on the record, judicial finding on the existence of a factual basis. The record
showing of counsel or waiver would not suffice for subsequent enhancement on
pleas by waiver. At least one court, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
has approved the use of guilty pleas by waiver to summary offenses (maximum
jail time 90 days) for use in enhancement of subsequent offenses (up to 2 years
jail). See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 507 A.2d 57 (Pa. 1986).
57. See Nichol v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994)(denying counsel); Baldasar v.
Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980), reh'g denied, 447 U.S. 930 (1980) (denying counsel
by allowing conviction for misdemeanor without counsel to be used to enhance
sentence in subsequent conviction); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)(denying
counsel); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)(denying counsel); Loper v.
Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972)(denying counsel); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.
443 (1972)(denying right to counsel where there was no advice of right to counsel
and no waiver of counsel); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967)(denying counsel
presumptively where record was silent on counsel or waiver); Douglas v Califor-
nia, 372 U.S. 353, 356-75 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)(de-
nying counsel for indigent in a non-capital felony); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)(denying counsel with admonition
to create a paper trail); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
58. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
59. White alleged victims and black alleged assailants.
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to trial indicated otherwise, but, of course, the United States Supreme
Court could do nothing about the state courts' interpretation and ap-
plication of state law. The Court determined that the right to ap-
pointed counsel in a state, capital, criminal case is a question covered
by due process of law. That determination allowed the Court to inter-
vene under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the opinion by Justice
Sutherland,6o the Court ruled:
[In a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble
mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the [trial] court, whether
requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due
process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such time
or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the
preparation and trial of the case. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the
fundamental postulate... "that there are certain immutable principles ofjus-
tice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the
Union may disregard."6 1
The Court specifically limited its Powell ruling to capital cases in
which the accused, for whatever reason, might be unable to employ
counsel. Powell represents one of the Court's "fundamental fairness"
cases.
A habeas challenge to a federal court conviction, Johnson v.
Zerbst,62 then laid the groundwork for innumerable future federal
constitutional rights waiver cases. Johnson had been convicted of pos-
sessing and passing counterfeit money and sentenced to four and one-
half years in the federal penitentiary, apparently with no prior crimi-
nal record. He had counsel before the commissioner who bound him
over to the grand jury, but could not afford counsel for the trial and
could not make bail. The trial judge asked only if Johnson had a law-
yer. Johnson's response was he did not. When asked if he was ready
for trial, Johnson answered that he was. The trial judge did not ad-
vise Johnson of his right to counsel nor of his right to appointed coun-
sel nor did the trial judge make a record of Johnson's knowledge of
those rights or of an express waiver of counsel.63 The trial judge also
made no finding on the record of a waiver of counsel. The Court noted
that the average, non-lawyer, criminal defendant "requires the guid-
ing hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him" and
ruled that "[tihe Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in
60. A well known "conservative" justice. Justices Butler and McReynolds dissented
from Powell.
61. 287 U.S. at 71-72 (internal citation omitted). Justice Sutherland has been de-
scribed as a natural law/natural rights jurisprudent of note. See HADLEY ARKEs,
THE REUrn OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A JURISPRUDENCE OF NATRAL
RIGHTS (1994).
62. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Justice Black wrote for the Court. Justice Reed concurred
without opinion. Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented without opinions.
Justice Cardozo took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
63. See id. at 460.
[Vol. 79:293
NEBRASKA PLEA-BASED CONVICTIONS
all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an ac-
cused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of
counsel."64
On the question of waiver, the Court reminded readers of its ear-
lier positions that courts indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver of fundamental rights and do not presume acquies-
cence in the loss of fundamental rights as a lead-in to its famous line:
"A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege."6 5 The Court taught further that the
right of an accused to counsel
invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court in which the accused... is
without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the... responsibility upon the
trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent
waiver by the accused. While an accused may waive the right to counsel,
whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial
court... upon the record. 66
Relief by the collateral attack mode, habeas or otherwise, tradition-
ally can be granted only against void judgments. Precious few things
make a judgment void-lack of jurisdiction happens to be one of them.
Federal habeas corpus, at the time of Johnson, could be used to in-
quire into both the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court and its
personal jurisdiction over the defendant through evidence outside of
the trial record. The Court declared compliance with the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of the assistance of counsel an essential pre-
requisite to the subject matter jurisdiction of federal trial courts in
criminal cases. A proper waiver would remove the assistance of coun-
sel from the jurisdictional element category. However, if an accused is
not represented and has not competently and intelligently waived
counsel, then "the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to
a valid conviction and sentence."6 7 A federal trial court loses its juris-
diction when it declines to appoint counsel for an accused who is una-
ble to obtain counsel. A judgment entered without jurisdiction is
void. 68 Nothing in the Court's opinion explained how denial of counsel
became a jurisdictional element. The Court simply declared it to be
SO.
64. Id. at 463.
65. Id. at 464.
66. Id. at 465.
67. Id. at 467.
68. See id. at 468. The Court ruled this way despite the presumption of regularity it
traditionally (and consistently before this case) recognized as applying in the col-
lateral attack context. To compensate for the ouster of the presumption of regu-
larity, the Court placed on the collateral petitioner the burden of proving by the
greater weight of the evidence (newer form of the description, "preponderance of
the evidence") that the petitioner was tried without counsel and without a compe-
tent and intelligent waiver of counsel. See id. at 468-69.
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Johnson v. Zerbst illustrates the strictness of a direct application of
a constitutional right against the offending government, as opposed to
the flexibility of the fundamental fairness/due process approach used
in Powell.69 Powell did not fully reveal the extent of the flexibility the
Court intended in the right to counsel area, but did leave the opening
for filling out the idea in later cases. The Court fleshed out the flexi-
bility of the concept with Betts v. Brady,70 the Court's next collateral
attack on a state court criminal conviction based on alleged denial of
counsel. The challenged conviction was for a non-capital felony and
race was not involved.
Betts had requested appointed counsel and did not waive the de-
nial of counsel, but did waive a jury trial. The defendant had been able
to cross-examine, to present witnesses of his own, and to briefly argue
his defense to the robbery charge. His efforts at defending himself
earned him an eight-year prison sentence. The denial of counsel fol-
lowed the local court's practice of appointing counsel only in murder
and rape cases. Because the case attacked a state court's judgment,
the majority refused to apply the Sixth Amendment directly, opting
instead to continue applying to state cases its fundamental fairness,
totality of all the circumstances approach. 71 Justice Roberts, writing
for the majority, explained:
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, as
such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment, although a de-
nial by a state of rights or privileges specifically embodied in that and others
of the first eight amendments may, in certain circumstances, or in connection
with other elements, operate, in a given case, to deprive a litigant of due pro-
cess ... [under] the Fourteenth. Due process ... formulates a concept less
rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a matter of rule.
7 2
In order to constitute a due process violation, Justice Roberts indi-
cated the majority required the totality of the circumstances to show a
denial of fundamental fairness "shocking to the universal sense ofjus-
tice."73 In its concluding paragraph, the majority expressed the limits
of its Betts decision:
[Tihe Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and incarceration of
one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness
and right, and while want of counsel in a particular case may result in a con-
viction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the amend-
ment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any
court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not
represented by counsel. 7 4
69. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
70. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
71. See id. at 462.
72. Id. at 461-62.
73. Id. at 462.
74. Id. at 473. The majority's examples of such offensive procedures included Powell
and Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941), the Nebraska state habeas corpus
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action which the Nebraska Supreme Court felt did not merit an opinion, but
which the Betts majority described as a case involving a denial of counsel and
alleging "other facts which, if established, would prove that the trial was a mere
sham and pretense." 316 U.S. at 464. Of course, there had been no trial in
O'Grady; it was a plea-based conviction case (who would expect Supreme Court
justices to remember that minor detail a whole year after they issued their deci-
sion, anyway), but the procedures used left more than a little to be desired, espe-
cially in terms of obedience of state constitutional and statutory law, not to
mention the violations of federal constitutional law.
Students of legal argument, note the argumentation devices (overstating the
issue and the parade of horribles) the majority used in Betts when responding to
the petitioner's argument:
The petitioner... asks us, in effect, to apply a rule in the enforcement of
the due process clause. He says the rule to be deduced from our former
decisions is that, in every case, whatever the circumstances, one charged
with crime, who is unable to obtain counsel, must be furnished counsel
by the state. Expressions in the opinions of this court lend color to the
argument, but, as the petitioner admits, none of our decisions squarely
adjudicates the question now presented.
Betts, 316 U.S. at 462-463.
As a matter of sound advocacy, if that was petitioner's argument, petitioner
asked for too much. Petitioner stood before the Court (figuratively) as a poor
man, convicted of a non-capital felony after the trial court denied his request for
appointed counsel. The issue argued to the Court needed to be kept to the narrow
facts before the Court.
The majority held steadfastly to the overly broad road petitioner's argument
gave them:
The question we are now to decide is whether due process of law de-
mands that in every criminal case, whatever the circumstances, a State
must furnish counsel to an indigent defendant. Is the furnishing of
counsel in all cases whatever dictated by natural, inherent, and funda-
mental principles of fairness?
Id. at 464.
The Court was not ready to declare the right to counsel to be a fundamental
right and counsel missed the cues the Court had been giving in its earlier deci-
sions. The majority kept at the exaggerated argument to the end, with assistance
in his opinion from the state judge who had denied habeas and with encourage-
ment from the overly broad argument:
To deduce from the due process clause a rule binding upon the States in
this matter would be to impose upon them, as Judge Bond [the Chief
Judge of the Maryland Court of Appeals, who sat alone in the state
habeas action] points out, a requirement without distinction between
criminal charges of different magnitude or in respect of courts of varying
jurisdiction. As he says: "Charges of small crimes tried before justices of
the peace and capital charges tried in the higher courts would equally
require the appointment of counsel. Presumably it would be argued that
trials in the Traffic Court would require it." And, indeed, it was said by
petitioner's counsel both below and in this court, that as the Fourteenth
Amendment extends the protection of due process to property as well as
to life and liberty, if we hold with the petitioner, logic would require the
furnishing of counsel in civil cases involving property.
Id. at 473.
With that no longer just overbroad, but, by the end, unreasonably overbroad
(appointed counsel for civil cases), argument being pressed by petitioner's coun-
sel, dissenting Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy could not hold any of the
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Another advocacy consideration Betts presents relates to the deci-
sion-makers' backgrounds. Arguing that trial judges conducting
bench trials of criminal cases cannot provide fair trials to pro se de-
fendants under any circumstances, no matter how petty the charges
tried, just might produce different emotional responses from former
trial judges or former prosecutors than it would from appellate judges
with no trial judging experience and no prosecutorial experience.
Judge Bond made a point of that in his opinion and Justice Roberts
included Judge Bond's point in his majority opinion.75 Betts does not
really prove this point, but does lend enough support to the point, be-
cause two of the dissenters had prosecutorial experience and trial
judging experience, while four of the majority had prosecutorial
experience. 7 6
The fundamental fairness approach, a fact intensive, case by case
approach, does not assign to the denial of counsel in state criminal
proceedings the same jurisdictional role under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause that the Court assigned to denial of coun-
sel in direct application federal cases.
For twenty-five more years, Betts allowed state courts to apply only
a diluted right to counsel in state cases, while the Supreme Court held
the federal government strictly accountable for compliance with a
fully fortified right to counsel. In Gideon v. Wainwright,7 7 a slightly
divided Supreme Court overruled Betts, making the federal constitu-
tional right to the assistance of counsel directly applicable to the
states. The due process filter was removed. Under Gideon, trying a
majority justices to the narrower question actually presented by the facts of the
case, as the dissenters tried valiantly to do.
Notice also the point that the Court was being asked to impose a federal re-
quirement on the states. The federalism issue always presents itself in examina-
tions of a state's compliance with federal law. In 1942, federalism was a bigger
issue than it has become, although recently federalism has again become a big
issue in some legal areas. Further, the fiscal impact on the states and localities of
appointing counsel for all offenses and for civil cases would not fail to produce
some response.
When one serves as an advocate, if one wants a fair shot at what one considers
a correct answer, one absolutely must ask the correct question! Asking courts for
far more of an extension or reduction of a legal principle or far more or less relief
or remedy than the case requires can seriously risk getting even less than the
case deserves. Betts illustrates the point.
75. See Betts, 316 U.S. at 459.
76. See id. at 472 & n.31.
77. 372 U.S. 335 (1963)(slightly divided, meaning all 9 justices joined in the result,
with three justices writing separate concurring opinions, although Justice Doug-
las' concurrence could be considered an emphatic agreement with the majority




person for any felony, unless the defendant had counsel or had validly
waived counsel, violates the federal Constitution.7 8
Two years before Gideon, in a less heralded case, Hamilton v. Ala-
bama,7 9 a unanimous Supreme Court had already changed the
Court's position on appointed counsel before arraignment in state fel-
ony cases in states whose arraignments could be classified as critical
stages of criminal cases.8 0
A state's arraignment procedure can pose defendants with the
need to make critical, potentially irreversible decisions at that time. A
plea to the general issue at arraignment can result in procedural bars
to challenging defects in the charging instrument. This same plea can
also result in procedural bars to challenging the systematic exclusion
of one racial group from grand jury lists and other improprieties in the
drawing of grand juries, pleading insanity, pleas in abatement, and a
host of other critical defense issues. Defendants face the same, and
possibly even worse, pitfalls in going to arraignment without the ad-
vice and assistance of counsel that they do in going to trial. The pit-
falls that can be presented at arraignments formed a major point in
the Hamilton Court's reasoning.8 '
Still, Hamilton did not make clear that improper denial of the as-
sistance of counsel could result in a jurisdictional problem for the trial
court. Gideon made it so, but the Gideon Court did not say it had
made it so. In 1967, the Court took a step it said was necessary to
prevent the erosion of the Gideon rule in Burgett v. Texas.8 2 The rem-
edy the Court applied in Burgett created the basis for later challenges
to prior convictions claiming right to counsel violations.
In Burgett's felony jury trial, combined with his recidivist trial, the
state sought to use for sentence enhancement four prior felony convic-
tions and told the jury of the prior convictions at the opening of the
trial, a permissible tactic in Texas recidivist procedure at the time.8 3
The trial court eventually excluded all but one prior conviction.8 4 The
one admissible prior conviction record was ambiguous on the question
of whether the defendant had counsel at that trial.
78. See id. at 344.
79. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
80. Of which Nebraska is one.
81. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
82. 389 U.S. 109 (1967). The majority opinion was endorsed by five justices and
joined by Chief Justice Warren, who wrote a separate concurrence for the pur-
pose of responding to the dissent. Thus, on a count of opinions, it was a 5-1-3
vote, but after reading the 1, it becomes a 6-3 decision.
83. See id. at 111.
84. That action left the state unable to seek sentence enhancement with only one
admissible prior conviction, but the jury had been told of four and were then told
to ignore what they had been told. See id. at 113.
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The Court ruled that the one conviction record considered admissi-
ble by the state trial court raised, on its face, a presumption that the
defendant had suffered a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel at the earlier trial. The Court made this presumption because the
conviction record did not clearly show defendant had counsel or val-
idly waived counsel at that earlier trial. The majority said that admis-
sion into evidence of a prior conviction, which is constitutionally
invalid for violation of Gideon, was inherently prejudicial.8 5 In the
absence of an affirmative showing of counsel or waiver, the prior con-
viction becomes presumptively invalid,86 in order to prevent the sec-
ond infliction of the earlier denial of counsel in the later enhancement
proceeding.S7 For the purposes of this article, Burgett was the last of
the relevant right to counsel cases the Warren Court produced, but far
from the last Supreme Court right to counsel case requiring
discussion.
The Burger Court started producing relevant right to counsel cases
with United States v. Tucker. 8S Tucker was a proceeding on a motion
to vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence imposed in 1953 on
a conviction of armed bank robbery, a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 collateral at-
tack. Tucker's three prior felony convictions, including a 1938 Florida
conviction, a 1946 Louisiana conviction, and a 1950 Florida conviction,
were used for impeachment of Tucker's alibi defense testimony, and
the sentencing judge gave explicit consideration to all three convic-
tions in imposing a twenty-five year maximum sentence in the 1953
case. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, noted:
Several years later [apparently after the 1953 sentencing] it was conclusively
determined that respondent's 1938 conviction in Florida and his 1946 convic-
tion in Louisiana were constitutionally invalid. This determination was made
by the Superior Court of Alameda County, California, upon that court's find-
ing in a collateral proceeding that those convictions had resulted from pro-
ceedings in which [Tucker] had been unrepresented by counsel, and that he
had been "neither advised of his right to legal assistance nor did he intelli-
gently and understandingly waive this right to the assistance of counsel."
8 9
85. See id. at 115.
86. The Supreme Court ruled in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), that
presuming a waiver of counsel from a silent record is impermissible and also said
the record must show the accused was offered counsel but intelligently and un-
derstandingly rejected the offer. See id. at 516. Anything less does not show a
waiver of counsel. See id. Thus, anything less does not show the trial court had
jurisdiction.
87. See Burgett, 389 U.S. at 114-115.
88. 404 U.S. 443 (1972)(Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun dissented; Jus-
tices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate).
89. Id. at 444-45 (emphasis added). The superior court's decision was unreported,
but the Tucker Court cited to In re Tucker, 409 P.2d 921 (1966), and Tucker v.
Craven, 421 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1970), for the proposition that the accuracy of the
superior court's determination was not questioned. See Tucker, 404 U.S. at 445
n.2. The validity of the 1950 conviction had not been determined-the govern-
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Tucker claimed both that the impeachment use of the invalid priors
tainted the jury's verdict and their use by the sentencing judge invali-
dated the heavy sentence imposed.90 While the impeachment use was
error, the lower federal courts had found the error harmless, in view of
the overwhelming evidence of guilt, and the Court agreed.9 1
The effect on the validity of the sentence imposed raised a different
question in the view of the court of appeals and the Supreme Court.
The Court saw the sentence imposed on the basis of misinformation
(i.e., the invalid 1938 and 1946 convictions) as a matter of constitu-
tional magnitude. The invalidity of those priors would have presented
the sentencing judge not with the case of a man with three valid prior
felony convictions, but with the case of a man who, beginning at age
seventeen, had been imprisoned unconstitutionally for more than ten
years, serving five and a half of those years on a chain gang.92
The majority then relied on Gideon for the proposition that it is an
unconstitutional state action to try a person for a felony in state court
unless the person had a lawyer or had validly waived counsel. The
majority further relied on Burgett for the proposition that to permit a
conviction obtained in violation of Gideon to be used against a person
either to support guilt or to enhance sentence for another offense er-
odes the principle of Gideon.93 The majority saw that the only way to
prevent erosion of the Gideon principle in Tucker was to remand for
resentencing in the light of Tucker's accurate criminal history.94
Two and a half months after Tucker was released, the Court re-
leased Loper v. Beto,95 with Justice Stewart again writing for the ma-
jority. Loper was a Texas state prisoner seeking federal habeas corpus
relief from his 1947 conviction and 50-year sentence for raping his
eight-year-old stepdaughter. At his 1947 trial, the victim had been
the only witness to identify Loper as the perpetrator. Loper was the
sole defense witness and denied assaulting the victim in any way.96
Thus, credibility was an issue of some importance. The trial court al-
lowed the state to interrogate Loper on cross about his criminal his-
tory. Loper admitted in damaging detail to four prior felony
ment contended at sentencing in the 1953 case that Tucker had counsel in the
1950 case, but Tucker contended that his request for counsel had been denied.
See id. at 448 n.6.
90. See Tucker, 404 U.S. at 445.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 448.
93. See id. at 449.
94. See id.
95. 405 U.S. 473 (1972)(a 4-1-4 decision in the sense that Justice White wrote a con-
currence, but again, because of the nature of his concurrence, the decision actu-
ally was a 5-4; Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist dissented).
96. See id. at 474.
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convictions between 1931 and 1940, three in Mississippi and one in
Tennessee, all burglaries.9 7 The trial took one day and the jury con-
victed Loper and imposed the sentence.
In 1969, Loper commenced his federal habeas action. All four of
his prior felony convictions used to impeach his credibility at the 1947
trial had been obtained in violation of his right to counsel under
Gideon. He had not been afforded counsel nor advised of his right to
counsel, either retained or appointed, and he had not waived counsel.
The lower federal courts in the habeas action felt the impeachment
use of the priors was a matter of evidence law, not a constitutional
infirmity, and therefore could not be reached by a collateral attack.9 s
The Court granted certiorari in Loper only on the constitutional
question of whether the use of prior void convictions for impeachment
purposes deprives a criminal defendant of due process of law where
their use might well have influenced the outcome of the case.99 Jus-
tice Stewart reminded his readers that Tucker had applied only that
aspect of Burgett prohibiting the use of invalid priors to enhance
sentence.lOO
Loper, on the other hand, involved the use of invalid priors to sup-
port the proposition of guilt.'o' In doing so, the prosecution sought to
impeach the testifying criminal defendant's credibility, thereby imply-
ing, if not proving, guilt.l0 2 But the Loper Court noted that the relia-
bility of convictions obtained after a denial of counsel remains
impaired to the same degree when the convictions are used to impeach
a testifying defendant as when they are used as direct proof of
guilt.xos The principle of Gideon goes to the very integrity of the crim-
inal trial fact-finding process.1 0 4 Thus, the Court answered its ques-
tion. The impeachment use of void prior convictions in a felony trial,
97. See id.
98. The Supreme Court had indicated in Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2
(1963), that Gideon was wholly retroactive, and indicated in Bates v. Nelson, 393
U.S. 16 (1968), that Burgett was also retroactive. Loper made quite clear that
Burgett would be considered fully retroactive as well. Further, in Kitchens v.
Smith, 401 U.S. 847, 848 (1971), and Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513
(1962), the Court ruled that whenever the assistance of counsel is a constitutional
requirement, the right to be furnished counsel does not depend upon a request for
counsel. That rule applies to plea-based convictions as well as to convictions fol-
lowing trials. See Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
99. Loper, 405 U.S. at 480.
100. See id. at 482. The trial evidence of guilt in Tucker had been overwhelming quite
apart from the use of the prior convictions.
101. See id. at 482.
102. See id. at 483.
103. See id. As when proof of a prior felony conviction is an element of the offense
charged, for example, felon in possession of a firearm.
104. See id. at 483-84.
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where their use might well have influenced the outcome of the case,
does violate due process of law.
The Court in Loper did not expressly limit Gideon v. Wainwright to
only felony convictions, although proper application of stare decisis
would limit it to felonies. Efforts to apply Gideon to misdemeanors
eventually made their way into the Court. Argersinger v. Hamlin'0 5
made its way out of the Court in 1972. Argersinger held, again due to
the inherent unreliability of uncounseledlO6 convictions, that no per-
son may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty,
misdemeanor, or felony, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, un-
less the person was represented by counsel at trial or had validly
waived counsel.107 Scott v. IllinoisL08 revised Argersinger to restrict
the right to appointed counsel for indigent misdemeanor defendants to
only those misdemeanants who suffer actual imprisonment as a sen-
tence, not to all accused misdemeanants facing possible imprisonment
at the commencement of their cases.10 9
Baldasar v. IllinoisllO was the next in this line of cases. Baldasar
was a right to counsel decision in which the defendant's prior uncoun-
seled misdemeanor conviction was used for enhancement of a subse-
quent misdemeanor into a felony. The Court fractured into three
opinions in its 4-1-4 decision, with the concurring justice joining in the
result for his own reasons. The justices all implied it was a case in
which an indigent defendant had been denied appointed counsel in
fact, as opposed to a presumptive denial of counsel. No right, other
than the right to counsel, was involved in Baldasar.
105. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Justice Douglas wrote for the Court. Chief Justice Burger
concurred in the result and wrote separately. Justice Brennan filed a concurring
opinion in which Justices Douglas and Stewart joined. Justice Powell concurred
in the result and filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Rehnquist joined.
There were no dissents.
106. I will be using the term "uncounseled" as a short expression for a conviction or
convictions obtained after a denial of the defendant's right to the assistance of
counsel or obtained in violation of the right to counsel. I do not intend any indica-
tion that uncounseled convictions are equivalent to convictions following valid
waivers of the right to the assistance of counsel.
107. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37.
108. 440 U.S. 367 (1979). Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. Justice Powell con-
curred in a separate opinion. Justice Brennan wrote a dissent in which Justices
Marshall and Stevens joined. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissent.
109. See id. at 373-74.
110. 446 U.S. 222 (1980)(per curiam)(4-1-4 decision). Justices Stewart and Marshall
both wrote separate concurring opinions, and both were joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Stevens. Justice Blackmun concurred separately and alone. Justice Pow-
ell wrote a dissenting opinion, and was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Rehnquist, and Justice White. How one deals with a 4-1-4 decision presents an
interesting academic question. See Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of
Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLtzi. L. REv. 756 (1980).
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In May of 1975, Baldasar had been convicted, without counsel and
without a waiver of counsel, of a misdemeanor theft charge.", He
was sentenced to probation with a fine. In November of 1975, he was
charged with a new misdemeanor theft but the state sought enhance-
ment to a felony based on the May conviction. The item stolen was
worth $29.00, making the maximum possible misdemeanor sentence a
one-year term of imprisonment. At his jury trial, the defense objected
to the state's proffer of the prior conviction, claiming it was too unreli-
able given the absence of counsel or waiver. 11 2 The Circuit Court of
DuPage County, Illinois overruled the objection. Baldasar was con-
victed, his penalty was enhanced, and he was sentenced to serve a
term of one to three years in prison. The case reached the Supreme
Court on direct appeal from the enhancement case.
According to Justice Stewart's opinion, Baldasar seemed to have
been indigent at the time of the first conviction. 1 13 Justice Stewart
saw a clear violation of Scott v. Illinoisl14 in that Baldasar received an
increased term of imprisonment only because of the prior uncounseled
conviction. Justice Marshall saw the prior conviction as invalid for
the purpose of any imprisonment under Scott." 5 Thus, to Justice
Marshall, it was plain that the uncounseled prior conviction could not
be used collaterally to impose an increased term of imprisonment on a
subsequent offense.1 6 To him, the felony sentence was the direct con-
sequence of the prior uncounseled conviction." 7 Without counsel, a
conviction is too unreliable to support a sanction of imprisonment and
a prior conviction does not become more reliable when the accused is
convicted validly of a subsequent offense."18 Justices Brennan and
Stevens joined Justice Marshall on this point. "For this reason, a con-
viction which is invalid for purposes of imposing a sentence of impris-
onment for the offense itself remains invalid for purposes of increasing
a term of imprisonment for a subsequent conviction under a repeat-
offender statute."119
Justice Blackmun, the lone concurring justice, adhered to his dis-
senting position in Scott that the Court needed to adopt a bright-line,
consistent rule by merging the federal constitutional right to a jury
trial in criminal cases with the federal constitutional right to the as-
sistance of counsel in criminal cases. 1 20 The result of his proposed
111. See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 223.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 224.
114. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
115. See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 227.
116. See id. at 227-28.
117. See id. at 227.
118. See id. at 227-28.
119. Id. at 228.
120. See id. at 229-30.
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merger would be that an indigent accused would be entitled to ap-
pointed counsel for any offense punishable by more than six months'
imprisonment or any time the indigent accused should actually suffer
imprisonment on conviction.'21 Under his idea, Baldasar would have
had a right to appointed counsel in his prior conviction case, because it
was punishable by up to one year of imprisonment.122 Since Baldasar
was denied counsel in that case, the resulting conviction became inva-
lid for enhancement use in the case before the Court.
Justice Powell, writing for all four dissenters, took the administra-
tively easier position.123 He stated that if a conviction is valid for any
purpose, then it is valid for enhancement use.124 Baldasar's first of-
fense conviction was valid because it was not a felony and he was not
actually jailed.125 Baldasar created some confusion in the lower
courts,126 but then the Supreme Court "overruled" Baldasar in Nich-
ols v. United States,127 contributing to yet another chapter in the saga
of uncounseled convictions.
Nichols pleaded guilty to a federal felony drug charge.128 Under
the federal sentencing guidelines, his sentencing range was increased
from 168-210 months to 188-235 months because he had a state con-
viction of driving under the influence ("DUI") based upon his uncoun-
seled no contest plea. Nichols contended that state conviction should
not be used in the computation of his criminal history points under the
guidelines because his DUI conviction was uncounseled. In the DUI
case, Nichols was sentenced to pay a fine with no jail term. The Court
adhered to its Scott rule that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction
is a valid conviction under the Sixth Amendment, so long as imprison-
ment is not actually imposed, even though imprisonment may be an
authorized sanction. In Nichols, the Court took the next logical step
and ruled that uncounseled misdemeanor convictions, valid under
Scott, can be relied upon to enhance the sentence for a subsequent
offense, even though the enhanced sentence includes imprison-
121. See id.
122. See id. at 230 (implying indigence at the time of the first conviction).
123. See id.
124. See id. at 231-33.
125. See id. at 231.
126. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 742-45 (1994).
127. 511 U.S. 738 (1994). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. Justice Souter
concurred in the judgment with a separate opinion in which he first pointed out
the fractured Baldasar decision properly could not be considered as precedential
for any proposition, since a majority of the justices (5) had not been able to find a
common ground for agreement on anything-as a result, there was nothing to
"overrule." Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ste-
vens and Ginsburgjoined. Justice Ginsburg also filed a separate dissent. The 5-
1-3 decision reflected a slightly less fractured Court.
128. See id. at 740.
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ment.12 9 The majority felt the difference between sentence enhance-
ments by criminal history point accumulations or by application of
recidivist sentencing statutes made no difference, because neither ap-
proach changes the penalty imposed for the earlier offense.i3 0
The Court's allocation of the burden of inquiring into defendants'
right to counsel deserves special emphasis here. The United States
Supreme Court has not allocated to defendants the burden to ask for
counsel. Rather, the Court has allocated to arraigning and trial courts
the burden of inquiring into each unrepresented defendant's desire for
and ability to obtain counsel.' 3 1 The Court has also allocated the duty
to supply counsel to defendants who want, but cannot obtain, counsel
in all felony prosecutions and in misdemeanor prosecutions in which
sentences of imprisonment actually are imposed.
Each of the Supreme Court's right to counsel cases reviewed thus
far have had their impacts on criminal procedure in Nebraska and
every other state. The definition and extent of the impact any one
decision has made varies. Certainly Gideon must be considered to
have had a major impact in non-capital felony cases. Scott created a
number of smaller impacts depending upon the local variables courts
face across a state. Nichols likely will be second only to Gideon in the
degree of its impact. Nichols affects both misdemeanor and felony
cases. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, however, provides only
one of the many federal constitutional bases upon which state court
plea-based convictions may be declared invalid. The other bases, all of
which receive less exacting scrutiny from the United States Supreme
Court, are discussed in the next part of this article.
C. General Validity of Plea-Based Convictions Under United
States Supreme Court Cases
The United States Supreme Court's other major line of cases deal-
ing with the validity of plea-based convictions entered in state courts
deal with all the other federal constitutional rights of the criminally
accused, the knowledge that must be imparted to the accused, and the
absence of coercion or improper inducements.' 3 2 In this line of cases,
129. See id. at 746-47.
130. See id. at 747.
131. See Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847 (1971); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506
(1962); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
132. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998)(actual voluntariness); Marshall
v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983)(actual voluntariness); Henderson v. Morgan,
426 U.S. 637 (1976)(actual voluntariness); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970)(actual voluntariness); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970)(actual
voluntariness); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)(actual voluntari-
ness); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)(presumptively involuntary in ab-
sence of paper trail required of state courts); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.
459 (1969)(presumptively involuntary in absence of required paper trail under
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the Court concerned itself with whether the pleas tendered were vol-
untary pleas. Pleas were considered voluntary if the defendants knew
the relevant considerations before tendering their pleas and tendered
their pleas of their own free will. After all, even involuntary pleas can
represent reliable admissions of guilt in the same sense that even un-
reliable admissions of guilt can be voluntary admissions in the federal
constitutional sense.13 3 This line of cases can be further subdivided
into cases dealing with the actual voluntariness of pleas and cases
dealing with the paper trail requisite to presumptive voluntariness of
pleas.134 The questions involved are different. Obtaining the correct
answer depends upon asking the correct question, both in the volun-
tary/reliable context and in the actually voluntary/presumptively vol-
untary context. 13 5
Kercheval v. United States'36 involved the admissibility of a guilty
plea the trial court allowed the accused to withdraw at the eventual
jury trial on the substituted not guilty plea. En route to ruling the
withdrawn plea was inadmissible at trial, the Court, in a unanimous
opinion written by Justice Butler,'3 7 made several statements charac-
terizing the plea of guilty, which frequently have been cited as correct
statements of the law even though they were dicta, or even less, just
expressive gloss:
A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an
extra-judicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it is
conclusive. More is not required; the court has nothing to do but give judg-
ment and sentence. Out of just consideration for persons accused of crime,
courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made vol-
untarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the
consequences. 13 8
Justice Butler's "just concern" for criminal defendants grew into the
requirement for acceptance of valid pleas and the required plea pro-
ceeding records this article examines.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962)(actual
voluntariness); cf. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927)(admissibility
of prior withdrawn plea).
133. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986)(holding in part that voluntari-
ness of confession under federal constitution and reliability of confession are dif-
ferent questions: reliability is a state law matter; voluntariness under
Fourteenth Amendment is a federal law matter).
134. A few of the Court's cases dealing with the validity of plea-based federal convic-
tions will need some discussion due to their relationship with the state cases.
135. As in so many other areas of the law.
136. 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
137. Another well-known "conservative" justice.
138. 274 U.S. at 223.
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1. Voluntariness of Pleas
Machibroda v. United States3 9 involved pleas of guilty tendered
by a defendant with retained counsel. Machibroda claimed, in a col-
lateral attacki40 filed two and a half years after sentence, that the
guilty pleas had been induced by the prosecuting attorney's promises
of a total combined sentence not exceeding twenty years. The trial
court imposed consecutive sentences of twenty-five years and fifteen
years.' 4 ' The district judge before whom the later section 2255 peti-
tion was filed was also the arraigning and sentencing judge in the
challenged case. The district judge denied a hearing on the petition.
The Supreme Court vacated the district court's ruling and remanded
for a full evidentiary hearing. Justice Stewart wrote for the Court
that "[a] guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it
of the character of a voluntary act, is void. A conviction based on such
a plea is open to collateral attack."i42
The concept of threats depriving a plea of its voluntary character is
clear enough.14 3 The concept of promises depriving a plea of its char-
acter as a voluntary act creates interesting possibilities for discussion
on what sorts of promises can be considered improper promises, but
would carry us too far astray for purposes of this article.i44 Obvi-
ously, some promises will deprive the plea of its validity necessary to
support a conviction, and some promises will not negatively affect the
validity of a plea-based conviction.i 45 A fairly good (but certainly far
from foolproof) barometer for the acceptability of prosecution promises
or inducements resulting in pleas lies in the case law on what sorts of
139. 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
140. Brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
141. See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. at 488.
142. Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
143. See, e.g., Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
144. Prosecutor promises usually center around charge reductions, charge dismissals,
declining to charge known criminal conduct, and sentence recommendations or
other sentence-related concessions (the prosecutor's selection of charge can bind
the court on sentence possibilities), although frequently other areas can become
the subjects of prosecutor promises. We will not explore this area any further in
this article.
145. See infra text accompanying notes 168-171 for more on this issue. Within the
context of an appeal from a denial of leave to withdraw a guilty plea, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court has indicated a number of defects that could invalidate a
plea-based conviction, which also give us insight into what factors the supreme
court might consider:
[Lleave should ordinarily be given to withdraw a plea of guilty if it was
[tendered] by mistake or under a misconception of the nature of the
charge; through a misunderstanding as to its effect; through fear, fraud,
or official misrepresentation; was [tendered] involuntarily for any rea-
son; or even where it was [tendered] inadvisedly, if any reasonable
ground is offered for going to the jury.
State v. Journey, 186 Neb. 556, 557, 184 N.W.2d 616, 617 (1971).
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promises render confessions involuntary. Generally, a particular
promise that would render a confession involuntary most likely would
have the same effect on a guilty or no contest plea. But many plea
bargain promises would defeat the admissibility of a confession, while
maintaining the validity of a plea. Prosecution promises that do not
invalidate resulting confessions probably do not invalidate resulting
guilty or no contest pleas.146
It is noteworthy that neither Justice Butler in Kercheval nor Jus-
tice Stewart in Machibroda felt a need to base their statements re-
quiring a voluntary act to tender a guilty plea on any particular legal
source. Apparently the concept was so settled by the common law that
by the 1920s, the Supreme Court considered the point intuitively obvi-
ous.1 4 7 Counsel must seek to persuade. Thus, counsels' choice of
wording can become very important. The Court discovered by 1969
that the point may not have been so clear even in the lower federal
courts, where a conflict had developed about what was required by
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court then
set out in McCarthy v. United States'48 to resolve the conflict.
2. Paper Trail Requisite to Presumptive Voluntariness of Pleas
McCarthy had been convicted of one count of federal tax evasion on
his negotiated guilty plea.149 He was represented at arraignment by
retained counsel. Defense counsel told the court he had advised Mc-
146. The day has long passed when any promise would invalidate a confession, but,
again, that subject lies outside the scope of this article.
147. As it should have been, given plea practice had been around for centuries, includ-
ing plea bargaining of a sort. See Edward Lane-Reticker, Nolo Contendere in
North Carolina, 34 N.C. L. REv. 280 (1956); John H. Langbein, Understanding
the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 L. & Soc'Y REv. 261 (1979); Nathan B.
Lenvin & Ernest S. Meyers, Nolo Contendere: Its Nature and Implications, 51
YALE L.J. 1255 (1942); Patrick W. Healey, Note, The Nature and Consequences of
the Plea of Nolo Contendere, 33 NEB. L. REv. 428 (1954)
I credit University of Nebraska College of Law Professor Stephen Kalish,
property law class, 1972-73 academic year, for introducing me to the phrase "in-
tuitively obvious."
An advocacy point should be made here: I strongly suggest that, unless coun-
sel has developed a relationship with a judge such that counsel knows the judge's
personality and temperament well enough to know what one can and what one
should not say to that judge on the bench in session, counsel should not respond
to a judge's questions by telling the judge that the answers should be intuitively
obvious. Counsel once said that to me on the bench. I, myself, once, and never
again, said to a judge on the bench in response to his comment, "Judge XXX, you
know better than that." I lost that case. Those sorts of comments hardly serve
the purposes of persuasive advocacy.
148. 394 U.S. 459 (1969)(8-1-0 decision-Justice Black concurred separately solely be-
cause he would have reversed on the simple ground that the district court did not
comply with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, rather than using supervisory power).
149. See id. at 460-62.
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Carthy of the consequences of a plea. The district judge inquired of
McCarthy whether he understood a guilty plea waived his right to a
jury trial and subjected him to the maximum possible imprisonment
and fine.' 5 0 At the prosecutor's urging, the judge also inquired of Mc-
Carthy whether his tender of a guilty plea had been induced by
threats or promises. McCarthy responded that his plea decision was
not the product of either and that he tendered his plea of his own
volition.5i
At sentencing, McCarthy claimed his failure to pay his taxes had
not been deliberate, but resulted from his poor health. Defense coun-
sel emphasized to the court that McCarthy was sixty-five years old, in
poor health, had kept his books in a neglectful and inadvertent
method during a period when he had been suffering from a very seri-
ous drinking problem.' 5 2 The district judge imposed a sentence of
one-year imprisonment and a fine of $2,500, well within the statutory
range. When asked to suspend the sentence, the district judge ex-
pressed that his impression from the pre-sentence report was that the
defendant's method of keeping his books had not been inadvertent and
refused to suspend the sentence. The Supreme Court, finding the dis-
trict judge had accepted the plea without fully complying with Rule
11, reversed the conviction and allowed defendant to plead anew as
the proper remedy.' 5 3
Chief Justice Warren asserted that the decision was not a constitu-
tional decision, but was purely an exercise of its supervisory power
over the lower federal courts.' 5 4 Chief Justice Warren proceeded with
a full explanation of what Rule 11 requires. He explained that Rule
11 had two purposes. First, to assist the district judges in making the
constitutionally required determination that a defendant's guilty plea
is truly voluntary. Second, to assure the production of a complete re-
cord at the time the plea is accepted of the arraigning court's coverage
of the factors relevant to the voluntariness determination. 55
The Chief Justice explained the genesis of Rule 11 lay in the na-
ture of a guilty plea. He wrote:
A defendant who enters such a plea simultaneously waives several constitu-
tional rights, including his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,
his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers. For this
waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Consequently,
if a defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been
obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void. Moreover, because a
150. See id. at 461.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 462.
153. See id. at 463-64.
154. See id. at 464.
155. See id. at 465.
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guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it
cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of
the law in relation to the facts. 1 5 6
The purpose of requiring arraigning judges to inquire into the de-
fendant's understanding of the charge and the factual basis lies in en-
suring that the defendant has, according to the acts the defendant
admits, committed an offense as charged or a lesser included of-
fense.15 7 That purpose, in tun, serves to protect defendants who
plead voluntarily and with an understanding of the charge, but who
do not realize their admitted conduct does not actually fall within the
charge.15s
The more complete the record made at the plea proceeding, the
more expeditiously the appellate courts can dispose of direct appeals
and post-conviction actions challenging plea-based convictions.15 9
The requirement that arraigning judges personally address pleading
defendants in open court can satisfy the goal of creating a full record,
but only if the arraigning judges meticulously cover everything re-
quired by the rule, depending upon individual case variables, which
the Court explicitly recognized will present themselves.1 60
The Court hoped full compliance with Rule 11 would produce
records that also would reduce the "great waste of judicial resources
required to process the frivolous attacks on guilty plea convictions
that are encouraged, and are more difficult to dispose of, when the
original [plea proceeding] record[s are] inadequate. 161 The Court
made special reference to the defendant's understanding of the nature
of the charge and the relation of the facts to the charge. Subjectivity
and self-serving testimony pervade collateral attacks based on con-
victs' claimed failure to understand the charges and the relation be-
tween the facts and the charges before the acceptance of their pleas.
When presented in the post-conviction setting, the credibility
problems render the resolution of the claims more difficult than it
would be with adequate plea proceeding records.162 The Court felt
156. Id. at 467 (footnote and citation omitted).
157. See id. at 467.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 465.
160. See id. at 467 n.20.
161. Id. at 472. The extreme idealism, approaching even naivete, apparent from that
stated justification for the rule seems somehow out of place from experienced Su-
preme Court justices, but, of course, one can always hope.
162. The reality has been a predictable increase to flood levels of litigation based upon
the hopes created by the new appellate rulings, with the steady pace of the claims
already in vogue before the new ruling continuing unabated. Appellate courts at
all levels of the judicial hierarchy seem not to foresee what they bring upon the
trial courts initially, and eventually upon themselves, this way.
At least on these particular points, dissenting Justice Thomas E. Brennan of
the Michigan Supreme Court saw more clearly:
2000]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
there is no "adequate substitute for demonstrating in the record at the
time the plea is [tendered] the defendant's understanding of the na-
ture of the charge."13 The Chief Justice concluded: "[it is, therefore,
not too much to require that, before sentencing defendants to years of
imprisonment, district judges take the few minutes necessary to in-
form them of their rights and to determine whether they understand
the action they are taking."i 64 The eight-member majority of the Mc-
Carthy Court claimed they did not act as they did in McCarthy as a
matter of constitutional doctrine, but strictly were exercising their su-
pervisory power over the lower federal courts. In the months immedi-
ately following the Court's release of McCarthy on April 2, 1969, seven
members of the McCarthy Court must have experienced a major
change of constitutional heart.
On June 2, 1969, the Court released Boykin v. Alabama.i65 Boykin
cannot be described accurately as expressing a clear holding beyond
the following propositions: (1) that state courts, under federal due pro-
cess standards, must make records of their guilty plea proceedings ad-
equate enough to establish that the pleading defendants tendered
their guilty pleas voluntarily and with an understanding of the nature
of the charges and the possible penalties they faced, that their pleas
waived their federal constitutional trial rights, including their federal
constitutional right to be free from compelled self-incrimination, that
they admitted all the essential elements of the charges to which they
tendered guilty pleas, and waived their right to present defenses; and,
(2) in the absence of plea proceeding records adequate to establish the
required matters, the convictions cannot be presumed to be valid
under the United States Constitution and cannot survive a direct ap-
peal or a federal habeas corpus proceeding.1 66 The question of the ap-
plicability of the criminally accused federal constitutional rights was
not new to the Boykin Court.
But the requirement of an adequate record was new. If no such
record existed, it would be remedied by nearly automatic invalidation
of the convictions thus obtained. This remedy presumed that the state
court judges had not honored the applicable provisions of the United
States Constitution. Justice Harlan complained in dissent that the
I cite this fact [that the defendant may now testify that he lied to the
trial judge at the plea proceeding] merely for the edification of those who
still cling to the hope that 20 or possibly 200 "official questions" at plea
taking will somehow reduce the torrent of collateral attacks on guilty-
plea-based convictions.
No way, my friends. No way.
People v. Jones, 188 N.W.2d 536, 538 (Mich. 1971).
163. 394 U.S. at 470 (emphasis removed).
164. Id. at 472.
165. 395 U.S. 238 (1969)(7-2 decision-Justices Harlan and Black dissented).
166. See id. at 242-44.
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Court had in effect imposed on the states Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.J67 He felt it had been imposed because the key
part of the ruling was the requirement of adequate plea acceptance
records to survive federal constitutional review, and because the
Court could impose the record requirement on state courts only as
matter of federal constitutional due process. 168 Even though he over-
stated, 69 his complaint was not very far off the mark.
Before Boykin, the presumption of regularity accorded to state
court judgments had reigned supreme. Federal courts presumed state
courts had acted properly until a complaining litigant proved they had
not. Under Boykin, a state court trial judge commits plain error by
accepting a guilty plea without creating a record containing an affirm-
ative showing that the defendant tendered the plea intelligently and
voluntarily.1 70 At no time did the majority say Boykin's pleas actually
were involuntary (although on that plea proceeding record, they prob-
ably could have been actually involuntary with no recorded clue),17 l
but they ruled that the pleas were presumptively involuntary. The
ruling requires a proper paper trail, nothing more, but nothing less
either.
167. See id. at 245 (Justice Harlan wrote the dissent; Justice Black joined it).
168. The Court used a readily available and familiar device to help support its author-
ity to act in this case, the federal question. Federal rights are waived by pleas of
guilty. As a result, federal questions are presented by guilty pleas tendered in
state courts: 'The question of an effective waiver of a federal constitutional right
in a proceeding is of course governed by federal standards." Id. at 243.
169. Justice Harlan described the requirements of Rule 11 as rigid. Therein lies his
overstatement.
170. See id. at 242.
171. Edward Boykin, Jr., a 27-year old indigent black man, was indicted in Mobile
County, Alabama in 1966 for five counts of armed robbery, a common law crime
in Alabama at the time, with a statutory penalty ranging from a minimum often
years imprisonment to death by electrocution. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238 (1969). The Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, appointed counsel for
Boykin three days before the scheduled arraignment. See id. at 239. The ar-
raigning judge asked Boykin no questions and Boykin did not address the court
at the arraignment. See id. Boykin tendered guilty pleas at the scheduled ar-
raignment and the court accepted the pleas. Two months later, under normal
Alabama jury sentencing procedure at the time, the question of sentence was
tried to a jury, which sentenced Boykin to five death sentences. See id. at 240.
Nothing in the trial court record showed that Boykin had any prior convictions
for any offenses of any grade, let alone felonies. See id. In four of the robberies,
no one was injured, and in the fifth, a bystander was injured slightly and unin-
tentionally on Boykin's part. See id. at 239. Recall the background facts: The
civil rights movement had begun only recently. Alabama had been a hot spot in
the civil rights story. This case arose in the Deep South, involving a black defen-
dant. Justice Douglas was moved to include this passage in his opinion, despite
the absence of facts upon which to base the need for the passage: "Ignorance,
incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might
be a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality." Id. at 242-43. Only the background
facts can explain the inclusion of that statement.
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3. Other Considerations in Plea-based Convictions
A continuing interpretive problem created by some of the wording
Justice Douglas 172 used in his majority opinion in Boykin appears in
the way in which a very heavy majority of state courts seem to have
misunderstood Boykin. Justice Douglas restated Chief Justice War-
ren's language from McCarthy in a footnote of the Boykin opinion.
This footnote accurately quoted Chief Justice Warren's language from
McCarthy but was truly misleading. Justice Douglas put the proposi-
tion this way:
Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place
when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment
and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Second, is the right
to trial by jury. Third, is the right to confront one's accusers. We cannot pre-
sume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record.
1 7 3
Chief Justice Warren more accurately expressed the concept when
he wrote it his way in McCarthy.174 The Chief Justice's manner of
expression can easily be understood as teaching that a guilty plea in a
state criminal proceeding waives several federal rights. Justice Doug-
las' manner of expression in the Boykin footnote indicated that a
guilty plea in a state court criminal case175 waives only the three fed-
eral rights he listed in the rest of the quoted paragraph. A very large
number of the lower state and federal courts, including Nebraska's
appellate courts, have interpreted Justice Douglas' language choices
that very way and continue to do so. Very few state courts have un-
derstood Justice Douglas differently and more correctly.176 State
courts have misread the legally correct meaning of the passage and
continue to restrict the federal rights waived to the three Justice
Douglas listed. State courts also have not understood that the holding
172. No matter how great a Supreme Court justice William 0. Douglas may have
been, and I confess here that I consider him to have been a great one, indeed, I
have never considered him to have been even a good writer, although he could
inspire folks with his writings. Douglas' opinions tended to lack clarity to the
point that I find some incomprehensible. His Boykin opinion I find only poorly
written, but still comprehensible.
173. 395 U.S. at 243 (citations omitted).
174. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
175. Justice Douglas' first error in the quoted paragraph should be obvious - he said
"trial", but one generally does not tender a guilty plea in a trial unless one is
withdrawing one's earlier not guilty plea and replacing it with a guilty plea. To
Justice Douglas, a trial and a plea proceeding might be synonymous, or a trial
and a case are synonymous, or else he simply was wrong.
176. Louisiana has been a shining light in interpreting Justice Douglas correctly. See,
e.g., State v. Cressy, 440 So. 2d 141 (La. 1983); State v. Bennett, 407 So. 2d 683
(La. 1981); State v. Holden, 375 So. 2d 1372 (La. 1979); State v. Lewis, 367 So. 2d
1155 (La. 1979); State ex. rel. Jackson v. Henderson, 255 So. 2d 85 (1971); State v.
Lawrence, 600 So. 2d 1341 (La. App. 1991).
[Vol. 79:293
NEBRASKA PLEA-BASED CONVICTIONS
of Boykin and the catchy language Justice Douglas used in justifying
the Boykin holding were not the same thing.177
Formulating three simple questions and their simple answers
reveals the problem here. Does a guilty plea in state or federal crimi-
nal cases waive only the three federal rights listed by Justice Douglas?
Did guilty pleas waive only those three federal rights at the time the
Court released Boykin? The obvious and undebatable answer to both
questions is "no." Add the third simple question: Were those the only
federal rights applicable in state court criminal proceedings? Again,
the answer is an unequivocal "no." Table 1 depicts the rights waived,
the record showing required to support the validity of the waivers, and
the other federal constitutional rights waived but that require no re-
cord showing such waiver under the prevailing state court reading of
Boykin.
By June 2, 1969, the date the Court released Boykin, the following
rights were enforced: (1) the Sixth Amendment's federal right to the
assistance of counsel, which actually is a cluster of federal extrajudi-
cial, pretrial, trial, and post-trial rights;s78 (2) the Fifth Amendment's
federal exemption from compelled self-incrimination and from double
jeopardy, two more clusters of federal extrajudicial, pretrial,179 trial,
and post-trial rights; (3) the federal protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment relating to searches and seizures, yet another cluster of federal
extrajudicial, pretrial, and trial rights; (4) the Eighth Amendment's
prohibitions of excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual
punishments, still another cluster of pretrial and post-trial rights; and
177. The only modern, comprehensive explanation of stare decisis as practiced in
American law, a very different matter than stare decisis as practiced in English
law, was not available until well after Boykin's 25th anniversary. This, however,
presents a poor excuse for the failure to properly construct the holding of a case.
See RICHARD B. CAPPALU, THE Amruxc COMION LAw METHOD (1997); RUPERT
CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1977). Studying Cappalli until they
can demonstrate mastery of his teachings should be a precondition to every
American judge's entry into the duties of judicial office.
There were sources available to learn from before Cappalli published. These
included sources such as those Cappalli cited in his bibliography and even the
Nebraska Supreme Court's statement of the proper approach in Maxwell v.
Hamel, 138 Neb. 49, 55, 292 N.W. 38, 42 (1940), quoted in Conagra, Inc., v. Car-
gill, Inc., 223 Neb. 92, 95, 388 N.W.2d 458, 460 (1986): "As precedents, the con-
trolling features of an opinion are the rules of law necessarily reached and stated
in determining the issues presented based upon the facts found in the record."
Professor Cappalli would refine that statement to refer to the facts the appellate
court found material enough to include in their statement of the facts.
178. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
179. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52 (1961). But see Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (declaring Ala-
bama preliminary hearings to be critical stages of criminal cases, which does not
support the point in the text, but needs to be cited). Nebraska preliminary hear-
ings and Alabama preliminary hearings share the factors the Court felt made the
Alabama variety a critical stage.
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TABLE 1.
FEDERAL RIGHTS WAIVED BY PLEAS
RECORD MUST RECORD
KNOWLEDGE SHOW ADVICE, APPARENTLY
FEDERAL RECORD WAIVED BY UNDERSTAND- NEED NOT
RIGHTS MUST SHOW PLEAS OF ING, & EXPRESS, SHOW ADVICE,
APPLICABLE DEFENDANTS GUILTY & NO VOLUNTARY KNOWLEDGE,
TO STATES UNDERSTAND CONTEST WAIVER OR WAIVER









































** Record need show only existence of factual basis
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(5) the Sixth Amendment's federal trial rights, including jury trial
(within limits), speedy trial, confrontation,i 8 0 compulsory process, and
the right to present a closing argument or summation,' 8 ' plus the fed-
eral Due Process Clause trial rights: to be given advance notice of the
true nature of the charges at a time to allow for meaningful prepara-
tion, to be given notice of pretrial and trial proceedings, and to present
defenses as part of the opportunity to be heard.182 A guilty or no con-
test plea in the trial court waives all of these federal rights except (1)
rights to assistance of counsel before and at the plea proceeding, (2)
the rights at sentencingi8 3 and on appeal, and (3) many double jeop-
ardy problems, excessive bail, and, with some room to debate, speedy
trial.
A guilty plea, by June 2, 1969, may also have waived the right to
complain about violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments occur-
ring before the tender of the plea. The Court did not clarify this point
until the mid-1970s.184 The collection of federal rights enumerated
above, clearly waived by pleas of guilty and no contest as of June 2,
1969, seems to total considerably more than three federal rights, even
assuming all of them appear here.'8 5 If Boykin is read properly, a
defendant's waiver of each of the federal rights applied to state court
proceedings after Boykin also should be reflected in any plea proceed-
ing record.
No trial court judge conducting a plea proceeding, and no appellate
court attempting to divine a defendant's understanding from the bare
printed record, could possibly determine that a defendant under-
stands the federally protected trial rights waived by a guilty or no con-
test plea if the arraigning judge advises the defendant of only the
three rights Justice Douglas listed. Yet numerous appellate courts,
including even the current membership of the United States Supreme
Court, frequently quote or rely on Justice Douglas's description of the
federal rights waived by a guilty plea in appellate opinions explaining
their review of plea-based convictions as somehow dispositive of their
180. Confrontation also has its extrajudicial and pretrial applications. See, e.g.,
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S.
458 (1900); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
181. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975)(allowing trial judges to place rea-
sonable time limits on closings, but not to deny closings).
182. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
183. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
184. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). Almost two years before Boykin,
the Nebraska Supreme Court declared that a guilty plea, voluntarily and under-
standingly tendered, is conclusive and eliminates all questions as to the admissi-
bility of evidence, even those that might arise on claimed federal constitutional
violations. See State v. Livingston, 182 Neb. 257, 153 N.W.2d 925 (1967).
185. I have left some out on purpose, such as First Amendment defenses to the charge




reviews. The talismanic quality of Justice Douglas' wording falls far
short of legal reality.
A more reasonable alternative interpretation of both Chief Justice
Warren's description of the federal rights waived by a guilty plea in
McCarthy and Justice Douglas' description in Boykin could lie in the
inclusiveness of the words they chose. The right of confrontation and
the federal exemption from compelled self-incrimination both apply in
pretrial settings as well as at trial. The self-incrimination clause ap-
plies in post-trial and extrajudicial settings as well. When criminal
defendants exercise the federally guaranteed right to a jury trial, the
entire bundle of other federally protected rights automatically comes
into play. The waiver of a jury trial also necessarily waives all other
federal rights attendant to a jury trial.186 Thus, the Boykin and Mc-
Carthy rules employ only a skeletal format to describe the federal con-
stitutional rights waived by pleas. The Court trusted the legal
profession's tacit knowledge of the full range of rights waived by pleas
of guilty and no contest to flesh out the structure needed for any given
case.18 7 This interpretation focuses a small spotlight of genius on Jus-
tice Douglas' Boykin description of rights waived. What Justice Doug-
las really intended was to create, following the Chief Justice's lead in
McCarthy, a short enough description of the rights waived to provide
arraigning state court judges and the legal profession with a simple
mnemonic device, easily remembered.18
The Chief Justice and Justice Douglas could have gone on to say
something about rights attendant to trial and did not. Still, they could
not have intended to indicate that the bundle of rights attendant to
trial no longer existed in the Court's precedent base. Nor could they
have intended that the Court would no longer insist that state courts
honor all of the other applicable federal constitutional rights of the
criminally accused not specifically identified in Boykin. As a result,
the Chief Justice and Justice Douglas probably meant something close
to the interpretation set forth. This alternative recognizes that both
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas sat on the Court before and
throughout the 1960s and they both participated in, and possibly even
186. That is so, because there will be no trial after acceptance of a guilty or no contest
plea, all of the rights normally exercised as part of the trial evaporate.
187. A problem for the criminally accused lies in the need to conceptualize the bundle
of rights attendant to jury trial. Few of the criminally accused possess the ana-
lytical skills or education that would allow them to realize they waive a bundle of
rights attendant to trial simply by waiving a jury trial. Justice White alluded to
this very point in his opinion in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749, n.6
(1970).
188. A twentieth century application of a seventeenth century legal education idea.
See Richard J. Ross, The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers:




led, the Court's movement federalizing the rights attendant to trial
that became applicable to the states during that time frame. This in-
terpretation rejects all of the statements made by all of the lower
courts over the last thirty years indicating that guilty and no contest
pleas waive only three important federal constitutional rights.189
Additionally, Boykin, while frequently cited for the proposition
that a plea must be voluntary, did not create such a rule.o9 0 Boykin
only dealt with the paper trail that would be required of state courts
for purposes of establishing the validity of plea-based convictions
through documentary evidence. Boykin created a record-keeping rule.
Boykin conferred a "right" to an adequate plea proceeding record and
established the minimum that the record must show in order to be
considered adequate. Boykin neither confirmed nor conferred the ex-
istence of any other rights. To that extent, Boykin represents the
Court's attempt to reduce the number of cases attacking prior convic-
tions that would need to be decided on the totality of the circum-
stances in each case. It was an attempt at a bright line rule intended
to avoid case by case factual reviews - an attempt that essentially
has failed.
Since releasing Boykin, the Supreme Court naturally has contin-
ued reviewing state courts' plea-based conviction cases, but has
adopted nothing more of substance in the way of federally required
state court records. For purposes of this article, several more of the
United States Supreme Court's post-Boykin decisions that have re-
fined the requirements of valid plea-based convictions in a more sub-
stantive manner need brief discussion here. A group of four decisions
from 1970191 all dealt with various ways of encouraging, influencing,
or inducing the tender of guilty pleas based upon less severe sentence
possibilities following guilty pleas than following trial and conviction,
and the validity of pleas resulting from allegedly coerced confessions.
Brady v. United States'9 2 and Parker v. North Carolina'93 estab-
lished that an otherwise valid plea does not become involuntary if in-
duced by a defendant's desire to limit the maximum possible penalty
by pleading to lesser offenses. McMann v. Richardson194 presented
the appeals of three separate defendants' post-conviction claims that
their guilty pleas had been induced by the threat of admissibility of
their allegedly coerced confessions. In response, the Court stated that
defendants and defense counsel often must make difficult decisions
189. This alternative also exhibits more respect for Justice Douglas.
190. That rule predates even Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
191. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Justice White wrote all four majority opinions.
192. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
193. 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
194. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
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when choosing whether to plead guilty. The Court concluded that
guilty pleas retain their validity so long as the pleas were tendered
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.' 95 All four decisions settled the principle that a defen-
dant who would not have tendered a guilty or no contest plea but for
the purpose of seeking an opportunity to limit the maximum possible
penalty that could be imposed, does not necessarily show that the plea
was not voluntary. Obviously, the Court did not grant carte blanche to
plea bargaining prosecutors. The Court maintained arraigning courts'
obligation to review plea bargains and to accept or reject grossly un-
fair bargains.19 6
The Brady Court also taught that the standard as to whether a
guilty plea is voluntary must be that:
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, includ-
ing the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecu-
tor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to
discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled
or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature
improper as having no relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g.
bribes).1 9 7
The Brady approach to the voluntariness of pleas added two ingredi-
ents not appearing in earlier Supreme Court opinions while providing
examples of prosecutor misbehavior that would invalidate plea-based
convictions. These ingredients were brewing out in the circuits and
were the concept of direct consequences, and more specificity about
the intelligence part of the Court's voluntary-intelligent formula for
evaluating the validity of plea-based convictions.
In Brady, Justice White provided a list of inputs for assessing the
intelligence of the tender of a plea, when he said:
The record before us ... supports the conclusion that Brady's plea was intelli-
gently made. He was advised by competent counsel, he was made aware of
the nature of the charge against him, and there was nothing to indicate that
he was incompetent or otherwise not in control of his mental faculties .... 198
Note the three key components in this construct: (1) advice by compe-
tent counsel; (2) awareness of the nature of the charge; and, (3) mental
competence. Brady, Parker, and McMann can also be described as
standing collectively for the proposition that, with respect to the ad-
vice of counsel, a defendant pleads intelligently when represented and
195. See Brady, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
196. Earlier, in Nagelberg v. United States, 377 U.S. 266 (1964), the Court had ruled
that the arraigning judge had discretionary authority to permit a defendant to
withdraw an earlier plea of not guilty and plead to a lesser offense with the prose-
cution's agreement in return for the defendant's "extensive cooperation" with the
government.
197. 397 U.S. at 755 (citing Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 (5th Cir.
1957)(en banc)).
198. 397 U.S. at 756.
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fully advised by competent counsel, even if counsel's advice turns out
to be wrong on a point of law after the passage of time and more legal
development of the point involved.
Brady also added some additional flavor to the Court's sense of the
plea of guilty, as expressed by Justice White:
That a guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and
discernment has long been recognized. Central to the plea and the foundation
for entering judgment against the defendant is the defendant's admission in
open court that he committed the acts charged in the indictment. He thus
stands as a witness against himself and he is shielded by the Fifth Amend-
ment from being compelled to do so-hence the minimum requirement that
his plea be the voluntary expression of his own choice. But the plea is more
than an admission of past conduct; it is the defendant's consent that judgment
of conviction may be entered without a trial-a waiver of his right to trial
before a jury or a judge. Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be
voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient aware-
ness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. 1 9 9
Notice that Justice White added "trial before a... judge" as part of the
bundle of rights waived by a plea. Few of the United States Supreme
Court's cases make that point. Many defendants do not understand
that they have a right to a trial before a judge, instead of a trial to a
jury unless the information specifically is given to them, and repeated
to them until they do understand. Defendants also need to be told if
they choose that option, then the rights attendant to a jury trial essen-
tially match the rights attendant to a bench trial,200 with the excep-
tion of the identity of the ultimate fact finder and the absence of jury
instructions. Either the defendants who do not understand these
rights miss that part of their counsels' advice, 201 or counsel are not
giving that advice routinely. In addition, the courts who seem to be-
lieve Boykin stood for the proposition that guilty pleas waive only
three important federal rights have missed the point that guilty pleas
also waive the right to a judge trial, as an alternative to a jury trial,202
as well as the fact that the right to have a trial before a judge, instead
of before a jury, also carries the procedural protections derived from
the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court also gave us hybrid pleas, like the plea of
guilty-but-not-guilty, a hybrid that came to be known as an Alford
199. 397 U.S. at 748.
200. I cannot cite to any published authority for the point regarding defendants' fairly
frequent lack of understanding about their judge trial option. For that point, I
rely on my twenty years of conducting arraignments.
201. Another point from my arraignment experience: many criminal defendants ad-
eptly exercise selective listening skills, missing large blocks of counsels' advice on
a regular basis.
202. Waiving a jury trial in favor of a bench trial can become an important strategic
choice in some cases, depending upon many factors, such as the inflammatory
nature of the charge in the community.
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plea. North Carolina v. Alford2O3 presented essentially the same
problem as Brady, Parker, and McMann, but carried the complicating
feature that the pleading defendant protested his innocence in spite of
his guilty plea, a necessarily oxymoronic approach. Alford established
the additional proposition that defendants validly can plead guilty
while claiming their innocence, as long as the arraigning judge closely
examines the factual basis presented by the prosecution and concludes
the facts would sustain a finding of guilt despite the defendant's claim
of innocence. 20 4 The bottom line, reiterated in Alford, was and re-
mains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.205
Two of the factors entering into the "intelligent" plea equation,
awareness of the nature of the charge and mental competence, both
presented themselves in Henderson v. Morgan.20 6 Pleas may be
deemed involuntary, either because the defendant does not under-
stand the nature of the constitutional protections waived by the plea,
or because the defendant has such an incomplete understanding of the
charge that the defendant's plea cannot stand as an intelligent admis-
sion of guilt.2 0 7 Of course, the Court had established much earlier
that, without adequate notice of the nature of the charge, or proof that
the defendant in fact understood the charge, the plea could not be con-
sidered voluntary in the sense of an intelligent admission of guilt.20 8
So, if a plea is not intelligent, it also is not voluntary. But a plea can
be intelligent without being voluntary. The definitional problem
arises from the concept of the requisite degree of voluntariness with
its intelligence component. In reality, this construct does not deal
with the meanings of the words used, but with the identification and
signification of a complex set of policy choices, expressed by the volun-
tary-intelligent formula. Note that the United States Supreme Court
does not employ the redundant phrase, "freely, voluntarily, know-
ingly, intelligently, and understandingly." To support a judgment of
guilt, a plea must be "voluntary in a constitutional sense."20 9
Henderson also established that any offense poses a special prob-
lem of ensuring the defendant's understanding of the specific intent
203. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
204. See infra Part IV.
205. See North Carolina v. Alford, 426 U.S. at 37.
206. 426 U.S. 637 (1976). This case provided an example, at first blush, of another
fractured decision by a vote of 3-4-2 - Justice Stevens wrote for the Court; Jus-
tices Blackmun, Powell, Stewart and White concurred; Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist dissented. The very last line of Justice White's concurring
opinion notifies the reader that he, and the three justices joining his opinion, also
joined in the Court's opinion, making the case a 6-3 decision.
207. See id. at 645.
208. See Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
209. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 644-45.
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element if the commission of the offense requires a specific intent.2 10
In a case involving a defendant of lower intelligence, the specific in-
tent element creates an even more difficult situation. In Henderson,
the federal habeas court reviewed a state court conviction by a negoti-
ated guilty plea to a second-degree murder charge, reduced from first-
degree murder.21 1 The trial judge in the habeas action found as a fact
that neither the arraigning judge nor defense counsel ever explained
to the defendant the nature of the negotiated charge or the specific
intent element. Nothing to that effect appeared in the arraignment
record.
Morgan was a nineteen-year-old with a functioning IQ of 68 to 72.
He claimed, but only through counsel at sentencing, that he intended
the victim no harm.2 12 Before the federal habeas court, he testified he
would not have pleaded guilty had he been told of the specific intent
element that his plea admitted. The Court held Morgan's plea was
involuntary because his admission of an intent he knew nothing about
could not support a finding that his admission was intelligent. No ex-
planation of the specific intent element was given to Morgan and his
low intelligence also played a part in the ultimate holding.213 In so
holding the Court utilized a well-established proposition of character-
izing real notice of the true nature of the charge as the first and most
universally recognized requirement of due process. The Court noted,
however:
There is no need in this case to decide whether notice of the true nature, or
substance, of a charge always requires a description of every element of the
offense; we assume it does not. Nevertheless, intent is such a critical element
of the offense of second-degree murder that notice of that element is
required. 2
1 4
Justice Stevens included some intriguing language with potential fu-
ture usefulness in the Court's opinion: "[lit may be appropriate to pre-
210. See id. at 647.
211. See id. at 638.
212. See id. at 643.
213. See id. at 647.
214. Id. at 647 n.18 (emphasis added). The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Nebraska has held that Henderson applies to Nebraska state court plea
proceedings. The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska ap-
plied Henderson in vacating a 1976 county court conviction by guilty plea to a
charge of concealing stolen property of a value of less than $100.00 with the in-
tent to defraud the owner thereof under the old criminal code. See Comer v.
Black, CV82-L-657 (D. Neb. September 24, 1984). Comer pleaded guilty, without
counsel, because he believed his mere possession of the property was proof of the
charge and he therefore had to plead guilty. The arraigning judge did not explain
the intent to defraud element, even though Comer did not understand that ele-
ment. United States District Judge Urbom found Comer's plea was involuntary
due to Comer's lack of understanding of the intent element. Without such under-
standing, Comer's plea could not be considered an intelligent admission of guilt.
If the admission is not intelligent, the plea is involuntary.
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sume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature
of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he
is being asked to admit."2 15 It did not take long2 i6 for the usefulness
of that statement to begin appearing.
In Marshall v. Lonberger,21 7 the defendant was tried in Ohio on a
murder charge with a possible death sentence. The procedure Ohio
followed at the time was a one step procedure under which the jury
heard the evidence on guilt and on the existence of aggravating factors
for sentencing purposes simultaneously. A one step procedure in a
death penalty case entails a high risk of jury confusion on the allowa-
ble purposes of the evidence of prior convictions. The defendant
claimed he had not been advised of the nature of the charge to which
he tendered his plea in the prior conviction in Illinois, and raised the
issue of his voluntariness. 21 8 While the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals bought the defendant's argument, the United States Supreme
Court did not. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals had
applied an incorrect standard of review of state court factual findings
and, upon the Court's corrected findings of fact, that the defendant's
Illinois plea was voluntary and admissible in the later Ohio trial.219
The defendant could not raise the issue the way he sought, but could
raise it by a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a direct appeal
from the prior conviction or in a post-conviction action.
At the time the Court released it, Marshall was the only instance
in which the Court had considered an attack on a prior conviction used
for an enhancement-type purpose within the context of a later case on
a ground other than denial of counsel. In fact, the prior conviction was
used in the Ohio case to prove an aggravating circumstance for pur-
poses of determining whether the sentence should be a life or a death
sentence, not strictly speaking, for enhancement. 220 That a death
sentence was at issue before the trial court may have made a differ-
ence in the Court's decision to reach out the way it did in Marshall.
The Court generally treats death penalty cases differently than it
215. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647.
216. In terms of judicial time, a construct nearly synonymous with geologic time.
217. 459 U.S. 422 (1983)(5-4 decision). Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority. Jus-
tice Blackmun wrote a dissent alone and joined in Justice Stevens's dissent,
along with Justices Brennan and Marshall. Justice Brennan wrote a dissent in
which Justice Marshall joined. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, said
the Court had granted certiorari to consider, among other things, the interrela-
tionship between Boykin and Henderson v. Morgan, but then, in his opinion, he
did not discuss the interrelationship or even mention it again.
218. See id. at 428.
219. See id. at 437.
220. There is a difference between the two uses (prior conviction used to prove an
aggravating circumstance or use of prior conviction for enhancement), although
perhaps the difference matters only in legal theory. See, e.g., State v. Reeves, 234
Neb. 711, 453 N.W.2d 359 (1990).
[Vol. 79:293
NEBRASKA PLEA-BASED CONVICTIONS
treats other criminal cases. The Ohio state court of last resort had
vacated the death sentence before the United States Supreme Court
took the case, but the Court treated it as a death penalty case anyway.
The nature of the claimed error in Marshall undoubtedly was a
motivating factor in the Court's decision to entertain an attack on a
ground other than denial of counsel as well. Lonberger claimed he did
not know, either through his attorney or the trial court, to what
charges he was pleading guilty in the prior conviction case. 22 1 There
is a vast difference in terms of the severity of the due process violation
between a case in which an accused has not been notified of the charge
levied, and a case in which the paper trail does not show advice and
comprehension of the federal right of confrontation, the federal right
against compelled self-incrimination, and the federal right to a jury
trial with its attendant rights.
Then Associate Justice Rehnquist included some language in the
Marshall majority opinion that lower federal courts reviewing state
criminal cases cannot ignore. Justice Rehnquist said: "Under Hen-
derson [v. Morgan], respondent must be presumed to have been in-
formed, either by his lawyers or at one of the pre-sentencing [sic]
proceedings, of the charges on which he was indicted."222 In addition,
he stated that "there is surely no obstacle to the use of the [Henderson]
presumption in a case such as this, when the defendant is challenging
a conviction which does not have a prior conviction as an element."223
Justice Rehnquist's language indicates a change in preference from
the earlier Boykin presumption that all defendants' lawyers and their
trial judges were neither competent nor trustworthy.224 Changing
that preference potentially could be useful as an extra tool in stem-
ruing the tide of federal court collateral attacks challenging the valid-
ity of plea-based state criminal convictions.
In Bousley v. United States,2 2 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist once again
explained that a guilty plea is constitutionally valid only to the extent
221. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 432.
222. Id. at 437. Unlike Mr. Morgan, Mr. Lonberger possessed experience in the crimi-
nal justice system and an apparently average or better intelligence. Those fac-
tual points also had an effect on the Court's decision.
223. Id. at 436 n.5. Query whether that statement indicates Justice Rehnquist
thought at that time there might be an obstacle to using the Henderson presump-
tion in a case in which a prior conviction is an element?
224. The lower federal courts reviewing Nebraska cases have historically tended to
focus on language from Todd v. Lockhart, 490 F. 2d 626, 628 (81 Cir. 1974) in-
stead of exploring the possible meaning of Justice Rehnquist's language. The
lower federal courts state "we do not return to the pre-Boykin practice of assum-
ing that a defendant represented by counsel has entered a voluntary and intelli-
gent plea."
225. 523 U.S. 614 (1998)(6 member majority, 1 justice concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part, 2 justices dissenting). The real problem in Bousley lay in the procedu-
ral question of whether a convict who did not raise a direct appeal challenge to
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it is both voluntary and intelligent, citing to Brady.2 26 One amicus
argument contended that Bousley's plea was tendered intelligently be-
cause he had counsel, he had received a copy of the indictment before
tendering his plea, and the indictment properly included all the ele-
ments of the offense charged. The Chief Justice noted that "[sluch
circumstances, standing alone, give rise to a presumption that the de-
fendant was informed of the nature of the charge against him." 22 7
Bousley, however, could point to the transcribed plea proceeding re-
cord to show the Supreme Court that neither he, nor his counsel, nor
the arraigning judge correctly understood the essential elements of
the crime charged.2 28
If the insufficiency-of-the-record contention could withstand exam-
ination in a collateral attack the Chief Justice said the plea was then
constitutionally invalid. It would have been more precise to explain
that the accused, his attorney, and the arraigning judge all had mis-
understood the relation of the facts to the law, instead of misunder-
standing the essential elements. But the results flowing from either
failure of understanding remain the same. One cannot correctly as-
sess the relevant factors in making a decision to plead when one has
been misinformed as to the true nature of the charge. A plea resulting
from misinformation cannot stand as an intelligently tendered plea.
That means the plea was tendered involuntarily. Thus, the conviction
based on that plea is not voidable, but void. Void judgments lie open
to collateral attacks.
The Supreme Court has never merged its two lines of cases, i.e.,
the right to counsel line of cases and the line of cases dealing with
other bases for the constitutional invalidity of plea-based convictions.
At least two sound reasons can support the Court's efforts at keeping
the two lines of cases separate. First, it was not necessary to go be-
the validity of his plea could raise the issue in a collateral attack. The Court had
ruled in earlier cases that voluntary and intelligent pleas of guilty made by ac-
cused persons who had been advised by competent counsel may not be collater-
ally attacked. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984). Claims that one's plea
was not intelligently tendered due to incorrect advice of the nature of the charge
given by the arraigning court can be completely addressed on direct review based
on the record created at the plea proceeding. The voluntariness and intelligence
of that plea can be attacked on collateral review only if first challenged on direct
review. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621. The problem arose inBousley because after
Bousley's arraignment and sentencing, while only the direct appeal of his sen-
tence was pending, the Supreme Court, in another case, interpreted the statute
involved in Bousley's case in a way that made Bousley's conduct not criminal.
The arraigning court, defense counsel, and defendant all interpreted the statute
to apply to defendant's conduct. Thus, the "Henderson presumption" could not
apply to save the conviction, assuming Bousley could prove his alleged misadvice.
226. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. at 619.
227. Id. at 618.
228. See id. at 622.
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yond the right to counsel in any of the cases in which the right was
violated by lower courts. Given the central role of the right to counsel
in exercising effectively most of the other rights the conviction auto-
matically becomes void upon finding a violation of the right to counsel.
The right to counsel lies in its own sphere, separate from and anterior
to all the other constitutional rights of the criminally accused; it is the
top of the line right. The message to lower courts should have become
clear-violate the right to counsel and suffer automatic reversal. Sec-
ond, the cases brought to the Supreme Court alleging violations of con-
stitutional rights other than the right to counsel presented no issues
related to the right to counsel. When a case presents no issue relating
to the right to counsel, both trial and appellate courts will generally
not involve themselves in issues not raised unless an appellate court
notices plain error. None of this should be taken to indicate courts
cannot merge their lines of cases dealing with the right to counsel
with their cases dealing with the other constitutional rights of the
criminally accused, but only that the Supreme Court has not, and may
have sound reasons for not doing so.
The right to counsel cases can be merged into a unified body of case
law dealing with the constitutional rights the criminally accused
waives by pleading guilty and no contest. The Nebraska Supreme
Court has chosen to merge the cases this way at least for the purpose
of instructing the lower courts and counsel of the jurisdiction's re-
quirements for the entry of valid plea-based convictions, for applica-
tion in direct appeals from plea-based convictions, and to provide
arraigning judges with a concise memory prompt. The Nebraska Su-
preme Court also seems intent on establishing a separate line of case
law dealing with collateral attacks on plea-based convictions in which
the right to counsel is the only constitutional right that properly may
be raised as an issue. Sound reasons can be urged in support of that
approach. These reasons include administrative ease, finality of crim-
inal judgments, and the more restricted scope of some types of state
collateral attack actions, as opposed to the broader scope of some types
of federal collateral attack actions. All of the plea-based conviction
activity in the United States Supreme Court inevitably has affected
plea-based conviction activity in the state courts. Nebraska has been
no exception. We turn now to Nebraska's plea-based conviction law.
III. EFFECTS OF PLEADING GUILTY OR NO CONTEST
IN NEBRASKA
A. The General Rules
The basic standard for taking a plea of guilty or no contest remains
whether the tender of such a plea represents a voluntary and intelli-
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gent choice among the alternatives open to a defendant.22 9 According
to the usual formulation of the general rule on the effect of guilty and
no contest pleas, a valid plea of guilty or no contest waives all defenses
to a criminal charge. 2 30 The defenses waived, whether procedural,
statutory, or constitutional, include lack of personal jurisdiction, po-
tential double jeopardy problems buried in the evidence but not
facially apparent in the charging documents, and even the statutory
speedy trial right, in the absence of a motion for discharge made prior
to tendering a plea of guilty or no contest.23 1 The Nebraska Supreme
Court has held the statutory directive that trial courts make findings
of fact relating to whether the statutory parental notification or rea-
sonable efforts at parental notification have been made before ac-
cepting pleas of guilty or no contest from defendants under age
eighteen is not a jurisdictional matter.23 2 Therefore, the pleas waive
the trial court's failure to make findings on parental notification or
reasonable efforts. A guilty plea admits all facts recited in open court
by the prosecuting attorney and all facts alleged in the charging in-
strument, including the time and the place where the offense was
committed. 23 3 The criminally accused has no absolute right to have a
tendered plea accepted, negotiated or otherwise. Acceptance of a plea
lies within the arraigning judge's discretion.23 4 However, readers
must beware because, as will appear, the general rules grossly over-
state the reality.
Much more is required than the general rules indicate depending
upon what specific purpose is involved. In order to establish the valid-
ity of convictions by pleas of guilty or no contest to felonies, misde-
229. See State v. Hyslop, 189 Neb. 331, 202 N.W.2d 595 (1972). Further, parental
consent is not required for a minor defendant's plea to be voluntarily and know-
ingly tendered. See Ford v. Lockhart, 904 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1990).
230. The effect of a change of plea during trial results in a waiver of all trial errors
occurring before the tender of the changed plea. See State v. Edwards, 236 Neb.
445, 462 N.W.2d 93 (1990).
231. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989)(discussing a double jeopardy
waiver by plea); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980)(determining that a
tender of plea of guilty or no contest, itself, establishes personal jurisdiction);
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1
(1927)(determining that voluntary appearance confers personal jurisdiction);
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); State v. Start, 239 Neb. 571, 477
N.W.2d 20 (1991); State v. Kitt, 232 Neb. 237, 440 N.W.2d 234 (1989); State v.
Kennedy, 224 Neb. 164, 396 N.W.2d 722 (1986); State v. Ziemba, 216 Neb. 612,
346 N.W.2d 208 (1984); State v. Turner, 186 Neb. 424, 183 N.W.2d 763 (1971);
Wolf v. State, 172 Neb. 65, 108 N.W.2d 410 (1961).
232. See State v. Taylor, 234 Neb. 18, 448 N.W.2d 920 (1989).
233. See State v. Bargen, 219 Neb. 416, 363 N.W.2d 393 (1985).
234. See State v. Dodson, 250 Neb. 584, 550 N.W.2d 347 (1996); State v. Johnson, 242




meanors, and ordinance violations carrying jail penalties,2 35 on direct
appeal, a sufficiently complete record must have been created in the
arraigning court. In addition, a number of different, but critical, is-
sues are posed both for purposes of direct appeals and for appeals of
enhancement proceedings. Plea-based prior convictions used to seek
sentence enhancements in later prosecutions require a different, al-
though far less complete, record than the record required supporting a
conviction in a direct appeal from the plea proceeding. The arena of
collateral attacks on prior convictions presents somewhat more pre-
dictability today. This predictability is due to the recent, nearly total,
demise of Nebraska's short-lived second-tier collateral challenge ac-
tions and the limitations attendant to post-conviction relief actions as
well as state habeas corpus actions. These collateral challenge actions
are used to stall or avoid enhancement use of a prior conviction (gener-
ally known as separate proceedings brought expressly for the purpose
of setting aside allegedly invalid prior convictions). Finally, the use of
prior convictions to prove elements of new offenses invokes several
simple and clear rules.
Before jumping into the details of the record showings required in
the various contexts within which plea based convictions are subjected
to review, we shall first review the subject of defenses not waived by
pleas of guilty and no contest. Despite the all-encompassing implica-
tion of the language of the general rule on defenses waived, pleas of
guilty and no contest do not waive a surprising number of defenses. In
addition, we cannot tell from the precedents whether pleas waive
some defenses or whether some defenses are jurisdictional defenses or
not.
B. Defenses Not Waived by Pleas of Guilty and No Contest
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction - Insufficiency of Charging
Document
Restating the general rule in a way the appellate tiers have ex-
pressed it, a plea of guilty or no contest waives every defense to the
charge, whether procedural, statutory, or constitutional, except the de-
fense that the information or complaint is insufficient to charge a crim-
inal offense.2 36 This particular defense not waived by guilty or no
contest pleas is one form of the defense of lack of subject matter juris-
diction. Insufficiency of the charging instrument to charge an offense
235. And only possibly infractions carrying no potential imprisonment until a second
or subsequent offense, but probably not.
236. Generally, in Nebraska practice, the charging instrument, if filed in district
court, is called an information. If filed in county court the charging instrument is
called a complaint. If filed in juvenile court, it is called a petition. Of course, if a
Nebraska criminal case is initiated through a state grand jury, which does not
happen very often, but does happen, the charging instrument is an indictment.
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fails to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. 237 In earlier
years, the Nebraska Supreme Court formulated the rule to say that a
plea to the general issue waives any defect in the manner of charging
an offense, provided the charging instrument contains no jurisdic-
tional defect and is sufficient to charge an offense.238
While the court has reworded the rule, the court has not changed
the rule's substance. Indictments, informations, complaints, and juve-
nile petitions, in order to be constitutionally valid charging instru-
ments under the Nebraska Constitution, must:
(1) show the acts the accused is charged with committing amounted to a crime
which the court had the power to punish and that the crime was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court;
(2) inform the accused of the nature of the charge against the accused; and,
(3) constitute a record from which it can be determined whether a subsequent
proceeding is barred by the former adjudication.23 9
The court applied this rule even in the context of a juvenile court pros-
ecution for a law violation,240 and explained that omission from the
indictment, information, complaint, or petition of one of the essential
elements of the offense results in the charging of no crime at all. "The
accused cannot be said to have waived any right to strike the informa-
tion or to quash the information or petition on the rather tenuous pre-
text that he has pled [sic] to a noncrime."241
'The information, [indictment, petition,] or complaint must contain
a distinct allegation of each essential element of the crime as defined
by the law creating it, either in the language of the statute or its
equivalent."242 Still, the court has left some room for poor draftsman-
ship. Only defects of such a fundamental character as would render
the charging instrument wholly invalid are not waived by pleas of
guilty or no contest. Mere technical defects are waived by such pleas.
The label "mere technical defects" describes defects and omissions
that go only to the form in which the various elements of the offenses
are stated or to unartful pleading.243
237. See State v. Start, 239 Neb. 571, 477 N.W.2d 20 (1991); State v. Maeder, 229 Neb.
568, 428 N.W.2d 180 (1988).
238. See Nelson v. State, 167 Neb. 575, 94 N.W.2d 1 (1959); Cowan v. State, 140 Neb.
837, 2 N.W.2d 111 (1942).
239. State v. Piskorski, 218 Neb. 543, 546, 357 N.W.2d 206, 209 (1984)(quoting Cowan
v. State, 140 Neb. 837, 840, 2 N.W.2d 111, 113 (1942)).
240. In re Interest of Durand, 206 Neb. 415, 293 N.W.2d 383 (1980)(dealing with fel-
ony attempted entry with intent to steal).
241. Id. at 418, 293 N.W.2d at 385. The proper form of the verb in this tense is
pleaded, even though the court used pled.
242. State v. Golgert, 223 Neb. 950, 953, 395 N.W.2d 520, 522-23 (1986)(DUI prosecu-
tion)(quoting State v. Banse, 184 Neb. 534, 537, 169 N.W.2d 294, 296 (1969)(fel-
ony obtaining money by false statement of financial condition) (quoting Nelson v.
State, 167 Neb. 575, 578, 94 N.W.2d 1, 4 (1959))).
243. See State v. Coleman, 209 Neb. 823, 311 N.W.2d 911 (1981).
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Under Nebraska Revised Statutes Section 29-423,244 citations in
lieu of arrest, when properly filed in trial courts, serve as complaints.
The rules relating to the sufficiency of charging instruments apply to
complaints and are based on the Nebraska Constitution. Section 29-
423 only requires that the citation form contain a description of the
crime or offense charged. However, the citation statute cannot over-
ride constitutional decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court. Thus,
citations filed as complaints must conform with the rules relating to
sufficiency of complaints.
Pleas of guilty and no contest tendered in cases prosecuted on uni-
form citations filed as complaints waive only those matters waived by
pleas in cases prosecuted on so-called long form or formal complaints.
The failure of the citation filed as a complaint adequately to allege a
third offense has been one of a number of infirmities leading to rever-
sal of convictions. 245 As a result, citations filed as complaints contain-
ing only descriptions of the offenses charged, without more detailed
descriptions of distinct allegations of each essential element of the of-
fenses charged either in the language of the statutes creating the of-
fenses or its equivalent, are invalid complaints for purposes of the
rules relating to sufficiency of charging instruments and will not sup-
port valid convictions. This is true even after pleas of guilty or no
contest. 24 6 Because the failure to charge an offense is a jurisdictional
defect, the objection initially can be lodged at any stage of the proceed-
ings and in any court. The issue need not be presented to and ruled on
by the trial court as with non-jurisdictional defects.247
Failure to conform to the rules relating to the sufficiency of cita-
tions filed as complaints poses no serious threat to the operation of the
plea by waiver system, except maybe in the relatively few cases at-
tacking the validity of driver's license revocations based on convictions
244. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-423 (Reissue 1995).
245. See State v. Prichard, 215 Neb. 488, 339 N.W.2d 748 (1983)(involving a prosecu-
tor who had stamped the citation with a properly drawn charge of driving under
the influence, but had only handwritten on the citation the words "third offense,"
without alleging details of prior convictions). The supreme court noted that trial
judges can satisfy their plea-taking responsibilities intelligently only when prose-
cutors file complaints against defendants which adequately set forth the charges
to which the defendants are pleading. See id. at 493, 339 N.W.2d at 751.
246. In this writer's personal experience sitting in 7 of Nebraska's 12 judicial districts,
county court judges frequently encounter charges alleged as mere descriptions of
charges on citations filed as complaints, such as DUI, Other-MIP, No Operator's
License, No Valid Registration, etc.
247. See State v. Laymon, 239 Neb. 80,474 N.W.2d 458 (1991)(supporting the proposi-
tion that you can raise insufficiency of charging instrument even after trial and
conviction, not just after plea). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals expressed
the general concept this way: a valid plea of guilty "bars further consideration of
all but the most fundamental premises for the conviction, of which the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the court is the familiar example." United States v. Doyle,
348 F.2d 715, 718-19 (2d Cir. 1965).
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arising out of pleas by waiver. Adherence to the rules relating to the
sufficiency of citations filed as complaints, however, can be vitally im-
portant in cases of plea-based convictions resulting in jail sentences,
in cases of prior plea-based convictions used for enhancement of sen-
tence in later cases, or in other proceedings where valid prior convic-
tions can be important. A conviction of a non-crime or a conviction
entered without jurisdiction results in a non-conviction and cannot be
used for sentence enhancement. The failure to charge an offense can
be raised any time in any action. A non-conviction can never become a
final conviction.
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction - Venue Problems
The effect of guilty and no contest pleas on the question of proper
venue is somewhat mysterious. Nebraska case law lacks clarity in
this area. Some Nebraska cases say pleas of guilty and no contest do
not waive venue; some say pleas waive venue. Some cases indicate
venue is jurisdictional;248 some indicate venue is not jurisdictional.2 49
Most recently, in State v. Meers,2 50 the Nebraska Supreme Court an-
nounced the right to be tried in the county where the alleged offense
was committed (venue) is a state statutory right, not a state constitu-
tional right. Silence or acquiescence cannot waive fundamental con-
stitutional rights, but they can waive statutory rights. In State v.
Vejvoda,25i the supreme court described the right of a criminal defen-
dant to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense was allegedly committed as a constitutional
248. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 169 Neb. 199, 99 N.W.2d 8 (1959)(failing to allege situs
of offenses charged as within territorial jurisdiction of trial court (venue) is a
jurisdictional defect and may be raised for the first time on appeal).
249. See State v. Paul, 256 Neb. 669, 592 N.W.2d 148 (1999)(holding lack of indication
of proper venue in factual basis not sufficiently prejudicial for appellate court to
take notice of plain error); State v. Dodson, 250 Neb. 584, 550 N.W.2d 347
(1996)(stating that factual basis must include venue; lack thereof considered prej-
udicial & reversible plain error)(plain error point overruled by Paul); see gener-
ally State v. Gorman, 232 Neb. 738,441 N.W.2d 896 (1989); State v. Vejvoda, 231
Neb. 668, 438 N.W.2d 461 (1989); State v. Laflin, 201 Neb. 824, 272 N.W.2d 376
(1978); State v. Furstenau, 167 Neb. 439, 93 N.W.2d 384 (1958); Clark v. State,
150 Neb. 494, 34 N.W.2d 877 (1948); Seay v. Shrader, 69 Neb. 245, 95 N.W. 690
(1903).
250. 257 Neb. 398, 598 N.W.2d 435 (1999). In this case, there were first degree sexual
assault charges tried to the court in Kearney County even though offenses al-
leged to have been committed in Adams County. There was no record of express
waiver or showing of knowledge or awareness of right to trial in Adams County,
but no defense objection in trial court to bench trial held in county other than
alleged place of offenses. Also, there was no explanation in the appellate record
about why the trial was in that other county - in other words, the proverbial
silent record - which sufficed to waive venue, because the silent record did not
show any objection by the defense.
251. 231 Neb. 668, 438 N.W.2d 461 (1989).
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right of the accused secured by Article I, section 11 of the Nebraska
Constitution. But the court specifically ruled the constitutional provi-
sion does not guarantee that the trial will be held in any particular
county, only that the accused has a right to a jury drawn from the
county or district where the offense is alleged to have been committed.
One reasonable inference from Meers25 2 is that rights which can be
waived by silence or acquiescence also can be waived by pleas of guilty
and no contest with or without a record of judicial advice and with or
without an expressly understood, voluntary waiver of such rights.
The question of whether venue can be waived without an under-
standing and voluntary explicit waiver becomes cloudy, despite Meers
and Vejvoda, because of conflicting cases not expressly overruled in
Meers or Vejvoda. In State v. FurstenaU,253 the defendant pleaded
guilty in Dodge County District Court to a burglary committed in Otoe
County. The supreme court ruled that even the guilty plea did not
confer subject matter jurisdiction on the Dodge County District
Court.2 54 The information filed in Dodge County District Court even
alleged the commission of the offense in Otoe County. The case came
up to the supreme court from the Otoe County District Court's ruling
that the plea-based conviction in Dodge County barred prosecution in
Otoe County. The supreme court disagreed, ruling that without sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, the Dodge County District Court could not
render a valid conviction that would bar the prosecution in the county
of proper venue. The supreme court even said the "defendant cannot
waive ... venue,"255 except by first being charged in the county where
the offense allegedly was committed and then seeking, by proper pro-
ceeding, a change in venue. From that ruling, one can reasonably de-
duce the tender of a guilty plea does not waive improper venue.
In Furstenau, the supreme court did not cite to or distinguish one
of its then more recent decisions, Clark v. State.256 The Clark court
held that guilty pleas to misdemeanors admitted the identity of the
defendant as the perpetrator of the offenses and admitted both the
time and the place where the offenses were committed, rendering
proof of the truth of the matters alleged unnecessary. Clark presented
an unusual procedural posture to the supreme court. At that time,
appeals from convictions in courts of inferior jurisdiction could be ap-
pealed to the district court where the defendant had a right to trial de
novo,2 57 but could also be brought up by petition in error. Clark chose
252. 257 Neb. 398, 598 N.W.2d 435 (1999).
253. 167 Neb. 439, 93 N.W.2d 384 (1958).
254. See id. at 449, 93 N.W.2d at 390.
255. Id. at 445, 93 N.W.2d at 389.
256. 150 Neb. 494, 34 N.W.2d 877 (1948).
257. In a trial de novo, the case is completely retried as though it had never been tried




the petition in error route, meaning that he was procedurally barred
from presenting new evidence in the district court and could not con-
test venue in the district court error proceeding. Despite that prob-
lem, the supreme court still said what it did about the effects of a
guilty plea, leaving its reasoning in some doubt, but intact as a prece-
dent nevertheless. Thus, the factual admissions inherent in a guilty
plea under Clark did waive the jurisdictional venue issues, but under
Furstenau did not, or so it seemed. Then, in 1978, the supreme court
again ruled that venue is a jurisdictional fact and that no showing
whatsoever at trial of the place where the offense was committed con-
fers no subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court.258
Ten years later, the Nebraska Supreme Court announced two deci-
sions only three months apart from each other that cause one to pause
and wonder. State v. Vejvoda,2 59 the foundational precedent for State
v. Meers,260 was the earlier of the two. In Vejvoda, the supreme court
revealed none of its reasoning nor cited any authority for the proposi-
tion that Article I, section 11 of the Nebraska Constitution relates to
criminal cases for which jury trials are constitutionally guaranteed,
but does not grant a constitutional right to be tried in a particular
county.26 ' Only the venue statutes confer that right - apparently
because, as the court said, the constitutional provision "is too plain to
require interpretation" - the court did provide a cite on the clarity of
the constitutional provision, but the case the supreme court cited did
not deal with venue.2 62
The criminal venue statutes provide little assistance. Nebraska
Revised Statutes section 29-1301263 states the general rule that all
criminal cases shall be tried in the county where the offense was com-
mitted and identifies the exceptions to that general rule. Section 29-
1301.03264 even provides: "Where an offense is within the jurisdiction
of two or more counties, a conviction or acquittal thereof in one county
is a bar to a prosecution or indictment therefor in another. 2 65 Both of
258. See State v. Laflin, 201 Neb. 824, 272 N.W.2d 376 (1978).
259. 231 Neb. 668, 438 N.W.2d 461 (1989).
260. 257 Neb. 398, 598 N.W.2d 435 (1999).
261. See id. at 672, 438 N.W.2d at 465.
262. Id. at 672, 438 N.W.2d at 465 (quoting Marino v. State, 111 Neb. 623, 625, 197
N.W. 396, 397) (1924)). The problems in Marino arose out of the post-conviction
discovery that a member of the trial jury was not a resident of the county in
which the alleged offense was committed and tried. Venue was not an issue at
all. Marino, therefore, provides no precedential support for the Vejvoda ruling,
except perhaps in a tangential way. The description of the constitutional lan-
guage as "too simple, and its meaning too obvious to admit of any serious doubt
as to the right thereby intended to be secured" actually came from Olive v. State,
11 Neb. 1, 13, 7 N.W. 444, 446 (1880).
263. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1301 (Reissue 1995).




those statutes were adopted as part of a single legislative bill designed
to deal with venue in cases where the offenses can be committed in
transportation devices and in instances where victims are moved
about to two or more counties during the commission of the crimes
involved. The use of the words "within the jurisdiction of two or more
counties" slightly indicates venue and jurisdiction are different mat-
ters in the minds of the coordinate branches of state government, but
gives no insight. The court took that position on March 31, 1989.
Consider for a moment, before reaching the second 1989 case, that
venue must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in the absence of a
waiver or admission of the venue issue. But the venue issue is waived
only by the defendant's motion for a change of venue after the defen-
dant first has been charged in the proper venue. Absent a motion for a
change of venue, a criminal defendant does not waive the venue issue
by failing to raise the issue before, or even during, trial. The defense
may remain silent on venue until final argument, if then, and the
state still must carry its burden of proof on venue at trial.
On June 30, 1989, the court released State v. Gorman.2 66 In
Gorman, the court discussed in juxtaposition the difference between
two concepts. The Court discussed the concept of subject matter juris-
diction as the power to hear a particular class of cases (the power to
adjudicate) and the concept of venue as the place of trial or the site
where the power to adjudicate can be exercised.2 6 7 The tenor of the
discussion made it appear the court no longer considered venue as a
component of criminal subject matter jurisdiction.
All the precedent cases the court cited in Gorman were civil cases.
The court did not cite Furstenau,2 68 a case in which the court clearly
266. 232 Neb. 738, 441 N.W.2d 896 (1989).
267. See id. at 740, 441 N.W.2d at 898.
268. In Furstenau, the court traveled all the way back to the Nebraska Constitution of
1866 and cases decided under it, then worked its way up to the then present
going through the relevant constitutional and statutory amendments and cases.
We will not examine the court's journey in any depth, except that we should note
three early cases. The supreme court ruled on venue in a criminal case, appar-
ently for the first time, in Dodge v. People, 4 Neb. 220, 226 (1876), using language
that made it plain the court considered venue in criminal cases to be a component
of subject matter jurisdiction at that time under a state constitution that did not
contain a jury trial venue provision. Already in 1880, in Olive v. State, 11 Neb. 1,
7 N.W. 444 (1880), the supreme court again needed to deal with the jurisdiction!
venue problem under the new Nebraska Constitution of 1875 and the 1879 legis-
lation in essence continuing in effect the same statute construed in Dodge, but
under the new state constitution. Again, the supreme court unequivocally ruled
that charging a defendant in an improper county, i.e., improper venue, divested
the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed. The object of the change to the present
language in the Constitution of 1875, according to the supreme court in State ex
rel. Scott v. Crinklaw, 40 Neb. 759, 59 N.W. 370 (1894), and in Olive, was to
embody in the state's fundamental law a guarantee of a criminal trial before a
jury drawn from the vicinage where the crime is supposed to have been commit-
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ruled that venue is a component of criminal subject matter jurisdic-
tion, nor any of the earlier criminal cases seemingly in conflict with
the Gorman discussion.2 69 The failure to cite any criminal case law
could indicate a number of possibilities. The supreme court could
have drastically changed its approach to venue in criminal cases be-
tween March 31, 1989 and June 30, 1989 when it released Gorman.
Or maybe counsel for both parties failed to call the court's attention to
the difference between its prior treatment of venue in Gorman and the
court did not notice. 270 Clearly, as of June 30, 1989, we could not
know the court's true position on venue. Conceptually, Gorman, Fur-
stenau, and Meers cannot coexist peacefully.
In addition, we must consider State v. Dodson271 and State v.
Paul272 and attempt to determine how they fit into the present con-
ceptual situation. In Dodson,273 the four-justice majority held a plea-
based conviction invalid because the prosecutor's recitation of the fac-
tual basis contained in the arraignment record did not indicate that
the offense was committed in the trial court's county. This was so
even though the prosecutor told the arraigning court the street inter-
section nearest the site of the stop, the complaint alleged a county of
commission, and the defendant tendered a plea of guilty.2 74 The ma-
jority considered the lack of information on venue in the factual recita-
ted. That is, drawn from the folks who lived in close enough proximity to the
defendant that they would know the defendant's good character (assuming the
defendant had maintained a good character reputation in his vicinage). This
same jury would also know something of the other folks who would testify before
the jury, instead of a jury of strangers from distant places. This constituted a
substantial right in the court's view. The Crinklaw court was concerned specifi-
cally with the relationship between subject matter jurisdiction and venue and
again discussed the effect of the incorrect venue on subject matter jurisdiction. A
separate article probably could be written on the problems of venue in Nebraska
criminal cases alone. In this article, however, we must move on to other subjects.
269. See, for example, the following (in reverse of the BLUWBOOes required chronologi-
cal order): Robeen v. State, 144 Neb. 910, 15 N.W.2d 69 (1944)(concluding that
venue is a jurisdictional fact and NEB. CONST. art. I, § 11, and NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-1301 (Comp. Stat. 1929) give the defendant in a criminal prosecution the
right to be tried by an impartial jury in the county where the alleged offense was
committed); Gates v. State, 160 Neb. 722, 71 N.W.2d 460 (1955)(following
Robeen; NEB. Rxv. STAT. § 29-1301(Reissue 1943)); State v. Liberator, 197 Neb.
857, 251 N.W.2d 709 (1977)(following Robeen); State v. Laflin, 201 Neb. 824, 272
N.W.2d 376 (1978)(following Gates and containing the statement that if there
were no showing whatsoever of where the offense was committed then the trial
court lacked jurisdiction-not a plea case, tried to a jury). The failure to discuss,
distinguish, overrule, or even cite any of the criminal case precedents leads me to
reject the possibility of implicit overruling of the entire line.
270. It would be somewhat difficult to believe that all seven justices and all their law
clerks could miss something so important.
271. 250 Neb. 584, 550 N.W.2d 347 (1996).
272. 256 Neb. 669, 592 N.W.2d 148 (1999).
273. 250 Neb. 584, 550 N.W.2d 347 (1996).
274. See id. at 592, 550 N.W.2d at 354.
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tion so prejudicial a mistake that the Nebraska Supreme Court took
notice of it as plain error.2 75 In Pau4,276 the supreme court again de-
clared the absence of any indication of proper venue in the recitation
of the factual basis as error, but insufficiently prejudicial for appellate
courts to take notice of the error under the plain error rule and over-
ruled Dodson on the plain error point.27 7
If venue is so important as to be considered jurisdictional, then the
factual allegation of the site of commission of the charged offense in
the charging instrument sufficiently resolves the point. This is true
when a defendant tenders a plea of guilty or no contest, as long as
venue can be waived by a plea. If a guilty or no contest plea admits
venue as a matter of fact, then the absence of information establishing
venue in the prosecutor's recitation of the factual basis becomes irrele-
vant. The matter stands admitted and need not be addressed any fur-
ther. The Nebraska Supreme Court even took this position once.278
Under normal rules relating to judicial admissions of factual mat-
ters evidence may not even be offered on the admitted facts. A guilty
or no contest plea is a judicial admission of factual matters. While a
prosecutor's recitation of a factual basis should not be considered evi-
dence, evidence is not generally offered in plea proceedings unless one
275. Normally, Nebraska's appellate courts refuse to consider errors not specifically
assigned in the appeal documents, as well as alleged errors not raised in the trial
courts. Nebraska's appellate courts, however, also reserve the right to note plain
error not complained of at the trial level or on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Hays, 253
Neb. 467, 570 N.W.2d 823 (1997). Plain error may be found on appeal when an
error unasserted or uncomplained of at trial or on appeal, but plainly evident
from the record, so prejudicially affects a litigant's substantial rights that, if left
uncorrected, the error would cause a miscarriage of justice or damage the integ-
rity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial process. See, e.g., State v. Dodson, 250
Neb. 584, 550 N.W.2d 347 (1996).
276. 256 Neb. 669, 592 N.W.2d 148 (1999).
277. Intangibles can affect appellate case dispositions. In the three years between
Dodson and Paul, all four members of the Dodson majority (all members of what I
have been calling the "old" supreme court) had left the supreme court and had
been replaced. All three Dodson dissenters (the first three members of what I
have been calling the "new" supreme court) remained on the court at the time of
the Paul decision and still are on the court. Dodson was decided by a 4-3 vote.
Paul was unanimous.
278. In Clark v. State, 150 Neb. 494, 34 N.W.2d 877 (1948), Clark took a petition in
error from his plea-based convictions in county court to the district court. The
district court affirmed. The supreme court, while noting the procedural limita-
tions of error proceedings, also described Clark's position before the district court
this way: 'The complaint ified in the county court charged as to each count the
commission of an offense by [Clark] in Otoe County. To this complaint [Clark]
pleaded guilty .... It follows that [Clark] presented to the district court a peti-
tion in error containing an adjudication that certain offenses were committed and
that he had committed the offenses at the time charged and in Otee County." See
id. at 497, 34 N.W.2d at 879. Clark wanted to contest venue in district court, but
his guilty plea lead to an adjudication that venue was proper because the plea
admitted the venue stated in the complaint.
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of the parties wants to make a record on some special point they con-
sider unusual in a case. Thus, even though the new supreme court
still considers the failure to establish venue in the prosecutor's factual
recitation, the defendant's answers to judicial questioning, or the
presentence report 27 9 to be an error, it probably should not be consid-
ered an error. As long as the charging instrument identifies the
county and state in which the alleged offense was committed, the plea
admits the place the offense was committed as the place alleged in the
charging instrument.
If venue refers only to the place where the power to adjudicate
criminal cases can be exercised in any given case, then venue, while
moderately important, is not especially important and certainly not
jurisdictional. Further, if venue in criminal cases is only important on
the question of the place at which the court has power to adjudicate
the case, then no good reason appears to require that venue be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt as an issue of fact for the jury.28 O It should
be nothing more than a question of law for the judge.28 1 Plainly, con-
siderable uncertainty surrounds venue questions as they relate to
pleas of guilty and no contest in Nebraska.
3. Subject Matter Jurisdiction - Statute of Limitations Problems
Another area of uncertainty in Nebraska exists in the limitation of
action question. The Nebraska precedents dealing with statutes of
limitations as aspects of subject matter jurisdiction charitably can be
described as lost in a nearly impenetrable fog of inconsistency, but Ne-
braska is not alone in the fog. Other states are in hopeless conflict
with each other. Seven states say criminal defendants cannot waive
the statute of limitations. Nine states say they can. Two states have
said both they can and they cannot.28 2 For its part in the disagree-
ment, the United States Supreme Court approved a state trial judge's
refusal to submit lesser included offense instructions in a capital mur-
der prosecution in the absence of defendant's express waiver of the
279. Those are the three usually delineated means of determining the accuracy of the
tendered plea, that is, making a record on factual basis. The record could be
made in combinations of those three, however, plus the use of other means, such
as testimony of arresting officers.
280. Consider State v. Phelps, 241 Neb. 707, 725, 490 N.W.2d 676, 689 (1992), which
stated that "[t]here is no question that in the absence of a defendant's waiver, the
State has the burden to prove proper venue beyond a reasonable doubt."
281. See, e.g., United States v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
879 (1994)(holding that venue not an element of offense-government may prove
by preponderance of the evidence and need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt).
282. See Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Waivability of Bar of Limitations Against Crimi-
nal Prosecution, 78 A.L.R.4th 693 (1990).
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statute of limitations, where the statute of limitations had run on the
lesser included offenses. 283
In Jacox v. State,28 4 the Nebraska Supreme Court referred to proof
of the commission of the charged offense within the period of limita-
tion as an essential element.28 5 The court also referred to use of the
statute of limitations as a defense that need not be specially pleaded
and may be raised by pleading to the general issue (i.e., by tendering a
plea of not guilty). The court ruled that, if the applicable limitation
period has expired before the filing of the charging instrument, a con-
viction for the offense alleged is not sustained by the evidence, is con-
trary to law, and may not be upheld. The Nebraska Supreme Court
reafi ed the principles from Jacox in State v. Nuss,286 and added
the principle that the statute of limitations must be construed liber-
ally in favor of the accused.
As the Nebraska Supreme Court colorfully expressed the idea in an
earlier case, a guilty plea to a complaint charging an offense barred by
the expiration of the limitation period admits the commission of an
offense with respect to which the state has surrendered "its rights to
prosecute"28 7 and declared:
the offense to be no longer the subject of prosecution. The [criminal] statute
[of limitations] is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly ap-
plied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast
over the offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country,
and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may
cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are
blotted out.
2 8 8
A guilty plea making an admission like that admits nothing of legal
consequence and necessarily results in a non-conviction. Hogoboom,
Jacox, and Nuss appear entirely consistent with each other.
The supreme court holding in State v. Keithley289 seems inescap-
ably inconsistent with the three earlier cases.290 Keithley refused to
waive the statute of limitations on a lesser-included type of man-
slaughter during his trial for second degree murder.291 Without a
waiver, the trial judge refused to instruct on manslaughter, leaving
the jury no lesser-included option. Later, in the context of a postcon-
283. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
284. 154 Neb. 416, 48 N.W.2d 390 (1951).
285. See id. Essential elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the
defendant admits them.
286. 235 Neb. 107, 454 N.W.2d 482 (1990).
287. Hogoboom v. State, 120 Neb. 525, 527, 234 N.W. 422, 423 (1931)(quoting 1 FRAN-
CIS WHARTON, WHARTON's CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 368, at 416 (1oth ed. 1918)).
288. Id. (quoting 1 FRANcIS WHARTON, WHARTON's CROUNAL PROCEDURE § 367, at 415
(10' ed. 1918)).
289. 236 Neb. 631, 463 N.W.2d 329 (1990).
290. See supra text accompanying notes 284-288 (demonstrating an inconsistency).
291. See Keithley, 236 Neb. at 633, 463 N.W.2d at 329.
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viction relief action, a type of collateral attack, the supreme court
ruled that the defendant was not entitled to the lesser-included in-
struction in the face of his refusal to waive the bar of the statute of
limitations.292 Thus, Keithley logically and clearly indicates the bar of
the expired statute of limitations can be waived in Nebraska.293 The
court of appeals later read it just that way.
Relying on Keithley and a number of cases from other jurisdictions,
the Nebraska Court of Appeals ruled the statute of limitations defense
can be waived and that a defendant does waive it by tendering a plea
of guilty or no contest.29 4 The cases the appellate court chose to follow
generally considered the statute of limitations to be a defense that
must be raised in the trial court. In other words, the statute of limita-
tions is an affirmative defense, raising a non-jurisdictional point.29 5
The appellate court panel also, "for the sake of completeness," even
noted the jurisdictions holding the statute of limitations not waived by
a plea of guilty or no contest generally consider the expiration of the
292. See id. at 635, 463 N.W.2d at 332.
293. State v. Journey, 186 Neb. 556, 184 N.W.2d 616 (1971), presented the supreme
court with the situation of a defendant who had not requested appointed counsel
until after his plea was accepted, but before sentencing. This defendant obvi-
ously did not know expiration of the statute of limitations was a defense available
to him when he tendered his plea. The supreme court allowed him to withdraw
his plea.
294. See State v. Wiemer, 3 Neb. App. 821, 533 N.W.2d 122 (1995)(involving a plea of
no contest).
295. See id. at 833, 533 N.W.2d at 132-33. The appellate court also cited to a United
States Supreme Court decision as the authority upon which most of the federal
courts had taken the position that the defense of the expiration of the statute of
limitations is an affirmative defense. See Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police of
the City of New York, 245 U.S. 128 (1917). Irrespective of what the federal courts
lead our appellate court to believe with respect to the holding of Biddinger, the
real issue in Biddinger related to the admissibility of evidence within the context
of a federal habeas action on the presence of the accused in the extraditing state
at the time of the offense charged in the extraditing state. Biddinger had nothing
to do with whether the statute of limitations defense was or was not an affirma-
tive defense. The most relevant United States Supreme Court case cited in Bid-
dinger was United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. 168 (1872). Cook was one of the
infrequent federal criminal cases that made it to the Supreme Court on certified
questions arising upon a division of trial court judges' opinions from a circuit
court hearing a federal criminal case. In Cook, all the Supreme Court ruled was
that the statute of limitations defense could not be raised by demurrer to the
indictment, but could be raised by special plea or under a plea to the general
issue (i.e., a not guilty plea). Cook did not hold that expiration of the limitation
period was an affirmative defense either. A point of advocacy relevant here:
counsel should always read the cases they cite to courts, figure out what the real
issues were, and construct the real holdings. Earlier cases that do not deal with
the issues counsel needs addressed do nothing to assist the advancement or pro-
gress of the law, but do damage to courts' confidence in counsel and does damage
to the bar's confidence in courts who buy into inapposite authority.
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limitations period a jurisdictional matter.29 6 Recall that the Ne-
braska Supreme Court had ruled that using the statute of limitations
as a defense need not be pleaded specially and may be raised by a not
guilty plea. In other words, it is not an affirmative defense.297 In
Wiemer,298 the court of appeals did not cite or even mention the prior
inconsistent holdings of the Nebraska Supreme Court. In fairness to
the court of appeals, the supreme court itself did not cite, distinguish,
or even mention its own inconsistent precedents in Keithley. The
Keithley court cited only federal precedent apparently without notic-
ing federal practice and Nebraska practice differed on the jurisdic-
tional question.
No consideration of the effect of Nebraska's statute of limitations
on jurisdiction can be complete without at least a glance at the con-
trolling statutory language. Nebraska Revised Statutes section 29-
110299 provides the general rule. Unless the complaint or indictment
is filed within the applicable limitation period, no person shall be
"prosecuted for any felony" and no person shall be "prosecuted, tried or
punished for any misdemeanor or other indictable offense below the
grade of felony or for any fine or forfeiture under any penal stat-
ute."3 00 A statute declaring that a person fitting within its terms can-
not be prosecuted or tried or punished certainly smells jurisdictional.
Recall that the authorities from outside Nebraska generally consider
the jurisdictional point dispositive of the question of whether guilty or
no contest pleas waive the limitations defense. Thus, Nebraska trial
court judges, in the course of conducting arraignments, somehow must
obey inconsistent messages from the appellate tier, at least think
about the statutory language, and navigate safely through those
waters.
4. Miscellaneous Defenses Not Waived
Several other potential defenses do not evaporate on tender of
guilty or no contest pleas. Guilty and no contest pleas do not waive
facially obvious double jeopardy problems.3 01 Nor do such pleas waive
due process violations that would prevent the government from prose-
cuting, such as the filing of charges carrying more severe penalties
than the originally filed charges in retaliation for the defendant tak-
296. 3 Neb. App. at 833, 533 N.W.2d at 133.
297. See Nuss, 235 Neb. 107, 454 N.W.2d 482 (1990); Jacox, 154 Neb. 416, 48 N.W.2d
390 (1951); Hogoboom, 120 Neb. 525, 234 N.W. 422 (1931). The Hogoboom lan-
guage made it quite clear that the supreme court then considered the statute of
limitations a jurisdictional matter.
298. 3 Neb. App. 821, 533 N.W.2d 122 (1995).
299. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-110 (Reissue 1995).
300. Id. (emphasis added).
301. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975).
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ing a successful appeal. 30 2 Pleas of guilty or no contest also do not
waive the ability to claim ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in
the defendant's tender of the pleas.30 3 Also, authority outside Ne-
braska supports the proposition that competence to plead may be a
jurisdictional question. If competence to plead is jurisdictional, then
guilty and no contest pleas do not waive the question of competence to
plead.30 4
Nebraska has spawned no case law on the point, but there is yet
another problem in the area of "defenses" and waivers by pleas. If the
trial judge is actually prejudiced, a guilty or no contest plea does not
waive the disqualification. As seen in United States v. Troxell and
United States v. Gipson, guilty and no contest pleas do waive most
other bases for requests that trial judges recuse themselves.O5 One
key to these cases lies in the proposition that due process requires
impartial decision-makers. These two cases resolved the question
with reference to the nature of the disqualification at issue. A judicial
disqualification that is subject to remittal of disqualification under the
applicable code of judicial conduct, in the language of criminal proce-
dure re-labeled "subject to waiver," is discretionary. From that pre-
mise, pleas of guilty and no contest waive the judicial disqualification.
A mandatory disqualification is one that cannot be remitted under the
applicable code of judicial conduct, so it cannot be waived by pleas,
either.
There also seems to be a nameless, amorphous type of jurisdic-
tional question lurking somewhere in the ephemera beyond the outer
limits of normal subject matter and personal jurisdiction that relates
to the legal basis upon which a court could impose a criminal judg-
ment or sentence. Without a legal basis upon which to impose sen-
tence, any judgment rendered is void, not just voidable. Void
judgments are open to collateral attacks in which the courts must ex-
amine whether the trial court involved in the earlier judgment had a
legal basis upon which to impose the judgment. Constitutionally inva-
lid convictions have been declared void. The exact contours of this
particular approach cannot be drawn with any precision, but whatever
302. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
303. See United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979); State v. Stranghoener, 212
Neb. 203, 322 N.W.2d 407 (1982).
304. See JAmEs E. BoND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GuiTr PLEAs §7.21(g)(2d ed. 1982).
305. See, e.g., United States v. Troxell, 887 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1989)(involving actual
prejudice); United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1988) (involving
general disqualification claim that since judge, before appointed to the bench,
was the United States Attorney while defendant was prosecuted, judge should
recuse), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1044 (1988).
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it is, pleas do not waive the lack of a legal basis upon which to impose
judgment.3 0 6
Litigants attempting collateral attacks on this basis, and probably
other bases as well, will march straight into the wall created by the re-
invigorated dogma that the regularity of the prior criminal court pro-
ceeding will not be open to inquiry in state habeas corpus actions (a
form of collateral attack). Such inquiry is only available in more di-
rect proceedings.3 0 7 This seems the likely result of the current Ne-
braska Supreme Court's apparent aversion to its immediate past
predecessor's approaches to challenges levied against the validity of
plea-based convictions.
A jurisdictional question has been cast as any question the answer
of which could divest the state of the power to prosecute or divest the
court of the power to proceed. Thinking of jurisdiction that way pro-
vides a ready mnemonic tool for arraigning judges. The ability to re-
member all the details (many more details will be forthcoming)
involved in accepting pleas generally, while mentally occupied in the
details of the individual proceeding taking place, is one of the keys to
entry of valid convictions. Mnemonic tools provide arraigning judges
invaluable assistance in that regard. Reliance on second nature may
not be wise after reviewing all the details that can affect the validity of
plea-based convictions, to which we now turn.
IV. VALIDITY OF PLEA ON DIRECT APPEAL
"While a conviction based upon a guilty [or no contest] plea is
scarcely appeal-proof, such a conviction does insulate from appelate
[sic] review a great number of procedural irregularities that a defen-
dant convicted after trial may raise on appeal."3 0 8 In the view of the
United States Supreme Court:
a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in
,he criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in
open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he
may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of
constitutional rights that occurred prior to entry of the guilty plea.3 09
Thus, the arraigning judge has an obligation to each defendant
tendering a plea of guilty or no contest to protect the innocent and to
insure that such pleas are the product of the defendant's free and in-
306. See Berumen v. Casady, 245 Neb. 936, 515 N.W.2d 816 (1994). This could be the
cubby hole into which we can place the loss of jurisdiction to proceed that befalls
the trial courts who violate the defendants' right to counsel under federal
precedent.
307. See Rehbein v. Clarke, 257 Neb. 406, 598 N.W.2d 39 (1999).
308. JAams E. BoND, PLEA BARGAIninG AND GuILTY PLEAS § 1.5(b) (2d ed. 1982).
309. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
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telligent choice.310 The record of Nebraska plea proceedings must re-
flect that the judge has performed this obligation, at least in those
cases where a sentence to imprisonment follows the arraignment. The
record required for purposes of a direct appeal must satisfy, at a mini-
mum, the requirements of State v. Tweedy:31i
[N]o defendant may be imprisoned for any offense, whether a traffic infrac-
tion, misdemeanor, or felony, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of his
rights as provided for by ... Boykin-Turner .... That means that such de-
fendants are entitled to be informed of the nature of the charges against them,
the right to assistance of counsel, the right to confront witnesses against
them, the right to a jury trial where.., authorized, and the privilege against
self- incrimination. A voluntary and intelligent waiver of these rights must
affirmatively appear from the record.
3 1 2
And now, several revisions later, satisfying Tweedy still probably suf-
fices. Arraignment records on direct appeal must satisfy the more re-
cent cases of State v. Irish31 3 and State v. Hays.31 4 Close analysis
reveals that Irish and Hays added very little, if anything, to Tweedy.
The key to Tweedy lay in the sentence to imprisonment, not the
formal classification of the offense as a traffic infraction, misde-
meanor, or felony, although at that time perhaps just the possibility of
imprisonment could have been the key. Nebraska ordinance violation
prosecutions are criminal matters for most purposes.31 5 As a result,
ordinance violations with the possibility of imprisonment initially or
on subsequent enhancement of penalties on repeat convictions are
subject to the rules discussed in this article. Tweedy applies only to
guilty pleas accepted after August 31, 1981.316
The duty of arraigning judges to advise defendants of their consti-
tutional rights applies only at proceedings at which defendants tender
pleas of guilty or no contest. There is no duty to advise defendants
pleading not guilty of their constitutional rights at the proceedings. 31 7
Further, arraigning judges have no duty to advise any defendants of
310. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38, n.10 (1970); cf. McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) (noting that trial judge must preserve defendant's
rights).
311. 209 Neb. 649, 309 N.W.2d 94 (1981).
312. Id. at 654-55, 309 N.W.2d at 98.
313. 223 Neb. 814, 394 N.W.2d 879 (1986).
314. 253 Neb. 467, 570 N.W.2d 823 (1997).
315. See State v. Schachter, 217 Neb. 536, 348 N.W.2d 911 (1984) (requiring burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Knoles, 199 Neb. 211, 256 N.W.2d 873
(1977) (applying double jeopardy under state constitution-traffic infraction);
State v. Kolosseus, 198 Neb. 404, 253 N.W.2d 157 (1977) (applying wiretapping
act). A few ordinance violations are classified as misdemeanors by statute, in-
cluding, for example, zoning violations. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 19-913 (Reissue
1995). An unanswered question lying beneath the surface of Tweedy is whether
an infraction convict may be allowed to lay out the fine and costs even
voluntarily.
316. See State v. Clark, 217 Neb. 417, 420, 350 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1984).
317. See State v. Crider, 232 Neb. 210, 211-212, 440 N.W.2d 219, 220 (1989).
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the right to appeal. The failure to advise a defendant of the right to
appeal does not invalidate any conviction or sentence. 318
After several years of applying Tweedy, toying with different ideas,
and developing additional rules in scattered cases, the supreme court
adopted its consolidated and uniquely stated Nebraska rule in State v.
Irish:3 19
[In order to support a finding that a plea of guilty or nolo contendere has been
entered freely, intelligently, voluntarily, and understandingly,
1. The [arraigning] court must
a. inform the defendant concerning (1) the nature of the charge; (2) the
right of assistance to counsel; (3) the right to confront witnesses against the
defendant; (4) the right to a jury trial; and (5) the privilege against self-in-
crimination; and
b. examine the defendant to determine that he or she understands the
foregoing.
2. Additionally, the record must establish that
a. there is a factual basis for the plea; and
b. the defendant knew the range of penalties for the crime with which he
or she is charged.
[Tihe taking of the foregoing steps is sufficient to assure that a plea repre-
sents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of ac-
tion open to a criminal defendant, the ultimate standard by which pleas of
guilty or nolo contendere are to be tested.
3 2 0
The court's Irish formulation did not contain within itself, nor should
it have needed to include, 32 1 a requirement that the record affirma-
tively disclose voluntary and intelligent waivers of the rights to coun-
sel, jury trial, confrontation, and the exemption from compelled self-
incrimination as required by the Boykin-Turner-Tweedy rules. The
Irish majority relied mainly on Boykin, Turner (1971), and Tweedy as
the holdings from which its formulation was distilled.322 Further, the
Irish majority said nothing that could be construed to detract from the
previously required affirmative showing of a voluntary and intelligent
waiver. Most importantly, the extent of a showing of such a waiver
318. See State v. Von Dorn, 234 Neb. 93, 101, 449 N.W.2d 530, 535 (1989).
319. 223 Neb. 814, 394 N.W.2d 879 (1986).
320. Id. at 820, 394 N.W.2d at 883 (internal citations omitted); see also State v.
Belmarez, 254 Neb. 467, 473-74, 577 N.W.2d 264, 269 (1998) (explaining that the
requirements assure that a plea represents a voluntary choice between various
options available to a defendant); State v. Fulton, 231 Neb. 918, 438 N.W.2d 788
(1989) (providing an excellent example of the method the supreme court used in
1989 to analyze whether the arraigning court satisfied the requirements of Irish
and whether the defendant tendered the plea voluntarily and intelligently); State
v. James, 6 Neb. App. 444, 446-47, 573 N.W.2d 816, 819 (1998)(petition for fur-
ther review overruled).
321. Tweedy had already required the affirmative showing of a voluntary and intelli-
gent waiver of the three federal rights listed in Boykin. While it could be argued
the failure to include that requirement in Irish meant the court no longer re-
quired the showing, that argument would be especially weak, even under the
American approach to precedent.
322. See Irish, 223 Neb. at 819, 394 N.W.2d at 882.
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was not in issue in Irish. Generally, courts do not respond to issues
not raised, so the failure of an appellate court to include discussion of
an issue not raised usually means nothing from the precedential point
of view. There was no reason, therefore, to believe that the affirma-
tive showing of a voluntary and intelligent waiver had been aban-
doned. The supreme court made it clear in later decisions the
requirement had not been abandoned.3 23
Correctly advising a pleading defendant of the required matters
and determining each defendant understands a plea of guilty or no
contest waives the rights of which the court advised the defendant are
separate mandatory steps. The record on direct appeal must show
both steps were properly taken. 324 The supreme court concluded in
State v. HaysS25 that a guilty plea (obviously, also a no contest plea)
can be accepted validly
only if the record [of the plea proceeding] affirmatively shows that a defendant
understands that by pleading guilty he [or she] waives [the defendants] right
to confront witnesses against [the defendant], [the defendant's] right to a jury
trial, and [the defendant's] privilege against self-incrimination, or otherwise
affirmatively shows an express waiver of said rights. 3 2 6
The better practice is for the arraigning judge to take the few mo-
ments necessary with each pleading defendant to ask the defendant if
the defendant understands the plea waives at least the three federal
rights and to ask the defendant for an express waiver of each of those
rights. Thus, while properly speaking, Hays did not add anything to
Irish that was not already there from other cases. Hays made abun-
dantly clear the court will insist on the sufficiency of the arraignment
record to show correct advice, understanding, and express waivers. 3 27
323. See State v. Hays, 253 Neb. 467, 570 N.W.2d 823 (1997); cf. State v. Nowicki, 239
Neb. 130, 474 N.W.2d 478 (1991) (stating that a voluntary and intelligent waiver
will not be inferred from the appearance of the defendant at trial without counsel
after having been informed of his or her right to counsel).
324. See State v. Fochtman, 7 Neb. App. 532, 538-39, 584 N.W.2d 468, 473 (1998).
Readers who wish to review the general case law background of the Irish rule at
this point may find it in State v. Clark, 217 Neb. 417, 350 N.W.2d 521 (1984);
State v. Tweedy, 209 Neb. 649, 309 N.W.2d 94 (1981); and State v. Turner, 186
Neb. 424, 183 N.W.2d 763 (1971).
325. 253 Neb. 467, 570 N.W.2d 823 (1997).
326. Id. at 475-76, 570 N.W.2d at 829.
327. The current position emphasizing the need for express waivers completes, once
again, the total retreat from the early, post-Boykin, Nebraska approach that ex-
press waivers were not required. See State v. Workman, 186 Neb. 467, 183
N.W.2d 911 (1971); State v. Turner, 186 Neb. 424, 183 N.W.2d 763 (1971); State
v. Starr, 186 Neb. 327, 182 N.W.2d 910 (1971).
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V. SUFFICIENCY OF THE RECORD
Having no record of the court's advice to defendants is clearly in-
sufficient. State v. Kucera3 2S presented a direct appeal of a conviction
for theft of less than $300.00 with a five-day jail sentence. Kucera
appealed only the sentence, not the conviction. 329 The Nebraska Su-
preme Court allowed the insufficiency of the record to be raised for the
first time on appeal and remanded to the trial court for rearraign-
ment, because the record from the trial court did not disclose that the
defendant was advised of any of her rights at any time.330
Kucera does not mean that only a verbatim transcription of the ar-
raignment proceeding is acceptable. 3 31 In State v. Blue,332 the coun-
seled defendant waived the presence of the court reporter at her
arraignment and entry of a no contest plea. The original docket entry
did not satisfy Tweedy. The trial judge, however, prepared an order
nunc pro tune on May 15, 1986, amending and expanding the original
docket entry of the arraignment, held on July 26, 1985, to show full
Tweedy compliance.333
The Nebraska Supreme Court allowed the long, after-the-fact nunc
pro tunc procedure and held:
Although a verbatim transcript is not constitutionally required to establish
the validity of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, such a record is the preferred
method for showing that the arraignment in the district court complied with
all constitutional requirements. Ordinarily, the arraigning court should not
permit a defendant entering either a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to waive
the presence of the court reporter.3 34
Thus, a detailed journal entry or checklist, as long as it complies with
Tweedy, State v. Ziemba,335 and State v. Predmore,33 6 may be a suffi-
cient record of the arraignment on direct appeal.
However, the Blue decision also apparently hinged in large part on
the counseled defendant's own role in procuring the deficient record at
arraignment and then asserting it as error on appeal.337 The careful
arraigning judge is still well advised to follow the preferred method of
328. 215 Neb. 337, 338 N.W.2d 443 (1983).
329. See id. at 337, 338 N.W.2d at 444.
330. See id.
331. For example, in State v. Hall, 188 Neb. 130, 195 N.W.2d 201 (1988), a postconvic-
tion action, the supreme court faced the unusual situation of the inability of any-
one to find the certified transcript of the trial court proceedings, the bill of
exceptions, or even the original court reporter from the plea proceeding. The
court approved the use of other evidence, including the presiding judge's testi-
mony, as a sufficient means of establishing the validity of the conviction.
332. 223 Neb. 379, 391 N.W.2d 102 (1986).
333. See id. at 383, 391 N.W.2d at 105.
334. Id. at 381, 391 N.W.2d at 104.
335. 216 Neb. 612, 346 N.W.2d 208 (1984).
336. 220 Neb. 336, 370 N.W.2d 99 (1985).
337. See State v. Blue, 223 Neb. 379, 391 N.W.2d 102, 105 (1986).
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memorializing the arraignment proceedings. 338 In 1968, The Ameri-
can Bar Association Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty outlined, a
year before Boykin, what the ABA believed should be the minimum
procedure in the taking of pleas of guilty or no contest. Even though
the Nebraska Supreme Court recommended compliance with the ABA
standards in State v. Turner,3 39 the court did not require compliance
with the standards in 1971.340
Care must be taken that the journal entry or checklist summariz-
ing what transpired at the arraignment proceeding is an accurate re-
flection of the event. Where the checklist and the certified
transcription of the oral proceeding conflict, the certified transcription
(for appeal purposes, designated the "bill of exceptions" in Nebraska
practice and "certified transcription" for all other purposes) will con-
trol.3 4 1 Checklists and journal entries used for this purpose should
also be authenticated by the arraigning judge's signature or ini-
tials.3 42 Also, a new sentence imposed following probation revocation
subjects the trial court's entire record to a direct appeal. The record
supporting the underlying conviction will then be subject to appellate
scrutiny as any other direct appeal from a guilty or no contest plea.3 43
VI. PERSONALLY ADDRESSING THE DEFENDANT
The arraigning judge must address the defendant personally and
examine the defendant to determine whether the defendant under-
stands the nature of the charge, the range of possible penalties, and
the effects of the tendered plea of guilty or no contest. This responsi-
bility cannot be delegated to defense counsel and cannot be satisfied
without a dialogue between the judge and the defendant. In State v.
Luther,344 the defendant's attorney tendered no contest pleas to two
counts of third degree sexual assault on behalf of his client. The judge
asked defendant's counsel whether defendant's pleas were made will-
ingly and understandingly and whether defendant understood the
pleas would subject defendant to the same penalties as would guilty
338. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GuiLTY § 1.7 (1968).
339. 186 Neb. 424, 426, 183 N.W.2d 763, 765 (1971).
340. Even though Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 does not apply to state courts, the Nebraska
Supreme Court once recommended compliance with Rule 11 as a matter of good
practice. See State v. Leger, 190 Neb. 352, 354, 208 N.W.2d 276, 278 (1973).
341. See State v. Jackson, 220 Neb. 656, 658-59, 371 N.W.2d 679, 681 (1985) (holding
that when checklist showed explanation of penalties, but certified transcription
did not, the defendant was not properly informed of all possible penalties).
342. See State v. Hays, 253 Neb. 467, 472, 570 N.W.2d 823, 827 (1997).
343. Cf. State v. Ozmun, 221 Neb. 481, 378 N.W.2d 170 (1985) (setting aside defen-
dant's sentence of imprisonment where there is no showing in the record that
defendant either had assistance or waived counsel).
344. 213 Neb. 477, 329 N.W.2d 569 (1983).
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pleas.3 4 5 The defendant's attorney responded: "That's correct." The
record, however, did not show any conversation directly between the
judge and the defendant. The Nebraska Supreme Court remanded
the case, explaining it cannot be said the record demonstrated that the
defendant tendered the pleas knowingly and understandingly, in the
absence of a record showing personal examination of the defendant by
the judge.346 The dialogue between the judge and the defendant can
reveal a number of important considerations.
A. Competence to Plead
By definition, an incompetent defendant cannot tender a voluntary
and intelligent plea of guilty or no contest.3 4 7 A defendant can be
incompetent, as relevant here, from any number of reasons, including
such causes as hearing and speaking impairments, inability to com-
municate in the English language, mental deficiency or illness, or
from being under the influence of hallucinogens or intoxicants. The
simple device of appointing qualified interpreters can, for purposes of
guilty and no contest pleas, cure incompetence from hearing and
speaking impairments or an inability to communicate in the English
language.3 48 The record must be kept with special care when the pro-
ceedings include the use of interpreters.3 49
Mental competence to plead and mental competence to stand trial
are measured under the same legal standard. That standard is
whether the defendant has the present capacity to understand the na-
ture and object of the proceedings, to comprehend the defendant's own
condition with respect to such proceedings, and to assist in presenting
a rational defense. 35 0 Any grounds for uncertainty as to a defendant's
competence to plead generally should be objectively evident to the ar-
345. See id. at 477, 392 N.W.2d at 570.
346. See id.
347. See Case v. State, 177 Neb. 404, 410, 129 N.W.2d 107, 111 (1964).
348. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-2401 to 25-2406 (Reissue 1997 & Cum. Supp. 1999); see
also State v. Topete, 221 Neb. 771, 773, 380 N.W.2d 635, 636 (1986)(explaining
that the trial court had discretion as to whether or not to appoint an interpreter).
349. In 1987, the Legislature adopted a detailed, mandatory procedure for the benefit
of the hearing impaired, dovetailed into the statutes on court interpreters, inter
alia. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-150 to 25-159 (Reissue 1995).
350. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993); State v. Rehbein, 235 Neb. 536, 455
N.W.2d 821 (1990); State v. Teater, 217 Neb. 723, 725, 351 N.W.2d 60, 62 (1984);
see also State v. Beans, 212 Neb. 31, 321 N.W.2d 72 (1982)(applying mental com-
petence standard in a case of a defendant pleading temporary incapacity due to
mental illness); State v. Quarrels, 211 Neb. 204, 318 N.W.2d 76 (1982)(determin-
ing mental competency where a defendant pleads mild retardation); State v.
Guatney, 207 Neb. 501, 299 N.W.2d 538 (1980)(reciting a complete list of factors
to consider in concurring opinion of Krivosha, C.J.); State v. Stapleton, 187 Neb.
628, 193 N.W.2d 284 (1971)(applying mental competency standards to narcotics
addict experiencing withdrawal symptoms).
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raigning judge, but not always. Whatever special steps may be neces-
sary can be determined at the time the arraigning judge develops
uneasiness with respect to the defendant's competence, which may
mean nothing more than complete relevant inquiry of the defendant
and counsel, if any. As a general rule, the judge/defendant dialogue
normally produced by a thorough arraignment proceeding produces an
adequate record demonstrating the defendant's competence to plead.
If the arraigning judge is presented with or knows of a mental health
evaluation report opining the defendant's incompetence, then no mat-
ter how counsel or the defendant may feel, the judge has a duty sua
sponte to conduct a competency hearing.35 1
The arraigning judge always should make a finding on the record
that the defendant is competent,3 5 2 assuming the defendant is compe-
tent. Findings of fact made by trial judges are generally not reversible
unless clearly erroneous. The more complete the record, the more
fruitful will be the appellate defense of the ensuing conviction.
B. Written Pleas
A written petition to tender a guilty plea is not an acceptable sub-
stitute for the requirement that the arraigning judge address each de-
fendant personally and ascertain that the defendant understands the
defendant's rights and makes a voluntary and intelligent waiver of
them. In State v. Predmore,3 5 3 the trial court substantially complied
with the personal colloquy requirement. The record showed Predmore
was present when the court advised a defendant in the immediately
preceding arraignment of his rights.354 The record also demonstrated
that Predmore admitted hearing and understanding the prior recita-
tion and voluntarily waived repetition of the advice of rights. Addi-
tionally, the court inquired of defendant personally about defendant's
understanding of the contents of his written petition to plead
guilty.3 55 The court held this substantial compliance was sufficient
but noted it is preferable to address and advise each defendant sepa-
rately. Further, the supreme court discouraged the use of written plea
351. See State v. Johnson, 4 Neb. App. 776, 787, 551 N.W.2d 742 (1996); see also State
v. Hernandez Zepeda, No. A-98-455, 1998 WL 800964, at *2 (Neb. Ct. App. Nov.
10, 1998)(holding that the decision to hold a competency hearing is within the
discretion of the trial court).
352. Cf. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (holding that there was nothing
in the record to indicate that defendant was incompetent); Carter v. Illinois, 329
U.S. 173 (1946); State v. Jost, 219 Neb. 162, 361 N.W.2d 526 (1985) (explaining
that the requirements for valid entry of a guilty plea provides the court with a
sound basis to evaluate the competency of the defendant).
353. 220 Neb. 336, 370 N.W.2d 99 (1985).




petitions because the supreme court believed the use of written plea
petitions increases, rather than decreases, the likelihood of error.3 5 6
C. Group Arraignments
The personal colloquy requirement does not interfere with the use
of group, or en masse arraignments to process the high volume of cases
facing many trial courts, despite the preference for individual arraign-
ments. In order to make an intelligent and voluntary plea in a group
arraignment, the defendant must have been present when the court
advised those charged of their constitutional rights and the other mat-
ters required by Irish. The record must disclose that defendant was
present at that time.35 7
The proper group arraignment procedure requires that the ar-
raigning judge calls each person being arraigned before the bench,
identifies the person, and advises the person that the remarks of the
court (i.e. the advice of rights, plea options, and consequences of each)
apply to each person individually.358 Given the recent re-emphasis on
the difference between giving advice and establishing the advisees'
understanding, trial judges also need to inquire specifically into each
defendant's understanding of the information imparted and that pleas
waive the rights explained in order to create sufficient group arraign-
ment records.
D. Grouping of Rights
"Grouping" rights in the judge's recital, i.e., combining a number of
rights and imparting several items of information without a pause for
response from a defendant, has been approved,35 9 but not explicitly, in
Nebraska. The Nebraska appellate tiers have reviewed quite a num-
ber of arraignments in which the trial court judges did group the
356. See State v. Mindrup, 221 Neb. 773, 777, 380 N.W.2d 637, 639 (1986); see also
State v. Cooper, 196 Neb. 728, 246 N.W.2d 65 (1976)(recommending strict adher-
ence to the personal address requirement of A. BAR Ass'N STANDARDS RELATING
TO PLEAS OF GuILTY § 1.4 (1968)); State v. Prichard, 215 Neb. 488, 493, 339
N.W.2d 748, 750 (1983)(stating that the use of printed plea and advice of rights
forms "must be supplemented in some way by a verbatim record of the dialog
between the court and the defendant-even in as minimal a degree as a question
directed to defendant asking him if he can read.")
357. See State v. Ziemba, 216 Neb. 612, 621, 346 N.W.2d 208, 214 (1984) (concluding
that the record did not disclose Ziemba's presence at the critical time); see also
State v. Martens, 222 Neb. 870, 387 N.W.2d 701 (1986)(concluding that the re-
cord did disclose defendant's presence at the critical time). Further, if the record
is incorrect, the trial court must be asked to correct it. The Nebraska Supreme
Court grants the record of the trial court the status of absolute verity on appeal,
at least presumptively.
358. See State v. Predmore, 220 Neb. 336, 340, 370 N.W.2d 99, 101 (1985).
359. In re Guilty Plea Cases, 235 N.W.2d 132, 138-39 (1975).
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rights advisory and have not disapproved or even seriously criticized
the approach. Under State v. Turner (1971),360 before accepting a
guilty or no contest plea, the arraigning judge does not need to direct
the defendant's attention to every constitutional right and obtain a
separate express waiver of each right before the judge can find a vol-
untary and intelligent waiver of such rights. Since the Tweedy361 and
Irish362 decisions, however, reliance cannot be placed on Turner, ex-
cept in hearing collateral attacks on post-Turner (1971), pre-Tweedy
convictions. 3 63 This is especially true since the supreme court indi-
cated its strong preference for express waivers of each individual right
in State v Hays.364 After Hays, no question should remain that ar-
raigning judges must obtain express rights waivers to produce records
adequate to survive direct appeals. Nothing in the need to create ade-
quate records to satisfy Hays, however, should prevent grouping of
rights in the arraigning courts' advisories.
E. Sentence Recommendations
"In the area of sentencing the defendant should be fully informed
that the trial judge will not be bound by any agreement. [The defen-
dant] should understand the recommendation is no more than a rec-
ommendation to be considered ... ."3 65 The supreme court has held a
defendant has no legal basis to rely on a sentence recommendation
made as a part of a plea bargain where the arraigning court made it
clear it was not in any way bound by any agreed sentence
recommendation.3 6 6
The Nebraska Supreme Court has specifically disapproved ABA
Standards Relating to Functions of the Trial Judge § 4.1(c)(1972), in-
sofar as it would not permit the withdrawal of pleas unless necessary
to correct manifest injustice in the plea bargaining. The court has
gone a long way, however, toward adopting ABA Standards Relating
to Pleas of Guilty §§ 2.1 and 3.3 (1968) with respect to plea bargains,
the judge's responsibilities in plea bargains, and withdrawal of guilty
and no contest pleas. 3 67 Close adherence to those standards is advisa-
360. State v. Turner, 186 Neb. 424, 425, 183 N.W.2d 763, 765 (1971).
361. State v. Tweedy, 209 Neb. 649, 309 N.W.2d 94 (1981).
362. State v. Irish, 223 Neb. 814, 394 N.W.2d 879 (1986).
363. Cf. State v. Ohler, 219 Neb. 840, 366 N.W.2d 771 (1985) (rejecting defendant's
claim of ineffective counsel).
364. 253 Neb. 467, 570 N.W.2d 823 (1997).
365. State v. Evans, 194 Neb. 559, 564-65, 234 N.W. 2d 199, 202 (1975).
366. See State v. Hutton, 218 Neb. 420, 423, 355 N.W.2d 518, 519 (1984).
367. See State v. Evans, 194 Neb. 559, 564-65, 234 N.W. 2d 199, 202 (1975).
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ble. Withdrawal of guilty pleas is subject to differing rules depending
upon the circumstances.3 6 S
VII. REQUIRED INFORMATION FOR THE ACCUSED
A. Nature of the Charge
Nebraska assisted the United States Supreme Court in establish-
ing the importance of the nature of the charge in Smith v. O'Grady.3 69
The convict in Smith, a man of little education, claimed he had been
arrested and subjected to an uncounseled plea bargain, which in-
cluded an agreed three-year prison sentence, and tendered his plea in
reliance on the agreement. 37 0 But Smith received a twenty-year
mandatory minimum sentence, learning the true charge only after
sentencing, despite repeated pre-plea requests for a formal statement
of the charge to which he was expected to plead. Smith failed to take a
direct appeal, because he knew no better and had no legal assistance.
After eight years in prison, Smith sought state habeas corpus relief.371
The state habeas court, a different district court than the sentencing
court, denied Smith's petition without a hearing. The Nebraska Su-
preme Court affirmed the denial, apparently considering the case not
important to merit an opinion, let alone a district court evidentiary
hearing.3 72 The Nebraska Constitution, at all relevant times, con-
tained guarantees of due process, 3 73 habeas corpus,3 7 4 counsel, a copy
of the charging instrument, confrontation, compulsory process, and a
jury trial,375 and immunity from compelled self-incrimination and
double jeopardy.3 76
Consider that, if true, Smith's state constitutional rights had been
violated in multiple ways. Yet the Nebraska Supreme Court did not
consider the case even worth an opinion. The case presents a single
example of the many sorts of claims the United States Supreme Court
368. See State v. Holtan, 216 Neb. 594, 344 N.W.2d 661 (1984). Withdrawal of guilty
and no contest pleas and the judge's responsibility with respect to plea bargains
are beyond the scope of this article, except as discussed above.
369. 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
370. See id. at 333-34.
371. See id.
372. See id. at 330.
373. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3.
374. See NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 8. Only three years after the court denied Smith's ap-
peal from the district court's refusal to hear the case, Judge Chappell, for the
supreme court, described the writ of habeas corpus as a "precious safeguard of
personal liberty... there is no higher duty imposed upon courts... than to
maintain it unimpaired." Tail v. Olson, 144 Neb. 820, 822, 14 N.W.2d 840, 841
(1944). One cannot help but notice the inconsistency between the rhetoric and
the reality.
375. See NEB. CoNsT. art. I, § 11.
376. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 12.
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had to leave to the state courts' discretion, unless the Supreme Court
could find a violation of federal due process to permit the Court to
exercise its federal question jurisdiction. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Smith and instructed that if an accused is
not given notice of the true nature of the charge levied, then the ac-
cused has been denied the first and most universally recognized re-
quirement of due process.3 7 7 Pleas may be deemed involuntary, either
because the defendant does not understand the nature of the constitu-
tional protections waived by the plea, or because the defendant has
such an incomplete understanding of the charge that the defendant's
plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt.378
The Nebraska Supreme Court has taken a flexible approach to
what is required in advising a defendant of the nature of the charge.
In State v. Turner (1984),379 the court held that "[t]he requirement
that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him is
satisfied if ... the record discloses that the defendant had fair notice
of what he was being asked to admit."3 8 0 Turner's own statement of
the factual basis showed a full understanding of the charge of robbery.
Further, Turner assured the court he had talked over the charge with
his attorney.3 8 1 Turner did not have any questions about the charge
when the judge referred to the charge contained in the information.
In reaching its decision, the court noted that "nature," in the sense
used, means only the essential characteristic of a thing.38 2 The
charge of robbery itself, stated in the statutory language, did not con-
tain "judicial jargon, technical terminology or words with mysterious
meaning which place recognition of the offense and comprehension of
its elements beyond the grasp of ordinary intelligence."3 8 3 Thus,
"[ilnforming a defendant about the nature of a charge levied does not
require a court to provide a spontaneous or unsolicited explanation of
the offense word by word in some geometric progression of defini-
tions."3 s 4 This general rule is limited, however, by introductory lan-
guage in the opinion linking the holding to charges about which it
accurately can be said that the statutory language involved "fully, di-
rectly, and expressly, without uncertainty or ambiguity, contains all
the elements necessary to constitute the offense to be punished."385
377. See Smith, 312 U.S. at 334.
378. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976).
379. 218 Neb. 125, 354 N.W.2d 617 (1984).
380. Id. at 131, 354 N.W.2d at 621.
381. See id. at 125, 354 N.W.2d at 617.
382. See id. at 130, 354 N.W.2d at 621.





Two months before Turner (1984), the court announced State v.
Clark,aS6 also a robbery case. In Clark, the arraigning judge did not
explain the charge nor even read the information to the defendant, but
simply stated defendant was charged with robbery.3 8 7 The supreme
court found the arraignment procedure sufficient, because Clark was
charged with only the one offense and had discussed the charge with
his attorney, which was apparently shown in the record. The Clark
decision should be given very little weight for post-Tweedy matters,
because Clark's guilty plea was tendered three years before the
Tweedy mandate was issued and the Clark court declined to apply
Tweedy retroactively. It is noteworthy that in Clark, the court, refer-
ring to the Turner case of 1971, said it had in Turner "embraced the
ABA Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty (Approved Draft 1968) as
the minimal procedure to be used in accepting guilty pleas," a claim
the court later would repudiate.3 8 8 In Irish,3 8 9 the supreme court spe-
cifically disapproved any of its earlier statements that any form of the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, including those relating to guilty
pleas, had been adopted in Nebraska.
In State v. Mindrup,3 90 the defendant, through her attorney,
waived the reading of the complaint.3 91 On appeal, she argued she
had not been advised of the nature of the charge. The court rejected
her argument because she had waived the reading of the complaint. If
read, it would have advised her of the nature of the charge. Further,
as in Turner (1984), the court noted the complaint charging third of-
fense driving while under the influence of alcohol was worded in the
language of the statute, free of ambiguity and stated all the elements
of the offense.
In closely related requirements not contained in the ABA Stan-
dards, each Nebraska defendant has a state constitutional right to a
copy of the charging instrument and a statutory right to receive the
copy of the charging instrument at least one day before being called
upon to answer or being arraiged.3 92 The statute provides for a
waiver of the right to a waiting period and provides that service of the
copy upon counsel suffices. In State v. Henn,3 9 3 the defendant as-
signed as error his non-receipt of a copy of the information, but his
386. 217 Neb. 417, 350 N.W.2d 521 (1984).
387. See id. at 418, 350 N.W.2d at 523.
388. Id. at 421, 350 N.W.2d at 524.
389. State v. Irish, 223 Neb. 814, 818, 394 N.W.2d 879, 882 (1986).
390. 221 Neb. 773, 380 N.W.2d 637 (1986).
391. See id. at 776, 380 N.W.2d at 639.
392. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 11; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1802 (Reissue 1995). The one-
day rule does not apply to a habitual criminal allegation. See State v. Cole, 192
Neb. 466, 467, 222 N.W.2d 560, 560-61 (1974); State v. Poe, No. A-91-102, 1992
WL 90034 (Neb. Ct. App. May 5, 1992).
393. 223 Neb. 280, 388 N.W.2d 846 (1986).
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attorney had received notice more than a month before the arraign-
ment. The supreme court ruled defense counsel's receipt of a copy of
the charging instrument satisfies the statute.3 9 4
The Turner (1984) and Mindrup decisions should be followed with
great care in recognition of the limitation in the scope of their holdings
to charges based upon simply worded statutes containing all the ele-
ments of the offenses charged. A number of crimes in Nebraska are
defined by statutes that do not contain all the elements. For example,
Nebraska Revised Statutes section 28-611(1),395 defining the offense of
issuing a bad check, and section 69-109,396 defining the offense of sell-
ing secured property without consent, do not contain all the elements
of the respective offenses. Intent to defraud has been declared an ele-
ment of each offense by Nebraska Supreme Court decisions.39 7 Thus,
the arraigning judges in such cases should heed the implication con-
tained in Turner (1984) and Mindrup and explain the element of in-
tent, especially if it is not alleged in the charging instruments. If the
arraigning judges do not heed the implication, then counsel should
know what to argue on appeal.
In addition, any offense that contains a specific intent poses a spe-
cial problem of ensuring the defendant's understanding of the specific
intent element. The specific intent element, in a case involving a de-
fendant of lower intelligence, creates an even more difficult situation.
Recall Henderson v. Morgan,3 9 8 in which the Court stated:
There is no need in this case to decide whether notice of the true nature, or
substance, of a charge always requires a description of every element of the
offense; we assume it does not. Nevertheless, intent is such a critical element
of the offense of second-degree murder that notice of that element is
required.3 9 9
It should be obvious that Henderson applies to Nebraska state
court plea proceedings. But just in case the point could be missed, the
United States District Court for the District of Nebraska applied Hen-
derson in vacating a 1976 county court plea-based conviction of con-
cealing stolen property having a value of less than $100.00 with the
intent to defraud the owner thereof under the old criminal code.40 0
The accused pleaded guilty, without counsel, because he believed his
mere possession of the property was proof of the charge and he, there-
fore, had to plead guilty. The arraigning judge did not explain the
394. See id. at 281, 388 N.W.2d at 848.
395. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-611(1) (Reissue 1995).
396. NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-109 (Reissue 1996).
397. See, e.g., State v. Kock, 207 Neb. 731, 300 N.W.2d 824 (1981)(regarding bad
checks); State v. Hocutt, 207 Neb. 689, 300 N.W.2d 198 (1981)(regarding secured
property).
398. 426 U.S. 637 (1976).
399. Id. at 647 n.18.
400. See Comer v. Black, CV82-L-657 (D. Neb. Sept. 24, 1984).
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intent to defraud element, even though the accused did not under-
stand that element. Judge Urbom found the accused's plea involun-
tary due to his lack of understanding of the intent element. Without
an accurate understanding of the specific intent element, the plea was
not an intelligent admission of guilt. Recall that admissions and waiv-
ers that cannot be considered "intelligent," in the special sense of that
word, cannot be considered "voluntary," in the special, constitutional
sense of that word.
Generally speaking, special circumstances or particular elements
of various offenses may require the arraigning judge to exercise great
care in explaining the nature of the charge. This requires especially
strict appellate review even though explaining the nature of the
charge historically was not a rigidly enforced precondition to accept-
ance of a valid plea.401 Recent case law indicates that the practice of
explaining the nature of the charge could be gaining momentum to-
ward becoming a more rigidly enforced requirement.402 Even so,
"there is no requirement that the ... court inform the defendant of
possible legal defenses."403
B. Possible Penalties
While Tweedy did not list among its requirements that a defendant
be advised of and understand the possible penalties for the offense
charged, it is settled that, at a minimum, the defendant must be
aware of and understand the possible penalties prior to acceptance of
a plea of guilty or no contest.404 In State v. Curnyn,405 the defendant's
401. The present Nebraska Criminal Code contains a number of specific intent of-
fenses, which, similar to bad check and selling secured property without consent
charges, would trigger the need for a more thorough than normal explanation.
402. See State v. Biernacki, 237 Neb. 215, 465 N.W.2d 732 (1991)(asserting the better
practice is for judge to directly inquire of the defendant personally regarding de-
fendant's understanding of charge); State v. Dean, 237 Neb. 65, 464 N.W.2d 782
(1991)(stressing it is especially important to explain and gain defendant's state-
ment of understanding regarding unusual elements such as intent and aiding
and abetting); State v. Ponec, 236 Neb. 710, 463 N.W.2d 793 (1990)(holding that
judge MUST examine defendant for understanding of charge, even if prosecutor
reads charge aloud to defendant as part of arraignment proceeding. This case
also declared Clark (1984), see supra text accompanying note 333, inapplicable to
uncounseled defendant facing multiple charges); State v. Walker, 235 Neb. 85,
453 N.W.2d 482 (1990)(holding that shortcuts from Irish requirements not al-
lowed, and therefore arraigning judges MUST explain nature of charge); see also
State v. Reams, No. A-92-780, 1993 WL 289487 (Neb. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 1993)(hold-
ing that if the record indirectly shows defendant understood charge, then the
judge's failure directly to inquire not fatal error).
403. State v. Enfield, 223 Neb. 870, 394 N.W.2d 667 (1986). Conventional wisdom
indicates judges have no business advising defendants of possible legal defenses
anyway.
404. State v. Irish, 223 Neb. 814, 394 N.W.2d 879 (1986), added that ingredient to the
list of required contents. By now it should have become apparent that the Ne-
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only contention in his appeal from a denial of post-conviction relief
was that the arraigning judge had not advised him of the mandatory
minimum nor maximum possible sentences for burglary. Referring to
Turner (1971), the supreme court noted that a defendant must under-
stand the relevant factors involved in a guilty plea. To that end, the
Turner court said that, before accepting a guilty plea, an arraigning
judge is expected to examine a defendant to determine whether the
defendant understands the nature of the charge, the possible penalty,
and the effect of the plea. The court then described the ABA Stan-
dards Relating to Pleas of Guilty as the minimum procedure to be
followed.
The record in Curnyn showed the only deficiency in Curnyn's ar-
raignment was the failure to advise Curnyn of the possible penalties
or even to inquire of Curnyn or defense counsel whether Curnyn was
aware of the possible penalties. The court observed that "[iut is diffi-
cult to conceive how a guilty plea can be voluntary and intelligent un-
less and until the defendant is informed or is made aware of the
possible penalties to which he may be subjected by... such a plea."40 6
The court held the arraignment deficient and remanded the case for a
determination of whether Curnyn was aware of the possible penalties
before pleading. If he was aware, the conviction and sentence were
affirmed. If he was not aware, then the conviction was vacated and
Curnyn would be allowed to plead again.
The supreme court later applied the Curnyn procedure on remand
in State v. Jackson4O7 and State v. Fischer.40 In Jackson, the judge's
checklist and the bill of exceptions conflicted as to whether Jackson
was informed by the court of the possible penalties, leaving open the
question of Jackson's knowledge at the time he tendered his plea. In
Fischer, as in Curnyn, the record showed the district court had not
advised the defendant of the possible penalties, but the supreme court
found some evidence implying defendant was aware.
braska Supreme Court developed several scattered rules in separate sub-lines of
cases dealing with the validity of plea-based convictions, beginning in earnest
only in 1971. Only as time passed and the need to consolidate the various sub-
lines of requirements for ease of reference became acute did the supreme court
finally consolidate them. The United States Supreme Court still has not done so
despite the fact that it started the whole thing. Of course, since state supreme
courts issue so many more decisions than the United States Supreme Court, the
problem of maintaining the efficient retrievability of case law presents a far more
pressing problem for the state supreme courts, and makes periodic restatements
of complete lines of authority more useful to state supreme courts.
405. 202 Neb. 135, 274 N.W.2d 157 (1979).
406. Id. at 140, 274 N.W.2d at 161.
407. 220 Neb. 656, 371 N.W.2d 679 (1985)(involving a DUI second offense - no con-
test plea).




The district court, on remand in Fischer, held an evidentiary hear-
ing at which the evidence showed that, even though the district court
had not informed Fischer of the possible penalties, both the county
attorney and defense counsel had informed Fischer. The county court
judge, after the county attorney had read the complaint and also had
stated the possible penalties in the county court, asked Fischer if he
understood the possible penalties, and Fischer stated that he did un-
derstand.409 On this evidence, the supreme court affirmed the convic-
tion and sentence despite Fischer's contention the trial judge
personally must state the penalty, explaining that, while it is prefera-
ble that the trial judge accepting a plea inform the defendant of the
possible penalty, it is possible to prove defendant's knowledge of that
penalty at the time of his plea by other means. In Mindrup, the court,
citing Fischer II, said: "[Ilt does not matter how a defendant comes to
understand the possible penalty for an offense, so long as he or she
was aware of it at the time of the plea."410
In State v. Tichota,41 with respect to a charge of refusal to submit
to a chemical test, the defendant contended the arraigning judge must
advise the defendant of the possible penalties for first, second, and
third offense refusal to submit, arguing by analogy to State v.
Ziemba.41 2 The supreme court held: "We agree. The court in this in-
stance advised him only of the penalty for 1st offense, which was all
that he was charged with and of which he was found guilty. To that
extent, there was no error."41 3 With what the court agreed does not
clearly appear, but the result is clear. One can reasonably infer that it
suffices if the arraigning court advises the defendant of the possible
penalties on the charge the defendant faces at the arraignment in-
volved. The arraigning court is not required to advise the defendant of
the possible enhanced penalties on potential subsequent offenses not
then before the court.
The trial judge's failure to correctly advise a pleading defendant on
the possible penalties can invalidate the pleas tendered.41 4 It is clear
that a defendant's plea cannot be found voluntary in a case where the
defendant is misinformed by the court as to the penalties and then
sentenced to a minimum term that exceeds the minimum the court
told the defendant could be imposed.41 5 Where the court misinforms
the defendant of the possible penalties, however, but sentences only to
409. See State v. Fischer, 220 Neb. 664, 665-66, 371 N.W.2d 316, 317 (1985)(Fischer
II).
410. Mindrup, 221 Neb. at 776-77, 380 N.W.2d at 639; see State v. Salisbury, 7 Neb.
App. 86, 579 N.W.2d 570 (1998).
411. 218 Neb. 444, 356 N.W.2d 85 (1984).
412. 216 Neb. 612, 346 N.W.2d 208 (1984).
413. Tichota, 218 Neb. at 446, 356 N.W.2d at 86 (emphasis added).
414. See State v. Van Ackeren, 234 Neb. 535, 451 N.W.2d 707 (1990).
415. See State v. McMahon, 213 Neb. 897, 331 N.W.2d 818 (1983).
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the minimum the court told defendant was possible, there is no
prejudice to the defendant, despite the misinformation.41 6
The supreme court has not yet released a decision in a direct ap-
peal squarely on point with respect to advice of enhancement possibili-
ties, except Tichota. The question was raised in an enhancement
appeal in State v. McSwine.417 The supreme court entertained the is-
sue in McSwine, even though it was outside the permissible scope of
appeals from enhancement proceedings. The court ruled that the fail-
ure to advise pleading defendants of future potential enhancements
upon continued criminality does not invalidate prior convictions. 418
Such advice "has never been a requirement at any point in the sen-
tencing procedure."4i9 Advising defendants of anything at sentenc-
ing, other than their right to speak prior to pronouncement of
sentence, has never been a requirement at sentencing, so the court
must have misspoken in McSwine.42o
For a time, the Nebraska Supreme Court had indicated by the
trend of its decisions that it might strictly apply ABA Standards Re-
lating to Pleas of Guilty § 1.4 (1968). That Standard requires the ar-
raigning judge to advise the defendant of the maximum possible
sentence, including the maximum possible from consecutive
sentences; the mandatory minimum, if any; and any different or addi-
tional punishment authorized by reason of prior convictions, which
may be established after the plea to the actual charge.421
Then, in State v. Irish,42 2 the Nebraska Supreme Court's 4-3 deci-
sion with a strong dissent abruptly severed the line of cases indicating
it might strictly apply the ABA Standards. Irish claimed his no con-
test plea was not tendered intelligently and voluntarily because the
district court had not informed him of the possibility that the sentence
imposed on the forgery charge to which he was pleading could be im-
posed to run consecutively with the sentence received on an earlier
conviction of manslaughter. The district court did impose the forgery
sentence to run consecutively to the earlier manslaughter sentence.
416. See State v. Jipp, 214 Neb. 577, 334 N.W.2d 805 (1983).
417. 231 Neb. 886, 438 N.W.2d 778 (1989).
418. So, we know the old supreme court's feeling on the question, but the most charita-
ble description we can give the court's answer to the question not presented is
that it was dictum.
419. State v. McSwine, 231 Neb. at 893-894, 438 N.W.2d at 782 (emphasis added).
420. With the adoption, however, of the so-called Truth-in-Sentencing Act, NEB. REv.
STAT. § 29-2204(1)(b) and (c)(Reissue 1995), sentencing judges must advise de-
fendants, on the record after pronouncing felony sentences, how much time the
defendants will serve before initial parole eligibility and before mandatory
discharge.
421. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (1982); ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCE-
DURE § 350.4(1)(e)(1972).
422. 223 Neb. 814, 394 N.W.2d 879 (1986).
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The majority first noted the ABA Standards, both the 1968 Ap-
proved Draft and the 1980 Second Edition, provide that a pleading
defendant "be advised of the effect which may result from the possible
imposition of consecutive sentences," an imprecise paraphrasing of the
Standards.423 The majority also noted that its language over the
years had "drifted" from the Turner (1971) language to statements
"that the court had adopted or embraced some of the standards relat-
ing to guilty pleas as reflected by the approved draft of 1968."424 The
majority then declared that "we now specifically disapprove any state-
ments that any form of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, in-
cluding those relating to guilty pleas, has been adopted by this
state."4
25
On the issue before the court, the majority rejected Irish's claim
that he should have been informed of the effect of a possible consecu-
tive sentence. Recognizing its language in Curnyn that, unless and
until a defendant is made aware of the possible penalties to which he
may be subjected, a voluntary- and intelligent guilty plea from that
defendant would be difficult to conceive,426 the Irish majority ex-
plained that the court's Curnyn language
does not mean, however, that the court must explain whether each sentence
imposed for each separate crime is to be served concurrently with or consecu-
tively to any other sentence which may be imposed, or which the defendant is
already serving for another crime. Explaining the possible range of penalties
for each crime is adequate to enable a defendant to freely, voluntarily, intelli-
gently, and understandingly plead to each crime with which he is charged.4 2 7
Thus, the supreme court does not include, in its minimum require-
ments for acceptance of guilty and no contest pleas, any form of advice
to defendants about the possibility of consecutive sentences, except
with respect to mandatory consecutive sentences.
In State v. Golden,428 the supreme court held that failure to inform
the defendant that any sentence on a conviction of use of a firearm in
the commission of a felony must be imposed consecutively to any sen-
tence on the underlying charge included in the case then before the
court rendered the defendant's pleas to both charges in the case invol-
untary, even though the defendant was sentenced only to probation.
Nothing in the record indicated the defendant was aware of the
mandatory consecutive sentence he faced at arraignment, although
the arraigning judge did tell the defendant that consecutive sentenc-
ing was possible. A possible consecutive sentence is a far different
423. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.4 (Approved Drai 1968);
STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JUSTICE § 14-1.4 (2d ed. 1980).
424. State v. Irish, 223 Neb. at 818, 394 N.W.2d at 882.
425. Id.
426. See State v. Curnyn, 202 Neb. at 140, 274 N.W.2d at 160-61.
427. State v. Irish, 223 Neb. at 821, 394 N.W.2d at 883.
428. 226 Neb. 863, 415 N.W.2d 469 (1987).
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matter than a mandatory consecutive sentence in terms of the actual
penalty a defendant faces.
The purpose of the rule requiring that defendants be told of
mandatory consecutive sentencing is to apprise defendants of the min-
imum time they will be imprisoned so their pleas will be tendered with
full knowledge of the potential consequences. 4 29 In Lyman, however,
a divided supreme court affirmed the conviction, even though the ar-
raigning judge did not advise the defendant of the mandatory consecu-
tive sentence involved.43 0 This was because the arraigning judge did
advise the defendant of a range of possible sentences exceeding the
minimum time properly possible even with the mandatory consecutive
sentence on one charge. As a result, the arraigning judge's error was
not prejudicial. Lyman seems consistent with McMahon,431 and
Jipp,432 even though neither case was cited in Lyman.
In State v. Stastny,4 33 a DUI second offense conviction by guilty
plea, the arraigning judge advised Stastny of the statutory straight
sentence for DUI second offense, but did not advise Stastny of the 48-
hour mandatory jail condition of any possible probation sentence.
Stastny received a straight sentence after the trial court overruled his
motion to withdraw his plea. The motion to withdraw the plea was
based upon a claim that Stastny was not aware, at the time of tender-
ing his plea, that, even if he received a probation sentence, he would
receive at least a 48-hour jail sentence. Despite the fact that Stastny
received a straight sentence, the possible duration of which the ar-
raigning judge indisputably advised Stastny before the plea was ten-
dered, the unanimous court reasoned:
[N]o case in Nebraska has required a sentencing court to inform a defendant
contemplating a guilty plea of the possible restrictions of freedom of move-
ment in an order of probation. For that matter, no authority exists in this
state that requires the defendant to be informed of the possibility of probation
at all. We do not propose to make such a requirement now, except where, as
here, the Legislature has seen fit to limit a trial judge's discretion and require
incarceration as a term of probation. Mandatory confinement is a sentence, as
well as confinement as a term of probation is penal. Jail time is jail time.
Under no circumstances was appellant going to escape incarceration if found
guilty, whether for 2 days or 30 days. He was entitled to be advised of that
fact... In view of the uniqueness of the question, we confine the effect of the
rule announced today to be prospective only.4
3 4
429. See State v. Lyman, 230 Neb. 457, 459, 432 N.W.2d 43, 44 (1988).
430. See id.
431. State v. McMahon, 213 Neb. 897, 331 N.W.2d 818 (1983).
432. State v. Jipp, 214 Neb. 577, 334 N.W.2d 805 (1983).
433. 223 Neb. 903, 395 N.W.2d 492 (1986).
434. State v. Stastny, 223 Neb. 903, 905, 395 N.W.2d 492, 494 (1986); see State v.
Spiegel, 239 Neb. 233, 474 N.W.2d 873 (1991).
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The remand was limited to further proceedings under the Curnyn pro-
cedure discussed above. The Stastny rule applies to all second and
third offense DUI and refusal to submit to chemical test cases.
It may be significant, but alternatively may reflect only the court's
normally expected practice of limiting its rulings to only the questions
actually and necessarily presented, that the Stastny court chose not to
mention the mandatory loss of driver's license provisions of the DUI
second offense law. The opinion does not reveal whether the arraign-
ing judge advised the defendant of the mandatory loss of license provi-
sions. In State v. Mindrup,435 the court's opinion did reveal that
Mindrup had been informed of the mandatory loss of license provi-
sions in a way that left the impression an arraigning judge should do
so, because the loss of license is part of the penalty. Stastny could
indicate by omission from the opinion that advice of the mandatory
loss of license is not required, but then, might not indicate that at all.
The entire line of cases from Tweedy to Stastny indicates the pen-
alty advice the supreme court will absolutely require of an arraigning
judge is advice of the range of possible imprisonment, or a showing in
the record that a defendant was aware of the range of possible impris-
onment. It is clear that the possibility of probation need not be men-
tioned in most cases. It remains somewhat unclear, however, whether
the supreme court will be as exacting on possible penalties other than
possible imprisonment. 43 6
In State v. War Bonnett,4 3 7 a division of the Nebraska Supreme
Court held that an arraigning judge must inform the defendant of the
possibility of a restitution sentence under section 29-2280 of the Ne-
braska Revised Statutes. The arraigning judge advised War Bonnett
of the possible imprisonment and fine, but not of the possibility of a
435. 221 Neb. 773, 380 N.W.2d 637 (1986).
436. So far, Nebraska has remained a non-participant in discussions of direct conse-
quences of pleas, of which the arraigning judges must advise pleading defend-
ants, and collateral consequences of pleas, of which no judicial advice is required.
The federal system and a number of other states have analyzed penalty advice
within the direct/collateral consequences concept. All courts agree the minimum
and maximum length of any potential imprisonment is a direct consequence, of
which advice must be given and understanding obtained. After that, agreement
on what is a direct consequence falls apart, but can include: concurrent and con-
secutive sentencing possibilities; special sentencing statutes, i.e., habitual of-
fender laws, mandatory consecutive sentencing provisions, and ineligibility for
parole. See JAs E. BOND, PiEA BARGAuING AND GurmTy PLEAS § 3.38 (2d ed.
1982). Collateral consequences of which advice has not been required have in-
cluded: possible evidentiary use of the plea in other cases; reputational and other
adverse social consequences; loss of the right to vote; loss of passport and privi-
lege of travel abroad; loss of right to possess a firearm; loss of public employment;
loss of business licenses and motor vehicle operator's licenses; enhancement use
in later criminal proceedings; and, potential civil commitment. See generally 5
WAYNE R. LAFAvE ET AL., CmmTAL PROCEDURE § 21.4(d)(1999).
437. 229 Neb. 681, 428 N.W.2d 508 (1988).
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restitution sentence. The court sentenced War Bonnett to serve one
year in the county jail and to pay restitution and costs. The supreme
court concluded that plea-taking procedure was deficient in its penalty
advice and remanded for further proceedings under the Fisher-Curnyn
procedure, because merely informing the defendant of the possible jail
sentence and fine is not sufficient to allow the court to impose a resti-
tution sentence. In State v. Mentzer,438 the court did not vacate the
sentence due to the failure of the arraigning court to advise the defen-
dant of a possible restitution sentence because the record of the sen-
tencing proceeding showed the defendant was aware of the possibility
even in the absence of advice from the arraigning judge. The sentence
was vacated in Mentzer because it was wrong, not because the defen-
dant was unaware of the possibility of restitution sentencing.
The War Bonnett holding was based partially upon the holding of
State v. Duran,439 which held that a restitution sentence under sec-
tion 29-2280 is a criminal penalty. Following the reasoning of both
War Bonnett and Duran, it may be necessary to advise defendants of
the possibility and range of community service sentences under sec-
tion 29-2278 as well. A community service sentence clearly is a sen-
tence and, therefore, a criminal penalty under Duran and State v.
Burnett.440 Merely informing a defendant of the possible jail sentence
and fine would not be sufficient to allow the court to impose a commu-
nity service sentence under the War Bonnett rationale. The question
left open is whether such information must be given to all pleading
defendants or only to those the arraigning court may consider appro-
priate candidates for restitution or community service sentences even
before hearing a factual basis or reviewing a presentence investigation
report.
The infirmity of selective advice of the full range of possible crimi-
nal penalties should be obvious,441 but penalty advice would not be
the only stage in the plea process where judges have been given the
leeway to prejudge the sentence and tailor the plea process to fit the
prejudgment. Prejudgment would be a violation of judicial ethics in
many situations, but apparently not when the plea process is
involved.442
438. 233 Neb. 843, 448 N.W.2d 409 (1989).
439. 224 Neb. 774, 401 N.W.2d 482 (1987).
440. 227 Neb. 351, 417 N.W.2d 355 (1988).
441. Trial judges are not required to inform pleading defendants of potential civil con-
sequences of pleas, only penal consequences. See, e.g., In re Interest of Theodore
W., 4 Neb. App. 428, 545 N.W.2d 119 (1996)(involving parent who tried to pre-
vent guilty-plea-based conviction from being used against parent in related juve-
nile court protective action, because the criminal court judge had not informed
the parent of the potential civil uses of the plea tendered).
442. Any time before sentencing that the right to counsel comes up presents a critical
point at which trial judges may exercise prejudgment for less lofty purposes, such
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C. The Right to Assistance of Counsel
Pleas of guilty or no contest do not waive the right to counsel; the
right to counsel is a separate and anterior matter.443 The record of
the arraignment must show the arraigning judge informed the defen-
dant of the right to retain counsel or, if indigent, to appointed counsel.
Further, the record must show that the defendant was either repre-
sented by counsel at the time of tendering a plea of guilty or no contest
or that defendant had waived counsel knowingly, voluntarily, and in-
telligently.444 In addition, the record must show the defendant under-
stood that guilty and no contest pleas, while they waive counsel for
trial, because they waive a trial, do not waive counsel at the time of
tendering the pleas, do not waive counsel at sentencing, and do not
waive counsel on appeal. 445 Where the trial court's record is silent as
to a defendant's opportunity for counsel, appellate courts may not pre-
sume the right to counsel was respected.446 The question of whether a
defendant should proceed without counsel must remain for the defen-
dant personally to decide. "A defendant has a constitutional right of
self-representation and may proceed to defend himself without coun-
sel, when he voluntarily, understandingly, and intelligently elects to
do so."44 7
No defendant can be completely denied the assistance of counsel
absent a determination of his ability to retain counsel or to have coun-
sel appointed.448 Of course, that general rule leaves out important
qualifications on the general rule. Absent a knowing and intelligent
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classi-
fied as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless counsel represented the
person at trial.449 Scott created an escape from the Argersinger rule
as saving public funds by refusing to appoint counsel, thereby preventing the im-
position of valid sentences of imprisonment.
443. See State v. Dodson, 250 Neb. 584, 550 N.W.2d 347 (1996).
444. See State v. Sack, 239 Neb. 690, 477 N.W.2d 921 (1991).
445. See State v. Paul, 256 Neb. 669, 592 N.W.2d 148 (1999)(overruling State v. Dod-
son, 250 Neb. 584, 550 N.W.2d 347 (1996), to the extent Dodson was inconsistent
with Paul). Given that arraigningjudges have not been required to advise plead-
ing defendants of the right to appeal, advising them of the right to counsel on
appeal, without advising them of the right to appeal, seems to indicate a change
could be imminent with respect to advice of the right to appeal.
446. See State v. Orduna, 250 Neb. 602, 550 N.W.2d 356 (1996); State v. Ristau, 245
Neb. 52, 511 N.W.2d 83 (1994).
447. State v. Jost, 219 Neb. 162, 168, 361 N.W.2d 526, 531 (1985); see Faretta v. Cali-
fornia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
448. See State v. Moore, 203 Neb. 94, 277 N.W.2d 554 (1979).
449. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367
(1979); see also State v. Golden, 8 Neb. App. 601, 599 N.W.2d 224 (1999)(holding
arraigning judge has no duty to advise defendant, charged with petty offense who
can be and is penalized only by a fine, of constitutional right to appointed counsel,
because that defendant has no constitutional right to appointed counsel and no
statutory right to appointed counsel).
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by holding that appointed counsel must have been provided an indi-
gent defendant only if imprisonment is actually imposed, thereby al-
lowing a trial judge to limit the possible sentences in advance of
conviction and avoid appointing counsel for indigents who could be,
but will not be, imprisoned. How the arraigning judge ethically deter-
mines, before hearing even a factual basis and certainly without the
benefit of a presentence investigation report, that this defendant could
be, but will not be, sentenced to imprisonment, remains a mystery.45 0
State v. Stott45i presented the situation of a defendant whose ar-
raigning and trial judges 45 2 did not advise her of the right to counsel
in an ordinance violation prosecution, even though the supreme court
referred to it as a misdemeanor, 4 53 in which imprisonment was a pos-
sible penalty. Stott conducted her trial pro se. Jail time was actually
made a part of the probation sentence imposed, twenty-four hours im-
mediately and fourteen days later, which were waivable on compli-
ance with all other conditions of the probation sentence. The district
court and the court of appeals had ruled the proper remedy lay in va-
cating the sentence and remanding for further proceedings. The
unanimous and new Nebraska Supreme Court ruled the proper rem-
edy was the complete invalidation of the conviction and dismissal of
the case. The supreme court based its decision on Johnson v.
Zerbst,454 Scott v. Illinois,4 55 the other cases in the right to counsel
line, and partially on Nichols v. United States4 56 emphasizing that, in
450. Professor LaFave and colleagues have discussed the commentators' and Court's
views. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAvE ET AL., CRmMNAL PROCEDURE § 11.2(a)(2d ed.
1999). The choice few care to address for the arraigning judge is between the
judge keeping all sentencing options available (which is what the legislative and
executive branches intended when adopting criminal statutes providing an im-
prisonment sentencing option) or thwarting the very law the judge is sworn to
uphold by limiting the range of possible penalties downward from the enactments
of the legislative and executive branches.
451. 255 Neb. 438, 586 N.W.2d 436 (1998).
452. It seems Ms. Stott's arraigning judge and trial judge were the same judge. It is
not unusual and is entirely reasonable to find one judge doing arraignments and
another judge doing the ensuing trials in multi-judge jurisdictions. The accuracy
and completeness of the record the arraigning judge made becomes crucial when-
ever another judge will be the trial judge or sentencing judge.
453. The difference between a misdemeanor and an ordinance violation could become
important with respect to the statutory right to a jury trial, as well as the statu-
tory right to appointed counsel. Misdemeanors qualify defendants for county
court jury trials. Misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment qualify indigent de-
fendants for appointed counsel under Nebraska statute. Ordinance violations do
not qualify defendants for either a jury trial or for appointed counsel. Of course,
any ordinance violation for which the possible penalty exceeds six months' im-
prisonment would invoke the federal constitutional right to a jury trial, but still
might not invoke the federal constitutional right to appointed counsel.
454. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
455. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
456. 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
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the case of a criminally accused not represented by counsel or unable
to obtain counsel, who has not competently and intelligently waived
counsel, and whose trial court did not provide counsel even if the trial
court had jurisdiction to proceed at the beginning of the trial, it di-
vests itself of jurisdiction to proceed as a result of the violation of the
right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment's directly applicable right to
counsel erects a jurisdictional bar to uncounseled convictions resulting
in actual imprisonment, without regard to the classification of the of-
fense involved, that a due process-based right to counsel would not.
Obviously, caution must be exercised in using the Scott rule to
avoid appointment of counsel. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and the Nebraska Constitution's right to counsel may not require ap-
pointed counsel unless imprisonment is actually imposed, but consid-
eration also must be given to the Nebraska statutory right to counsel.
Under section 29-3902 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, Nebraska
courts must inquire into indigence for purposes of appointed counsel
in all felony cases and in misdemeanor cases punishable by imprison-
ment. Perceptive readers will notice instantly the potential difference
in meaning between the phrases, "cases in which imprisonment actu-
ally is imposed" and "misdemeanor cases punishable by imprison-
ment."45 7 It would seem the violation of the statutory right to
appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases in which imprisonment is a
possible penalty ought to render any resulting conviction invalid on
direct appeal, even if imprisonment is not actually imposed. Although
a statutory right carries less symbolic weight than a constitutional
right carries, courts are generally supposed to be bound by statutes.
In addition to the invalidity of convictions on direct appeal,
Baldasar v. Illinois,45s for a time, prevented the use of prior uncoun-
seled misdemeanor convictions to enhance the penalty and convert a
subsequent misdemeanor into a felony with a prison term. The denial
of counsel followed by a sentence of probation without actual impris-
onment, which subsequently must be revoked, arguably would pre-
vent imprisonment on imposition of a new sentence after
revocation. 4 59 Although this problem has engendered considerable
457. The judicial reluctance to reach out and decide cases on grounds not properly
raised by counsel or the parties may explain the lack ofjudicial attention given in
the reported Nebraska cases to the difference between the Scott constitutional
right to appointed counsel and the Nebraska statutory right to appointed counsel.
Under the statute, the possibility of imprisonment triggers the right to appointed
counsel for indigent defendants and the prejudgment that imprisonment will not
be imposed does not alter the possibility as a trigger. Counsel must properly
raise issues before many, if not most, courts will reach issues, including the appli-
cability of statutes.
458. 446 U.S. 222 (1980)(4-1-4 decision).
459. See David S. Rudstein, The Collateral Use of Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convic-
tions After Scott and Baldasar, 39 U. FIA. L. Ray. 517 (1982). The punishment
imposed after a revocation of a probation sentence is a punishment imposed for
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disagreement among the lower courts,4 60 it has not been resolved by
the Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court, with different
membership, adopted the Baldasar dissent and overruled Baldasar in
Nichols v. United States.461 Under Nichols, as long as the prior un-
counseled conviction remains valid under Scott, because no actual im-
prisonment was imposed on the prior conviction, then the prior may
be used to seek sentence enhancement to a sentence of imprisonment
on later convictions.
Due to the presumption against a waiver of the constitutional right
to counsel, the trial court is required to make a reasonable inquiry
into a defendant's ability to retain counsel or desire for appointment of
counsel. 462 In State v. Sondag, Sondag appeared at several prelimi-
nary hearings with retained counsel, but appeared for trial without
counsel. The trial judge did not inquire into either Sondag's ability to
retain counsel or desire for appointment of counsel, but assumed a
waiver of counsel from Sondag's appearance for trial unrepresented.
The supreme court refused to assume a waiver without a showing in
the record of a voluntary and intelligent waiver. Thus, inquiry must
be made of an uncounseled defendant, advice of the right to counsel
must be given, and an affirmative showing of a voluntary and intelli-
gent waiver must appear in the record.
But, in State v. Tharp,463 the court adopted the rule that once a
defendant has been informed of his right to retained or appointed
counsel, there is no requirement that the court advise the defendant
in each subsequent court appearance of the same right. Further, a
the original offense, not for the probation violation. The Nebraska Supreme
Court will need to make the necessary adjustment in the case law, given the pre-
cedent for a direct appeal of all issues appealable after a plea followed by a proba-
tion sentence and later revocation of the probation sentence, see, e.g., State v.
Ozmun, 221 Neb. 481, 378 N.W.2d 170 (1985), but not until someone properly
raises the issue.
460. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAvE ET AL., CRnMNAL PROCEDURE § 11.2(a)(2d ed. 1999).
461. 511 U.S. 738 (1994). The Baldasar rule had been adopted in Nebraska. State v.
Smith, 213 Neb. 446, 329 N.W.2d 564 (1983) (applying to all enhanced penalties).
Now the Nebraska Supreme Court has chosen to apply Nichols on the question of
the need to provide the opportunity for second-tier collateral challenges in sepa-
rate proceedings on prior convictions of DUI, State v. Louthan, 257 Neb. 174, 595
N.W.2d 917 (1999), and refusal to submit to chemical tests and on prior convic-
tions involved in habitual criminal actions, State v. Kuehn, 258 Neb. 558, 604
N.W.2d 420 (2000). Thus, the Nebraska case law may need further adjustment if
Nichols is applied to sentences of imprisonment after probation revocation on un-
counseled misdemeanor convictions. Again, however, the court will not reach out
and adjust the case law until someone properly raises the issue.
462. State v. Sondag, 214 Neb. 659, 335 N.W.2d 306 (1983). Recall that when section
29-3902 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes applies, then Nebraska trial courts are
placed under a statutory duty to initiate an inquiry into the unrepresented defen-
dant's ability to obtain counsel.
463. 224 Neb. 126, 395 N.W.2d 762 (1986).
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defendant's conduct in appearing without counsel and not asking for
counsel after receiving his one advisory of the right to counsel may
result in a waiver of counsel. Trial judges, however, must be aware
that the one-advisory-suffices rule of Tharp exists in a state of consid-
erable tension, if not open contradiction, with the rule that a waiver of
counsel for one critical stage of a criminal case does not necessarily
constitute a waiver for any later critical stages of the case.4 64 Addi-
tionally, the rule that the right to be furnished counsel under the
Sixth Amendment does not depend upon the accused making a
request.4 65
Tharp repeatedly appeared without counsel and proceeded. Al-
though he had on more than one occasion told the county court he
would retain or had retained counsel, his tender of a guilty plea with-
out counsel without more discussion on the day set for trial, was
deemed a waiver. At his sentencing hearing, Tharp appeared without
counsel and told the county court he had waived counsel when he ten-
dered his plea. He was sentenced to jail time, fined, and suffered a
revocation of his license on a driving under suspension charge. Tharp
appeared without counsel twice before the district court on appeal, but
processed his supreme court appeal by retained counsel, who chal-
lenged the plea for its lack of a record showing of an affirmative
waiver of counsel or the presence of counsel at the plea proceeding.
The distinction between Sondag and Tharp may be one of degree only
for which the careful arraigning judge will be vigilant. The waiver by
conduct rule may not be the sort of rule upon which to place much
reliance.
In State v. Richter,46 6 the supreme court outlined the contours of
the inquiry a trial court must make with respect to the question of
indigence. The trial court must consider factors such as (1) the seri-
ousness of the offense; (2) the defendant's income; (3) the availability
to the defendant of other resources, including real and personal prop-
erty, bank accounts, Social Security, and unemployment or other ben-
efits; (4) normal living expenses; (5) outstanding debts; and (6) the
number and age of dependents. Obviously, the inquiry could become
quite far-reaching. 46 7 While entitlement to representation by counsel
464. See Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954); see State v. Paul, 256 Neb. 669, 592
N.W.2d 148 (1999).
465. See, e.g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
466. 221 Neb. 487, 378 N.W.2d 175 (1985).
467. Such matters as child support obligations, the nature or purpose of indebtedness,
etc., could become important, but the statutory confidentiality surrounding finan-
cial affidavits supporting applications for the appointment of counsel, NEB. REv.
STAT. § 29-3902 (Reissue 1995), does erect some barriers to the need ever arising
for deep investigations into the questions inherent in such matters. A reasonable
inference from some recent supreme court decisions is that some trial courts, see,
e.g., State v. Paul, 256 Neb. 669, 592 N.W.2d 148 (1999); State v. Stott, 255 Neb.
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at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding is beyond question, enti-
tlement to counsel and entitlement to appointed counsel are different
matters under the ruling case law.
The supreme court has rejected some hyper-technical claims of er-
ror with respect to the lengths to which the trial court must go in its
coverage with a defendant of the right to counsel. For example, it is
not reversible error to fail to advise a represented defendant of his
right to counsel,468 nor is it reversible error to fail to advise a repre-
sented defendant that her guilty plea would waive her right to the
assistance of counsel at trial.469 Trial courts have no duty to advise a
represented defendant of the right to counsel during the plea collo-
quy,4 70 but, as a matter of good form, may consider advising a repre-
sented defendant of the right to appointed counsel should they become
indigent at any time during the pendency of the case. The Nebraska
Supreme Court has not yet prescribed to what length the arraigning
judge must go in explaining the right to counsel to an unrepresented
defendant. The court, however, recently came close to doing so and
strongly suggested they may soon require more explanation, rather
than less.471
In determining whether defendant has knowingly and voluntarily
waived counsel, "the key inquiry is whether the defendant was suffi-
ciently aware of the right to have counsel and of the possible conse-
quences of a decision to forego the aid of counsel."47 2 The court then
quoted what counsel could do at sentencing, in the view of United
States Supreme Court, that unrepresented defendants might not be
438, 586 N.W.2d 436 (1998); State v. Dodson, 250 Neb. 584, 550 N.W.2d 351
(1996), do not seem to use the statutory financial affidavits, creating a questiona-
ble situation as a result, but still may satisfy the reasonable inquiry test of the
statute. The supreme court insisted on the reasonable inquiry in State v. Echel-
berger, 227 Neb. 545, 418 N.W.2d 580 (1988).
468. See State v. Rhodes, 233 Neb. 373, 445 N.W.2d 622 (1989); State v. Neal, 216
Neb. 709, 346 N.W.2d 218 (1984).
469. See State v. Gray, 223 Neb. 256, 388 N.W.2d 836 (1986).
470. See State v. Trackwell, 250 Neb. 46, 547 N.W.2d 471 (1996).
471. State v. Wilson, 252 Neb 637, 564 N.W.2d 241 (1997), provides perhaps the most
complete discussion of the requirements for finding a valid waiver of counsel and
decision to exercise the right of self-representation in the Nebraska case law.
The supreme court also noted that an effective waiver of the federal right to coun-
sel suffices as a waiver of the right to counsel under the Nebraska Constitution,
indicating the court would follow the suggestions of the United States Supreme
Court on the sufficiency of the record inquiry as it relates to the extent of the
defendant's understanding of the waiver of counsel. The Eighth Circuit has
adopted a somewhat stricter approach for case by case application. See, e.g., Gil-
bert v. Lockhart, 930 F.2d 1356 (8th Cir. 1991); Young v. Lockhart, 892 F.2d 1348
(8th Cir. 1989).




able to accomplish. 4 73 Simply stating that there is a right to counsel,
retained or appointed, may suffice. In the alternative, it may be nec-
essary that an arraigning judge give a brief additional statement that
a lawyer may be able to discover defenses or mitigating circumstances
that a non-lawyer could not;474 or, a detailed explanation of the func-
tion and benefits of counsel may be required.4 75 Individual case vari-
ables could alter the detail required in any given situation.4 76
Overall, the Nebraska Supreme Court has adopted a flexible, common
sense, case-specific, totality of the circumstances approach to the suffi-
ciency of arraignments. Thus, it is reasonable to believe the court
would look at the circumstances of each case on this question as
wel1.4 7 7
D. The Right to a Jury Trial
The United States Constitution, as applied to the states, guaran-
tees jury trials for all state offenses whenever the Sixth Amendment
would require a jury trial if the case were in federal court, that is, for
only such offenses as are considered serious offenses. Likewise, the
Nebraska Constitution guarantees jury trials for all felonies and all
"serious" offenses, but not for anywhere near all offenses.478 Jury tri-
als in Nebraska's courts are statutorily authorized for all misdemean-
ors, including those not punishable by imprisonment, but are not
authorized for any ordinance violations, even those punishable by im-
prisonment, or for infractions.479 A request for a jury trial is required
before the county court must hold a jury trial on all but Class I misde-
473. Such as marshaling the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating facts, and gen-
eral assistance in presenting the defendant's case as to sentencing. See State v.
Paul, 256 Neb. at 676-677, 592 N.W.2d at 154 (quoting McConnell v. Rhay, 393
U.S. 2, 3-4 (1968)).
474. See, e.g., Spinella v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 494, 271 N.W.2d 91 (1978).
475. Justice Black created a catalog of concerns that might need to be addressed in
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948)(plurality opinion). See Swenson v.
Anchorage, 616 P.2d 874, 878-79 (Alaska 1980).
476. See State v. Green, 238 Neb. 328, 470 N.W.2d 736 (1991)(discussing appointment
of standby counsel, right to self-representation, and suggested, but not required,
advice/warning for trial judges to give to pro se defendants).
477. The appointment of counsel invokes a special rule:
Once counsel has been appointed for an indigent accused, the accused
must remain with the appointed counsel unless one of the following con-
ditions is met: (1) The accused knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
waives the right to counsel and chooses to proceed pro se; (2) appointed
counsel is incompetent, in which case new counsel is to be appointed; or
(3) the accused chooses to retain private counsel.
State v. Sack, 239 Neb. 690, 697-98, 477 N.W.2d 921, 926-27 (1991)(citations
omitted).
478. See NEB. CoNsT. art. I, § 6; State v. Kennedy, 224 Neb. 164, 396 N.W.2d 722
(1986).
479. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-2705 (Reissue 1995).
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meanor 48 0 charges, in apparent contradistinction with what once
seemed to be district court practice. In State v. Tweedy,481 the record
did not disclose whether the court informed Tweedy of his statutory
right to a jury trial and the effect of a guilty plea on that right.
Tweedy had no constitutional right to a jury trial, only a statutory
right, yet the court considered the apparent failure to advise Tweedy
of that statutory right to be one of the fatal errors in the arraignment.
Prior to Tweedy, it was not necessary to advise a defendant of the
statutory right to a jury trial.482 After Tweedy and Ziemba (requiring
advice of statutory enhancement hearing rights), Mangelsen no longer
seemed to be authoritative on the point. It seemed defendants having
only a statutory jury trial right must be advised of that right and a
voluntary and intelligent waiver must be obtained on the record. Pre-
sumably, the judicial advice with respect to the statutory jury trial
right should include advice of the need for a demand for jury and the
time limit for the demand to be made. 48 3 But, appearances can
mislead.
In State v. Bishop,484 a unanimous Nebraska Supreme Court
adopted the rule that a jury trial is required, unless waived by the
defendant, as a matter of constitutional right whenever the offense
charged is "serious," meaning punishable by a maximum penalty in
excess of six months' imprisonment on the authority of Baldwin v.
New York.485 Under Nebraska case law, until late 1992, only Class I
misdemeanors were "serious offenses" for the purposes of this rule.
Then, Class I misdemeanors and third offense DUI, as long as punish-
able by a fifteen year license revocation in addition to at least a six
month jail term, became "serious offenses" as the Nebraska Supreme
Court interpreted federal law.
In Bishop, the defendant requested a jury trial on a Class I misde-
meanor, two Class W misdemeanors, and a Class IV misdemeanor.486
480. Class I misdemeanors carry a possible penalty of up to one year imprisonment or
up to a $1,000 fine or both; Class Hs, up to six months imprisonment or up to a
$1,000 fine or both; Class IMls, up to three months imprisonment or a fine of up to
$500 or both; Class IAs, up to seven days imprisonment or a fine of up to $500
or both; Class IVs, a fine ranging from $100 to $500; and Class Vs, a fine of up to
$100. Class W misdemeanors carry possible jail time of anywhere from seven
days to one year, depending on whether the conviction is a first, second, or third
conviction. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-106 (Cure. Supp. 1998).
481. 209 Neb. 649, 309 N.W.2d 94 (1981).
482. See State v. Mangelsen, 207 Neb. 213, 297 N.W.2d 765 (1980).
483. NEB. CTY. CT. R. 23.
484. 224 Neb. 522, 399 N.W.2d 271 (1987).
485. 399 U.S. 66 (1970)(the Court's opinion was a three justice opinion, with two jus-
tices concurring, three justices dissenting, and one justice not participating). For
more information on how much weight to accord the Court's plurality decisions,
see Novak, supra note 110.
486. He was acquitted on the least serious charge, a Class IV misdemeanor.
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His request was denied because he did not file it within the time al-
lowed by the county court rule. With respect to the Class W charges,
the supreme court ruled they were petty offenses on which the defen-
dant had only a statutory right to a jury trial, for which a proper de-
mand was required. His request was untimely and, therefore,
constituted a waiver of his statutory right to a jury trial. Whether he
was advised of the time limit does not appear.
The supreme court, however, reversed the Class I misdemeanor
conviction and remanded for a new trial on that charge, because the
defendant had not waived a jury trial on that charge. The county
court had denied Bishop's request for a jury trial on that charge solely
because it was untimely. Without a record showing of a voluntary,
intelligent, and express waiver of a jury trial by the defendant, person-
ally, on a "serious offense" for which a jury trial is constitutionally
required, a waiver cannot be presumed. 48 7 Implicit in the supreme
court's ruling on the Class I charge is the concept that even reasonable
time limits for the assertion of a constitutional jury trial right cannot
be imposed. The right is deemed asserted automatically by a not
guilty plea, unless properly waived on the record.
The Bishop decision requires careful, thorough, charge-specific ex-
planations on the record of whether a request is necessary to obtain a
jury trial on whatever misdemeanor charges any given defendant may
face. In those cases, such as Golden, in which defendants are charged
with one or more Class I misdemeanors and one or more Class II or
lower grade misdemeanors, arraigning judges must be very careful in
their explanations and in ensuring any waivers obtained are both
properly made and properly recorded. 488 Of course, Bishop probably
applies to all cases in which the judgments were not yet final on the
date the Bishop mandate was issued.489 The Nebraska Supreme
Court applied Bishop to a case pending before the supreme court when
Bishop was announced, State v. Lafler.49o Whether Bishop can be
used to collaterally attack convictions that had become final prior to
issuance of the Bishop mandate remains to be seen, but it probably
cannot.
Just three months after the Bishop mandate came the decision of
State v. Miller.491 The record in Miller did not show affirmatively that
defendant had waived a jury trial. From the lack of a record showing
487. See State v. Bishop, 224 Neb. at 527, 399 N.W.2d at 276.
488. See State v. Golden, 8 Neb. App. 601,599 N.W.2d 224 (1999)(holding that no duty
binds arraigning judge to advise defendant charged with a petty offense and pe-
nalized only by fine of the statutory right to jury trial nor of the time and manner
in which to invoke that right).
489. The Bishop mandate was issued on June 9, 1987. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479
U.S. 314 (1987)(adopting a new federal retroactivity rule).
490. 224 Neb. 613, 399 N.W.2d 808 (1987).
491. 226 Neb. 576, 412 N.W.2d 849 (1987)(involving DUI third offense).
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of waiver, defendant argued he had not been advised of his right to a
jury trial and his conviction after a bench trial on the underlying DUI
could not stand. Defendant contended he was entitled to a constitu-
tional right to a jury trial because of the severe potential consequences
on conviction and enhancement for a third offense DU. On the au-
thority of Baldwin and Bishop, the supreme court rejected defendant's
contention. The maximum possible sentence on a DUI third offense at
that time was six months' imprisonment, a $500 fine, and a fifteen
year driver's license revocation.49 2 Under Baldwin and Bishop, it was
not a "serious" offense. Thus, it did not carry a constitutional right to
a jury trial, only a statutory right to a jury trial.
The statutory right to a jury trial is conditioned on the making of a
timely request for a jury trial. The Miller record did not reveal a re-
quest for a jury trial had been made. In State v. Lafler,49 3 a case tried
in district court, the supreme court latched onto the serious/petty of-
fense distinction and ruled a defendant wishing a jury trial on a
charge for which the defendant has only a statutory right to a jury
trial, a petty offense, must request a jury trial in district court just as
in county court, by analogy to the county court statute. Thus, citing
Lafler, the supreme court ruled Miller had waived his right to a jury
trial by his failure to request a jury. The argument that the trial court
had not advised him of his right to a jury trial died with that
conclusion.
Tweedy required advice and affirmative waiver of the right to a
jury trial "where authorized." Irish does not say anything about the
statutory right to a jury trial. Tweedy and Miller are clearly inconsis-
tent on that point. Ziemba (requiring advice of statutory enhance-
ment hearing rights) is inconsistent with both Mangelsen and Miller.
The question, therefore, of whether trial courts must advise defend-
ants of their statutory right to a jury trial, with its time limit for lodg-
ing a request for a jury trial and its need for lodging a request,
remains arguably open to debate under the Nebraska precedents with
respect to trials to be held in district courts.4 94 The federal courts
with jurisdiction over Nebraska may have created other questions.
Eighth Circuit case law differed from Nebraska case law until late
1992. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Richter v. Fairbanks,495
on federal habeas review of the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision
otherwise, declared that a DUI third offense under a city ordinance
492. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.07 (Cure. Supp. 1986).
493. 224 Neb. 613, 399 N.W.2d 808 (1987).
494. By their terms, section 25-2705 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes and Rule 23 of
the Nebraska County Court Rules both apply only to county court practice.
495. 903 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1990).
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was a "serious offense."496 Therefore, the federal constitutional right
to a jury trial applied. If section 24-536 (now section 25-2705) of the
Nebraska Revised Statutes denied a jury trial in such cases, then sec-
tion 24-536 was unconstitutional.497 In State v. Wiltshire,498 the Ne-
braska Supreme Court adjusted its position to follow the Eighth
Circuit's lead, declaring DUI third offense under state statute to be a
serious offense for purposes of the constitutional right to a jury trial.
Then came a United States Supreme Court decision declaring a fed-
eral DUI punishable by up to six months' imprisonment and a $5,000
fine or a five year probation alternative still not a "serious offense,"
but only a petty offense for purposes of the federal constitutional right
to a jury trial. The Court continued to apply its precedents to the effect
that an offense is not a "serious offense" until more than 6 months'
imprisonment is part of the possible penalty.4 99
Nachtigal and Bishop are consistent. Richter v. Fairbanks and
Nachtigal-Bishop obviously may be argued to be inconsistent by focus-
ing on the idea that the fifteen-year license revocation factor, even
when considered as an additional penalty, historically has never mer-
ited jury trial status in Nebraska law. On the federal jury trial right,
Nachtigal obviously should control, but Nachtigal has no particular
inevitable application under the state constitution and did not deal
with a long license revocation. The Nebraska Supreme Court has
shown little inclination to adopt independent state constitutional
standards more protective than the federal standards, leaving the rea-
sonable prediction that the court would not require more under the
Nebraska Constitution's jury trial provision than under the federal
constitutional jury trial provision.
E. The Right of Confrontation
Another of the three rights of which Tweedy was not informed, as
far as the record disclosed, and thus could not be presumed to have
waived voluntarily and intelligently, was his right to confront the wit-
nesses against him.500 In State v. Porchia, the arraigning judge did
not "especially inquire on the record whether Porchia understood that
by entering a plea of guilty he was waiving his right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses."501 As a result, the supreme court ruled the
496. The Eighth Circuit followed its reading of Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S.
538 (1989), in ruling on serious versus petty offenses.
497. See Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1990).
498. 241 Neb. 817, 491 N.W.2d 324 (1992), overruled on other grounds, State v.
Louthan, 257 Neb. 174, 595 N.W.2d 917 (1999).
499. See United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1 (1993).
500. See State v. Tweedy, 209 Neb. at 655-56, 309 N.W.2d at 98 (involving DUI second
offense).




plea could not be considered voluntary or intelligent. The supreme
court's later use of Porchia in State v. Hays5O2 likely indicates the
court is moving in the direction of stricter observance of arraignment
requirements on direct appeals from plea-based convictions.
In Hays, the supreme court described Porchia as a case in which
the court had directly addressed the issue of a pleading defendant's
understanding that the defendant would be waiving the defendant's
constitutional rights by pleading guilty or no contest. In Hays, the
court also said the Porchia ruling indicated that, by failing to espe-
cially inquire on the record into the defendant's understanding of the
waiver of the defendant's confrontation rights by pleading guilty, the
trial court had produced a record insufficient to show a valid plea-
based conviction.5 0 3
F. The Right to Be Free From Compulsory Self-
IncriminationO4
The third matter of which Tweedy was not advised on the record
was the right against compulsory self-incrimination and the effect of
his plea on that constitutional right. It is now well established that a
guilty plea cannot be found to be voluntarily and intelligently ten-
dered in the absence of advice to the defendant and a waiver on the
record of the defendant's immunity from compulsory self-incrimina-
tion at trial.505 That the waiver effected by pleading guilty applies
only to the federal immunity from compulsory self-incrimination that
would have applied at trial and does not apply to later stages of the
criminal case following the plea, including sentencing proceedings,
has been established.506
502. 253 Neb. 467, 570 N.W.2d 823 (1997).
503. See 253 Neb. at 474, 570 N.W.2d at 828.
504. The legal profession tends habitually toward referring to this constitutional right
through the shorthand label "privilege." I will refer to it using "right,"
"exemption," and "immunity" interchangeably to reinforce the point that we are
not dealing with a mere rule of evidence, but with a constitutional right protected
by both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
section 12, of the Nebraska Constitution. If I use "privilege," I do so by mistake of
habit.
505. See State v. Potter, 220 Neb. 866, 374 N.W.2d 27 (1985); State v. Litzenburg, 220
Neb. 807, 374 N.W.2d 1 (1985).
506. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999). In 1985, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court referred to advising the defendant and obtaining defendant's waiver
of "the defendant's right to remain silent and to not testify at trial," State v.
Branch, 220 Neb. 754, 755, 371 N.W.2d 740, 741 (1985), and "the right to remain
silent and the right to not testify at trial," State v. Wright, 220 Neb. 847, 848, 374
N.W.2d 26, 27 (1985). Whether the court intended any difference in meaning in
the differing language is unknown, but it would not seem so.
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In State v. Branch,507 Justice Caporale wrote a concurring opinion
in which he explained the reason for handling the cases in which the
arraigning judges failed to obtain waivers of rights on the record dif-
ferently than the Fischer-Curnyn line of cases in which the arraigning
judges failed to advise the defendants of the penal consequences of
their pleas or to determine the defendant's awareness of the possible
penalties. The difference is an important one. A defendant cannot
waive a penalty. Thus, the defendant must be shown only to be aware
of the possible penalties. It is only important that the defendant have
that knowledge at the time of his pleas.
With respect to the right to remain free from compelled self-incrim-
ination, the arraigning judge must be satisfied that the defendant has
voluntarily and intelligently waived that right as it would apply at
trial and must create a record showing an express voluntary and intel-
ligent waiver. Unless the defendant's conduct establishes the fact of a
voluntary and intelligent waiver, the judge must ask specifically
whether the defendant is waiving that right. Presumably, the same
reasoning applies to all of the rights, waivers of which must be found
to be voluntary and intelligent, as both Porchia and Hays indicate.
G. The Factual Basis for the Plea
"[A]ny arraignment and entry of plea should contain an express
statement by the court that a factual basis does exist for disposition of
the accusation pursuant to defendant's plea."50 An express judicial
determination of the existence of a factual basis to support a tendered
plea is desirable for three reasons:
(1) judicial inquiry insures the defendant actually committed an of-
fense at least as serious as the one to which the defendant has ten-
dered a plea of guilty or no contest;
(2) *udicial inquiry into the factual basis for a plea creates a more ade-
quate record, minimizing the necessity of reversal of a conviction due
to impermissible irregularities in the entry of a plea; and
(3) judicial inquiry provides an arraigning judge with a sound basis
upon which to evaluate the defendant's competence, willingness to
plead guilty or no contest, and understanding of charge or charges the
defendant faces.
With respect to establishing the factual basis to support guilty pleas,
the preferred method of obtaining the factual basis is by direct judicial
questioning of the defendant, but equally acceptable sources of the fac-
507. 220 Neb. 754, 371 N.W.2d 740 (1985).
508. State v. Jost, 219 Neb. 162, 169, 361 N.W.2d 526, 531 (1985).
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tual basis include statements of the prosecutor and incident reports
included in the presentence investigation report.509
In State v. Jost,51o the court cited Section 1.6 of the 1982 ABA
Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, which dealt with determining
the accuracy of the plea. Even though the arraigning judge in Jost did
not expressly state his finding of the existence of a factual basis, the
court found that deficiency was not so prejudicial as to require rever-
sal in the face of a record showing compliance with all other statutory
and constitutional guidelines.
A no contest plea creates a conceptually more difficult situation re-
lating to acceptable methods of determining the accuracy of the plea.
Whether a no contest plea waives the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination so as to allow the arraigning judge to interrogate
the defendant has not been fully resolved. The ABA Standards Relat-
ing to Pleas of Guilty indicate interrogation of defendants pleading no
contest is permissible, while the United States District Judges
Benchbook indicates the practice is impermissible.
A line of Nebraska cases holds that a plea of no contest is
equivalent to and places a defendant in the same position as a guilty
plea, in terms of waiving every defense to the charge, whether proce-
dural, statutory, or constitutional, except the defense that the com-
plaint is not sufficient to state an offense.511 The Nebraska Supreme
Court even has declared, in full agreement with the general trend of
the modern cases, that a no contest plea:
admits the matters alleged in an information when the plea is [tendered] 5 12
by a defendant,... places him in the same position in that particular case as
though he had pleaded guilty; and as a matter of course, an appropriate judg-
ment of conviction and sentence follows upon such plea as well as upon a plea
of guilty.5 13
Despite the implication of these decisions, the resolution of the
question is not quite so clear. In State v. Hyslop,514 the counseled de-
fendant tendered a plea of no contest to issuing an insufficient fund
check. On appeal, Hyslop contended the arraigning judge failed to
make a proper inquiry into the factual basis. The arraigning judge's
only inquiry, apparently, was a direct question of Hyslop: "[D]o you
509. See State v. Sare, 209 Neb. 91, 306 N.W.2d 164 (1981); State v. Painter, 195 Neb.
183, 237 N.W.2d 142 (1976).
510. 219 Neb. 162, 361 N.W.2d 526 (1985).
511. See State v. Kitt, 232 Neb. 237, 240, 440 N.W.2d 234, 236 (1989)("A plea of nolo
contendere is equivalent to a plea of guilty for convicting and sentencing a defen-
dant."); State v. Abramson, 197 Neb. 135, 247 N.W.2d 59 (1976); State v.
Neuman, 175 Neb. 832, 125 N.W.2d 5 (1963); State v. Hylton, 175 Neb. 828, 124
N.W.2d 230 (1963); cf. State v. Richter, 221 Neb. 487, 378 N.W.2d 175 (1985).
512. Remember, a defendant tenders a plea. A court enters a plea. See supra note 2.
513. State ex rel. NSBA v. Stanosheck, 167 Neb. 192, 197, 92 N.W.2d 194, 197-198
(1958)(emphasis added).
514. 189 Neb. 331, 202 N.W.2d 595 (1972).
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plead guilty because you did what is actually charged against you in
the Information, or because at least you are convinced that should you
go to trial on this Information the jury would find you guilty?" Hyslop
responded that he so pleaded for at least one of those reasons. Notice,
the arraigning judge inquired about defendant's tender of a guilty
plea, when, in fact, the defendant tendered a plea of no contest.
The supreme court observed the arraigning judge's question was as
far as the judge could possibly have gone on a no contest plea. The
supreme court rejected Hyslop's contention because Hyslop had ten-
dered a plea of no contest and
the very purpose of the plea is to afford a defendant an opportunity to avoid an
outright admission of facts as the basis for the plea of nolo contendere.
Neither the court nor the defendant is required to take a paradoxical position
in the application of [Standard 1.6] with relation to a plea of nolo contendere
... [Inquiry into accuracy is not required when the defendant [tenders] a plea
of nolo contendere. 5 15
The supreme court's decision in Hyslop also may have been influenced
to an unknown degree by other factors:
[It is clear... defendant was fully informed of the charge against him and
that the court made as full an inquiry as possible into the factual basis ...
defendant was represented by counsel, was an educated and sophisticated
person, fully conversant with the nature of the offense he was charged with
from previous experience, and knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly
[tendered] the plea that he made. 51 6
All of these factors may not coalesce in very many no contest plea
cases. One difficulty with Hyslop is the supreme court opinion does
not indicate whether the trial judge used any alternative method of
inquiry into a factual basis.
Certainly, following a defendant's tender of a plea of no contest,
and still on the record, the arraigning judge may request either an
oral report from the prosecutor detailing what the prosecutor's evi-
dence would be in the event of a trial or that a detailed investigation
report be included in the presentence report. Using the presentence
report to establish the factual basis also permits the arraigning judge
to defer acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest whenever the judge
is uncertain of the sufficiency of the factual basis on the oral presenta-
tion of the parties.
There must be a factual basis and should be a finding to that effect
under Jost. The alternative sources of the factual basis allow the ar-
raigning judge to discharge the obligation of inquiring into the accu-
racy of the plea even in the face of a no contest plea. Further, avoiding
direct inquiry of the defendant pleading no contest ultimately may be
the better route, given the implication of the Hyslop decision.
515. Id. at 333, 202 N.W.2d at 596.
516. Id. at 334, 202 N.W.2d at 597.
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The tender of a guilty or no contest plea with a protestation of in-
nocence creates a special situation and brings with it special
problems. The basic rule is that a guilty plea, voluntarily and intelli-
gently made, may be accepted, even though the defendant professes
innocence, provided there is a factual basis for a finding of guilt.517 In
State v. Beach,5 1 8 the Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted North
Carolina v. Alford to impose the additional requirement that the ar-
raigning judge, in accepting the plea, must have inquired into and
sought to resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim
of innocence. In Beach, the court found the arraigning judge's inquiry
insufficient to resolve that conflict. The court did not believe the pros-
ecutor's agreement to make no recommendation on sentence to be a
sufficient concession to justify a guilty plea by a man claiming to be
innocent. In Alford, the concession involved a possible death sentence
for first degree murder, as opposed to a maximum thirty-year sen-
tence for second degree murder. Further, the evidence the prosecution
would have produced in Alford was overwhelming, while in Beach the
intended prosecution evidence was not so strong. In Rhodes, the fac-
tual basis outlined by the prosecutor, if uncontested, left no reasona-
ble doubt of the defendant's guilt and the defendant conceded the plea
to be in his best interests.5 1 9 A detailed finding by the arraigning
judge resolving the conflict between the plea of guilty or no contest
and the pleading defendant's concomitant claim of innocence does not
appear to be necessary as long as the record shows a reasonable basis
upon which the arraigning judge may accept the plea.520
Appellate courts also may examine the presentence report, in addi-
tion to the bill of exceptions, in reviewing whether the factual basis
was adequate to support acceptance of a no contest plea.5 21 State v.
Parks5 2 2 presents an interesting example. The information missing
from the recitation of the factual basis at the plea proceeding leading
to the conviction was information pertaining to whether the victim of
the charged third degree assault on a peace officer was a peace officer
or employed by the Department of Correctional Services under the ap-
plicable statute. Because no one spoke that information at the plea
proceeding, that information properly could not have appeared in the
bill of exceptions, except in the form of exhibits offered into evidence
at the plea proceeding or perhaps in a hearing on a plea in abatement.
The transcription of the testimony presented at the county court pre-
517. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); State v. Rhodes, 233 Neb. 373,
445 N.W.2d 622 (1989); State v. Leisy, 207 Neb. 118, 295 N.W.2d 715 (1980).
518. 211 Neb. 660, 319 N.W.2d 754 (1982).
519. See also State v. Kincaid, 203 Neb. 495, 279 N.W.2d 152 (1979)(involving a record
with strong evidence of guilt).
520. See State v. Rhodes, 233 Neb. 373, 377, 445 N.W.2d 622, 625 (1989).




liminary hearing normally does not become part of the presentence
report, but for whatever reason did in this case. The court of appeals
told us, in its Parks opinion, the information required appeared in the
transcription of the preliminary hearing testimony.52 3
For a short time, it seemed defendants could fail to raise their
claims of factual basis deficiencies in the trial court or even in their
appeal filings and leave the job of determining the accuracy of their
pleas to the appellate courts under the plain error rule. The supreme
court reversed its own direction on the point in State v. Paul5 24 by
overruling State v. Dodson's use of plain error analysis to reach a fac-
tual basis deficiency not properly raised by the defendant. The court
of appeals had obeyed the supreme court's Dodson ruling in Paul. Rul-
ing that appellate courts may not take notice of factual basis deficien-
cies as plain error, the "new" supreme court reversed the court of
appeals and overruled Dodson. Claimed deficiencies in factual basis
must be raised properly to obtain appellate review.52 5
523. The appellate panel stated in its opening paragraph and in the first paragraph of
its analysis that Parks had tendered a no contest plea and then, throughout the
remainder of the opinion, told us what the effect of a guilty plea is with respect to
admissions made by the plea, en route to the statement of the decision that the
factual basis was sufficient to support the plea of no contest. The citation to and
reliance on cases relating to a guilty plea do not necessarily support the same
results when the plea involved is a no contest plea. There are differences be-
tween what a plea of guilty admits and what a plea of no contest admits as dis-
cussed earlier. Advocacy point: counsel must make the differences plain
whenever the differences are important to the case before the court, in order to
keep the court on track.
524. 256 Neb. 669, 592 N.W.2d 148 (1999).
525. Until the 1970s brought the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the
many state variations on the federal rules, evidential uses of pleas of no contest
and convictions based on pleas of no contest remained unclear.
There is still some doubt, however, as to the effect of the plea in subse-
quent cases. This doubt exists in part because of a failure to draw an
adequate distinction between the use of the plea in a subsequent pro-
ceeding as an admission of guilt and the use of a conviction based on the
plea (or the plea as the equivalent of a conviction) in a subsequent pro-
ceeding, not as an admission of guilt, but for some other purpose. As a
matter of evidence, it is clear that the plea of nolo contendere is very dif-
ferent from a plea of guilty. A plea of guilty might be said to be the ulti-
mate admission. It says, "I did it.' The plea of nobo contendere says only,
I do not care to discuss it.' It is not an admission of anything [beyond the
case in which it is tendered]. It would seem clear that the plea of nolo
contendere should not be admitted into evidence as an admission of guilt
in any subsequent case, civil or criminal.
Edward Lane-Reticker, Nolo Contendere in North Carolina, 34 N.C. L. REV. 280,
291 (1956)(emphasis added). The doubts remaining in 1956 on admissibility
have been cleared away by Rules 410 and 803(22) of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and Rules 410 and 803(21) of the Nebraska Rules of Evidence.
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VIII. THE PLEA ITSELF AND FINDINGS ON THE PLEA
A defendant has no absolute right to have his plea of guilty or no
contest accepted, even if the plea is voluntarily and intelligently
made.5 26 In addition to rejecting tendered, negotiated pleas for fail-
ure to satisfy the factual basis requirement, any tendered plea of
guilty or no contest may be rejected in the sound discretion of the ar-
raigning judge, although the discretion is not an unlimited discre-
tion.527 With respect to a no contest plea, the arraigning court's
consent to a no contest plea is required by section 29-1819.01 of the
Nebraska Revised Statutes. Further, a no contest plea should be ac-
cepted only after the court has given due consideration to the views of
the parties and the interest of the public in the effective administra-
tion of justice.5 28
The better practice requires that trial judges expressly find defend-
ants guilty before imposing sentence. Where a valid sentence is im-
posed, however, the imposition of sentence implies a judgment of
guilt.5 29 It is also not absolutely required that a defendant speak the
magic words, "I plead guilty," as long as the record clearly reflects that
a guilty or no contest plea was what the defendant intended and the
defendant admits the facts of the charge, subject to the limited scope
of the admissions made by a plea of no contest.530 Of course, it is bet-
ter form to solicit a direct plea from a defendant. The question is one
of due process, not one of slavish adherence to good form.
In State v. Hoffman,5 3 1 the court extended part of its Tharp ruling
to cover the entire arraignment advisory: "we stated [in Tharp that]
'once a defendant has been informed of his right to counsel, there is no
requirement that the same information be conveyed to a defendant on
each subsequent court appearance.' The same rule applies to all the
admonitions required to be given a defendant."53 2 The court used the
rights advisory given to Hoffman on September 3rd to show his knowl-
edge and understanding at the time he tendered his no contest plea on
November 13th. In a further extension, the supreme court added that
it is not necessary to re-advise a defendant of the defendant's rights
even when pleading to amended charges as long as the arraigning
court advised the defendant of the applicable rights at least once ear-
lier in the pending case.5 33
526. See State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977); State v. Leisy, 207
Neb. 118, 295 N.W.2d 715 (1980).
527. See United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975).
528. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.1 (b) (1982).
529. See State v. Ondrak, 212 Neb. 840, 326 N.W.2d 188 (1982).
530. See State v. Jones, 218 Neb. 382, 355 N.W.2d 227 (1984).
531. 224 Neb. 830, 401 N.W.2d 683 (1987).
532. Id. at 833, 401 N.W.2d at 685.
533. See State v. Glover, 236 Neb. 402, 461 N.W.2d 410 (1990).
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The supreme courts position allows arraigning judges to enhance
arraignment speeds,53 4 but ignores the short memories of many de-
fendants. Even though not required to repeat rights advisories given
at earlier proceedings, the cautious arraigning judge will still want a
record of a defendant's knowledge and understanding of the rights
waived by a plea of guilty or no contest at a separate, later plea
proceeding.
Thus concludes our discussion of the Nebraska plea proceeding re-
cord required to support the validity on direct appeal of convictions
based on pleas of guilty or no contest. In the next section, we will
examine the records necessary to prove a valid plea-based conviction
the prosecution seeks to use for enhancement purposes and to prove
elements of new offenses.
IX. VALIDITY OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS FOR ENHANCED
SENTENCES AND IN PROVING ELEMENTS OF
NEW OFFENSES
A. Sentence Enhancements
The record requirements for future uses of plea-based convictions
differ substantially from the rules relating to the initial validity of
plea-based convictions. For sentence enhancement purposes, the bur-
den on the State to prove valid prior plea-based convictions is only to
show that the defendant had, or validly waived, counsel at the time of
such prior convictions, or so goes the usual short expression of the
rule. In Soe,535 the supreme court rejected a defense argument that
State v. Ziemba5 3 6 required proof of the prior conviction which showed
full compliance with Tweedy. Ziemba already had explained the dif-
ference in the records required to establish valid convictions for pur-
poses of direct appeal, as opposed to enhancement use. Soe made the
difference crystal clear. At least some federal courts, for a time, were
requiring proof of full Boykin-Tweedy-Irish compliance in prior convic-
tions used for enhancements. The Nebraska rules will be discussed in
detail.5 3 7
534. Judges can deliver complete advisories, accept pleas, and make a proper oral re-
cord of the defendant's understanding and waivers in five to ten minutes anyway.
The speed enhancement achievable by not re-advising a defendant does not out-
weigh the desirability of ensuring the defendant's understanding, assuming the
possibility of ensuring the defendant's understanding in just a few moments.
535. State v. Soe, 219 Neb. 797, 366 N.W.2d 439 (1985).
536. 216 Neb. 612, 346 N.W.2d 208 (1984).
537. As readers consider the lengths to which Nebraska prosecutors have been re-
quired to go in order to prove valid prior convictions, readers may consider and
contrast the laxity in two of the federal circuits. In the Seventh Circuit, prior
convictions can be proved for sentence enhancement purposes by a fingerprint
matchup with prints taken from the defendant upon the defendant's admissions




The prosecution must allege and prove a valid prior conviction in
order to obtain enhancement of the penalty when the general en-
hancement rules apply. While the prior conviction is not an element
of the underlying offense in enhancement situations, 5 38 proof of the
valid prior conviction is part of the factual basis necessary to sustain a
charge carrying an enhanced penalty that includes incarceration. 539
Habitual criminal proceedings, a special enhancement situation,
include different and additional requirements. The factual basis must
include a showing that the prior convictions, except the first convic-
tion, must be for offenses committed after each preceding conviction,
and all such prior convictions must precede the commission of the un-
derlying offense. 54 0 Ellis (1983) and the habitual criminal statute ad-
ditionally require that defendants have been sentenced to terms of
imprisonment of at least one year each on priors used for habitual
criminal enhancements.541 It is the length of the sentence imposed,
not the time actually served that matters in habitual criminal pro-
ceedings. 54 2 Still further, in habitual criminal enhancements, the
prior convictions also cannot have arisen out of the same set of circum-
stances. Defendant's "guilty plea"5 43 to a habitual criminal allegation
admits the truth of whatever allegations appear in the information.
But, if the information does not show the priors were successive and
not arising out of the same set of circumstances, the factual basis is
insufficient, unless the state provides the needed facts in open court
recitation. Or, perhaps, the state also could provide the requisite facts
in the presentence report. Consistency would indicate appellate
courts should not notice the absence of such information as plain error
1367 (7th Cir. 1990). In the Second Circuit, prior convictions can be proved for
sentence enhancement purposes by a phone call from the sentencing judge in the
present case to the judge who presided over the earlier cases. See United States
v. Carter, 801 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1986).
538. See State v. Mangelsen, 207 Neb. 213, 297 N.W.2d 765 (1980)(involving DUI sec-
ond); Haffke v. State, 149 Neb. 83, 30 N.W.2d 462 (1948)(involving DUI third).
But see State v. Oliver, 230 Neb. 864, 874, 434 N.W.2d 293, 300 (1989)(White, J.,
dissenting).
539. See State v. Ellis, 216 Neb. 699, 345 N.W.2d 323 (1984)(enhancing misdemeanor
value bad check to felony).
540. See State v. Ellis, 214 Neb. 172, 333 N.W.2d 391 (1983)(involving habitual
criminal).
541. See id.
542. See State v. Wyatt, 234 Neb. 349, 451 N.W.2d 84 (1990).
543. One does not plead guilty or otherwise to habitual criminal allegations; one ad-
mits, denies, or does not contest habitual criminal allegations. The extra allega-
tion required to seek a habitual criminal enhancement does not charge an
offense. It simply alleges a status for purposes of sentencing. That being true,
one cannot plead guilty to the factual allegation.
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on their own motion.544 In other enhancement contexts, just the fact
of valid prior convictions matters. 545 The sentences imposed do not
matter.
For DUI enhancements, the Ellis rule on the timing of the prior
convictions does not apply. In State v. Donaldson,546 the defendant
was convicted of both prior convictions on the same day. Both prior
convictions were for DUI first offense. Donaldson argued he could not
be found to have been convicted of a third offense without first being
convicted of a second offense. The supreme court held that "[t]o con-
stitute a third-offense violation of section 39-669.07, it is necessary
only that a violator be properly convicted of two previous violations of
section 39-669.07, whether the earlier convictions be called first of-
fense or second offense."547 The court did not refer to Ellis, but the
court did quote from defendant's contention that the statutory system
of increasing the penalties for successive DUI violations closely paral-
lels the habitual criminal statute.548 As a result, it seems defendant
was arguing from Ellis.549 Donaldson and Ellis definitely differ on
the point.
What constitutes a "conviction" for purposes of sentence enhance-
ment has been open to discussion in Nebraska, but the possibility for
discussion may have closed in 1991. In State v. Kramer,550 the su-
preme court held, in the context of a DUI second offense case, that a
conviction takes place prior to the imposition of sentence. Thus, at
least under section 39-669.07 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, one
conceivably could be convicted, but not sentenced pending presentence
investigation, on day one, arrested for a new DUI on day two, and
charged with a subsequent offense, based upon the conviction on day
one. Under Kramer, this should be the result under almost all the
enhanceable misdemeanor and special enhancement felony statutes,
but under Ellis and Wyatt would not be the result under the habitual
criminal statute. The result could still be open to argument given the
number of definitions of "conviction" in the Nebraska case law,551 but
the argument could probably be easily finessed using the rule that the
"prior" conviction must have become final. Convictions cannot become
544. See State v. Johnson, 7 Neb. App. 723, 585 N.W.2d 486 (1998).
545. See State v. Jackson, 225 Neb. 843, 408 N.W.2d 720 (1987).
546. 234 Neb. 683, 452 N.W.2d 531 (1990).
547. Id. at 692, 452 N.W.2d at 537.
548. See id. at 691, 452 N.W.2d at 537.
549. See State v. Towler, 240 Neb. 103, 481 N.W.2d 151 (1992).
550. 231 Neb. 437, 439, 436 N.W.2d 524, 526 (1989).
551. For a listing of the Nebraska Supreme Court's various definitions of "conviction,"




final until sentence has been imposed and either the appeal time runs
without an appeal or the appellate process reaches its conclusion.5 52
In addition, in DUI and refusal to submit to chemical test prosecu-
tions, the factual basis requirement can be satisfied only with prior
convictions entered within the applicable statutory period of years
preceding the date of the current conviction. The time period has
changed from no time limit, to ten years, to twelve years, to eight
years, and again to twelve years.55 3 The applicable dates for pur-
poses of calculating the twelve-year period are the date of the prior
offense (not the prior conviction) and the date of the current offense
(not the date of the current conviction).554 The date of the current
conviction, for purposes of this application of the concepts of current
and prior convictions, using the definition of conviction from
Kramer,55 5 McKain,556 and Schulz,557 is the date on which the defen-
dant's plea or a verdict of guilty following trial was accepted (in a jury
setting) or announced (in a non-jury setting). The main qualifying fac-
tor in enhancement proceedings other than habitual criminal proceed-
ings relates to finality of the prior convictions. One very special rule,
however, must be observed: a felony conviction for driving during a
fifteen year motor vehicle operator's license revocation period cannot
be used "to trigger application of the habitual criminal statute" nor
can it be used "as a prior offense for purposes of penalty enhancement
pursuant thereto."558
Alleged "prior" convictions pending on appeal at the time of the
commission of the new offense are not final convictions. Only final
convictions qualify as priors for sentence enhancements. Convictions
pending on appeal, therefore, are not available for enhancement use
under State v. Estes.559 Estes should not come as a surprise, because
Estes simply followed Nelson v. State.560 But recall that the supreme
court has also held, in the context of a DUI second offense case, that a
conviction takes place prior to the imposition of sentence. Thus, at
least under section 39-669.07 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes and its
successors, even though it might appear that one can be arrested on
day one, convicted but not sentenced pending presentence investiga-
tion on day two, and arrested for a new DUI after the time of the con-
552. The appellate process does not reach its conclusion until the appellate tribunal,
whether court of appeals or supreme court, issues its mandate.
553. See NEB. Rav. STAT. §§ 39-669.07 & 39-669.08 (Reissue 1988); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 60-6,196 & 60-6,197 (Supp. 1999).
554. See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 60-6,196(4) & 60-6,197(6)(Supp. 1999).
555. State v. Kramer, 231 Neb. 437, 436 N.W.2d 524 (1989).
556. State v. McKain, 230 Neb. 817, 434 N.W.2d 10 (1989).
557. State v. Schulz, 221 Neb. 473, 378 N.W.2d 165 (1985).
558. State v. Hittle, 257 Neb. 344, 356, 598 N.W.2d 20, 29 (1999).
559. 238 Neb. 692, 472 N.W.2d 214 (1991).
560. 116 Neb. 219, 221, 216 N.W. 556, 557 (1927).
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viction on day two and charged with a subsequent offense based upon
the conviction on day one, the appearance does not comport with Ne-
braska law. The final conviction rule would apply under Estes. Thus,
arraigning judges must face another set of clearly inconsistent prece-
dents, along with incomplete statutes underlying the inconsistent
precedents.5 61
C. Burdens of Proof
As with almost any other effort in a criminal prosecution, the state
bears the burden of proof in seeking sentence enhancements. The ele-
ments of the state's prima facie case at one time could be expressed
fairly simply. The prosecution, however, must allege and prove with
respect to each prior conviction:
(1) that the prior conviction happened;
(2) that the defendant was represented by counsel at the time of con-
viction or validly waived the right to counsel; and,
(3) that the accused is the person previously convicted;
In State v. Sherrod,562 the prior conviction records introduced by
the state were from two different cases and recited in substance that
defendant was present in court with named counsel, he was informed
by the trial judges involved of the jury verdicts finding him guilty, he
was granted his right of allocution, and he was sentenced in each case.
Sherrod did not object to the introduction of the prior conviction
records. Instead, he argued that the records must show he was repre-
sented at the time of the convictions, not at the time of the prior
sentencings. Sherrod did not come forward with evidence to show he
was unrepresented at the time of the prior convictions. The supreme
court said the question presented under the circumstances in Sherrod
was whether the court could presume counsel was present at the time
of the prior convictions. The court noted the record was not silent on
the question of the presence or waiver of counsel.
As a result, the court had "no problem indulging in this presump-
tion" and held:
the State establishes a prima facie case for proving a prior, counseled convic-
tion by producing appropriate record evidence of a conviction which discloses
that at a critical point in the proceedings-arraignment, trial, conviction, or
sentencing-the defendant had either intelligently and voluntarily waived
counsel or in fact was represented by counsel at one of those times. The defen-
dant then has the burden of coming forward with evidence that in fact his prior
conviction was uncounseled.5 6 3
561. Not an especially stress-inducing problem for trial court judges; we're used to
that sort of thing.
562. 229 Neb. 128, 425 N.W.2d 616 (1988)(involving first degree sexual assault and
habitual criminal status).
563. Id. at 134, 425 N.W.2d at 621 (emphasis added).
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The appellant made a similar argument to the supreme court in
State v. Dyke,564 except that he had objected to the admissibility of the
record relating to one prior conviction at the enhancement hearing.
The trial court found the prior conviction valid. At the first arraign-
ment proceeding in the prior case, the court advised defendant of his
right to counsel and defendant waived counsel. At the second arraign-
ment proceeding, defendant appeared without counsel and the court
again advised him of the right to counsel. The judge noted on the
docket sheet that defendant would have an attorney. Defendant ten-
dered a not guilty plea. Defendant appeared for trial pro se, according
to the docket sheet, and was convicted. Defendant argued the trial
docket sheet did not indicate affirmatively that defendant was repre-
sented or had waived counsel at the time of the conviction.
The Nebraska Supreme Court observed that defendant's position
would require the trial court, in addition to advising a defendant of
the right to counsel at each of the prior critical stages of the case at
which defendant appeared unrepresented, to also advise the defen-
dant of the right to counsel at the time of conviction. That is precisely
what the United States Supreme Court requires of state trial courts
and precisely what Nebraska statute substantially requires of Ne-
braska trial courts. Yet, the Nebraska Supreme Court had absolved
trial courts of any obligation to advise defendants of the right to coun-
sel at each appearance after once having advised them of the right to
retained or appointed counsel, despite the United States Supreme
Court's position and the statute. In Dyke, the prior conviction record
showed defendant had been advised of his right to counsel twice and
had waived counsel at those appearances. Thus, according to the Ne-
braska Supreme Court, the trial court was not required to re-advise
the defendant of the right to counsel at the trial ("the proceeding
where he was convicted").
The supreme court applied its burden of proof rules from Sherrod
in Dyke, with the result that the state met its burden of establishing a
prima facie case at the enhancement hearing. The burden then
shifted to the defendant to produce evidence that, in fact, his prior
conviction was uncounseled. 56 5 Dyke produced no evidence showing
his waiver of counsel at the prior conviction to have been anything
other than voluntary and intelligent and did not attack the validity of
the prior conviction on that ground. Therefore, the enhancement deci-
sion was affirmed.
Two aspects of the Dyke decision should be noted in particular.
The proceeding where Dyke was convicted was a trial, not another ar-
raignment. Had the challenged prior conviction been the result of a
564. 231 Neb. 621, 437 N.W.2d 164 (1989).
565. See also State v. Kumpula, 4 Neb. App. 320 (1993)(stating that defendant has
burden of proof that prior conviction was uncounseled).
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plea, the result of the challenge in the enhancement appeal most
likely would have been different, because of the waiver of the right to
counsel once thought to be embodied in a plea. As we have seen, at
the plea proceeding itself, a defendant may expressly waive the assis-
tance of counsel simply by tendering a plea of guilty or no contest, not
any longer. Further, implicit in the supreme court's observation that
Dyke had not challenged the prior conviction on the ground that the
waiver of counsel involved was not voluntary and intelligent is the
idea that such a challenge would be appropriate in the context of an
enhancement proceeding.
Within the context of habitual criminal enhancement proceedings,
which are governed by a specific statute, section 29-2222 of the Ne-
braska Revised Statutes, an authenticated record establishing a prior
conviction of a defendant with the same name as the accused prima
facie suffices to establish identity, for the purpose of enhancing pun-
ishment, and suffices, in the absence of a denial or contradictory evi-
dence, to support a finding that the accused has been convicted at an
earlier time.5 66 Thus, upon admission of such evidence, the burden of
producing contrary evidence shifts to the accused.
The existence of a prior conviction and the identity of the accused
as the person convicted can be proved by any competent evidence, in-
cluding the oral testimony of the accused and duly authenticated or
certified records maintained by the courts or penal and custodial
authorities.567
Where the accused uses a different name at the time of committing
the "present" offense than the name used at the time of committing
the prior offenses, proof that the accused is the same person as the
previously convicted person must be presented beyond the face of the
records of the prior convictions. The name difference, however, does
not affect the adequacy of the prior conviction records for purposes of
proving the prior convictions.568
The state's burden of proof includes proof of the dates of the prior
convictions. Proving dates different than the dates referred to in the
complaint presents no problem, however, as long as the means were
provided to the accused to obtain information relating to the specific
dates of the offenses relied upon as prior convictions. The state bears
the burden, in cases presenting a variance in dates between the dates
alleged and the dates proved, of creating a record showing the accused
could not have been misled or confused by the variance. The exact
566. See State v. Sardeson, 231 Neb. 586, 607, 437 N.W.2d 473, 487 (1989); State v.
Jackson, 225 Neb. 843, 861, 408 N.W.2d 720, 732 (1987).
567. See State v. Davis, 224 Neb. 518, 521, 398 N.W.2d 729, 731 (1987); State v. Luna,
211 Neb. 630, 634, 319 N.W.2d 737, 740 (1982).
568. See State v. Wakeman, 231 Neb. 66, 434 N.W.2d 549 (1989)(involving DUI third,
in which officer testimony helped to establish identity).
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time of commission of an alleged prior offense is not essential to a
charge under a recidivist statute. The number of prior convictions is a
sentencing factor, not an element of an offense.5 6 9
D. Sufficiency of the Record
The record of an enhancement proceeding, in order to comport with
due process, must show at a minimum that the defendant was given
reasonable notice, an opportunity to be present and to be heard with
counsel (unless waived), the right to be confronted with the witnesses
against the defendant, the right to cross-examine the state's wit-
nesses, the right to offer evidence in defense, and the right against
compelled self-incrimination. Notice that these rules, applicable in
the enhancement hearing context, present an exception to the general
rule relating to sentencing hearings at which the rights of confronta-
tion and cross-examination do not apply. Beyond these minimums,
trial judges may conduct enhancement hearings in any fashion they
choose, as long as they do not abuse their discretion. 570
The rule had been that a plea of guilty or no contest to a charge
with an appended enhancement allegation admitted the prior convic-
tions and dispensed with the need of a hearing for proof of the prior
convictions. 57 1 But more is now required. In State v. Smith,572 the
court adopted the Baldasar rule and held a prior conviction, the record
of which fails to show that counsel was afforded or the right waived
may not be used to enhance the penalty. In State v. Ziemba,57 3 the
court expanded Smith to permit an admission by the defendant of the
prior conviction as alleged. Before accepting such an admission, how-
ever, the arraigning judge "must address the defendant and ascertain
569. See State v. Wyatt, 234 Neb. 349, 358, 451 N.W.2d 84, 90 (1990)(involving habit-
ual criminal); State v. Wakeman, 231 Neb. 66, 74,434 N.W.2d 549, 555 (1989)(in-
volving DUI); State v. Oliver, 230 Neb. 864, 869, 434 N.W.2d 293, 297
(1989)(involving DUI); State v. Jameson, 224 Neb. 38, 44, 395 N.W.2d 744, 748
(1986)(involving DUI); State v. Harig, 192 Neb. 49, 56-57, 218 N.W.2d 884, 889
(1974)(involving habitual criminal).
570. See State v. Bowen, 244 Neb. 204, 210, 505 N.W.2d 682, 687-88 (1993); State v.
Jackson, 255 Neb. 843, 862, 408 N.W.2d 720, 733 (1987). With respect to DUI
and refusal to submit to chemical test enhancement hearings, by statute, the de-
fense must also be given the following opportunities: to review the records relat-
ing to the alleged prior convictions, to object to the validity of the alleged prior
convictions, and to present mitigating circumstances prior to sentencing in the
current case.
571. See State v. Feagin, 196 Neb. 261, 262, 242 N.W.2d 124, 124-25 (1976); State v.
Graham, 192 Neb. 196, 201, 219 N.W.2d 723, 726 (1974); State v. Youngstrom,
191 Neb. 112, 116, 214 N.W.2d 27, 29 (1974).
572. 213 Neb. 446, 329 N.W.2d 564 (1983).
573. 216 Neb. 612, 346 N.W.2d 208 (1984).
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that he was represented by counsel at the time of the prior conviction
or waived his right to counsel."57 4
State v. Tichota575 indicated the defendant's waiver of proof of the
prior convictions should be shown to have been a voluntary and intelli-
gent waiver. State v. Smyth 5 76 indicated that it suffices to show in the
records of the prior convictions that, at each of the arraignments re-
sulting in the prior convictions, the defendant "was either represented
by counsel or advised of his right and intelligently, voluntarily, and
knowingly waived that right."577 The record offered for enhancement
need not show the arraigning court in the prior conviction case found
the existence of a factual basis for that plea-based conviction. 5 78
The information that the record of the prior convictions must dis-
close with respect to the waiver of counsel and whether the waiver
was voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly made was ignored in
Tichota and Smyth. The supreme court covered that later when the
need arose. 579 In addition, it is clear that a journal entry containing a
finding that the defendant's plea was voluntary, but also containing a
finding that the same defendant's waiver of counsel at the same plea
taking proceeding was not voluntary, does not prove a valid waiver of
counsel for enhancement purposes.SSo Other decisions have clarified
the point.
In State v. Vainiunas,58 the court construed Smith5s2 to require
the record of a prior conviction used for enhancement purposes in a
third offense driving while intoxicated case to show on its face a volun-
tary and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel or that defendant
was represented by counsel. Vainiunas objected to the record of one of
the prior convictions offered against him. The judgment recited that
defendant was represented in court without naming counsel. The ap-
pearance docket sheet named a person as counsel for the defendant.
574. Id. at 620, 346 N.W.2d at 214.
575. 218 Neb. 444, 445, 356 N.W.2d 85, 86 (1984).
576. 217 Neb. 153, 347 N.W.2d 859 (1984).
577. Id. at 157, 347 N.W.2d at 862.
578. See State v. Werner, 8 Neb. App. 684, 693-94, 600 N.W.2d 500, 507 (1999).
579. See State v. Orduna, 250 Neb. 602, 610-11, 550 N.W.2d 356, 362 (1996)(noting
district court's checklist showed advice and valid waiver); State v. Ristau, 245
Neb. 52, 56-58, 511 N.W.2d 83, 86 (1994)(holding that even with admission of
prior must have record proof of counsel or waiver); State v. Nowicki, 239 Neb.
130, 136-40, 474 N.W.2d 478, 484-86 (1991)(stating that paper trail of uncoun-
seled priors must show advice of both right to counsel and waiver); State v.
Green, 238 Neb. 328, 344-47, 470 N.W.2d 736, 749-51 (1991)(noting that paper
trail of uncounseled prior must indicate waivers of counsel were found or could
have been found knowing and intelligent, with record information sufficient to
support a finding); State v. Vanderkuur, 235 Neb. 566, 567-68, 456 N.W.2d 473,
474 (1990)(finding that party either had counsel or had waived counsel).
580. See State v. Anderson, 232 Neb. 349, 349-50, 440 N.W.2d 257, 258-59 (1989).
581. 213 Neb. 800, 331 N.W.2d 522 (1983).
582. State v. Smith, 213 Neb. 446, 329 N.W.2d 564 (1983).
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The docket entry showing imposition of sentence contained no refer-
ence or showing as to whether defendant was represented. An addi-
tional record relating to the judgment showed a person's last name
handwritten in a blank for the name of defendant's counsel. The court
held the judgment and the appearance docket sheet presented a suffi-
cient showing on the record that defendant had been represented by
counsel in the trial court.
Ziemba5 8 3 established that checklists authenticated by the signa-
ture or initials of the judge5 8 4 could be used to affirmatively establish
that a defendant made a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea and
waived his rights voluntarily and knowingly. The checklists the trial
court used in Ziemba showed simply that defendant appeared, waived
counsel, was advised of his rights, and listed the possible penalties
and elements of the offense charged without further elaboration. The
court did not state whether the checklists were sufficiently complete
to comply with the Tweedy, Smith, and Ziemba rules, but it ruled a
checklist satisfying those requirements could be used to prove a valid
waiver of rights at a prior conviction.
In State v. Tonge,58 5 the checklist used to prove one prior convic-
tion showed defendant had been represented by counsel, while the
checklist used to prove the other prior conviction read, in its initial
hearing record: "Requested counsel no... has funds to hire own attor-
ney." In the arraignment checklist, it appeared defendant's constitu-
tional rights were explained, he understood his rights, and he waived
his right to counsel. The sentencing part of the checklist recited de-
fendant waived counsel. Defendant did not object to the checklists
before the arraigning court, but made his first objection on appeal to
the supreme court. The court held the checklists were valid and fully
comported with the requirements of Ziemba. Tonge also held the cer-
tified copy of the checklists offered in evidence did not need to bear a
filing stamp.
In State v. Baxter,58 6 the defendant had objected in the arraigning
court to the records of the prior driving while under the influence con-
victions. The arraigning court overruled his objections as to the
records of two prior convictions. Baxter contended the records failed
to show compliance with the full Tweedy requirements. The record of
583. State v. Ziemba, 216 Neb. 612, 346 N.W.2d 208 (1984).
584. Judgments of convictions entered in district courts may or may not bear the sig-
natures of the district judges who rendered the judgments and did not need to
bear the district judges' signatures throughout most of Nebraska's existence as
an organized part of the United States. However, district court judgments appar-
ently must bear the signatures of the district judges rendering them after the
effective date of LB 43 (1999). See State v. Fletcher, 8 Neb. App. 498, 596 N.W.2d
717 (1999).
585. 217 Neb. 747, 350 N.W.2d 571 (1984) (involving DUI third offense guilty plea).
586. 218 Neb. 414, 355 N.W.2d 514 (1984).
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the 1977 conviction included a complaint for first offense, later
amended to second offense, and showed Baxter was represented by
appointed counsel. The record of the 1978 conviction showed another
DUI charge and that Baxter had public defender representation at the
time of his plea and sentence. With respect to the 1978 conviction, the
original charge was a third offense, shown by the records to have been
reduced to second offense in an amended complaint, a copy of which
was not included in the exhibit used to prove the 1978 conviction.
Baxter additionally objected to the lack of a copy of the amended
complaint.
The supreme court found the exhibits sufficient because they re-
flected the convictions were entered at hearings at which the defen-
dant's counsel appeared. The supreme court said it would have been
preferable to have included a copy of the amended complaint, but that
the record was sufficient without it for enhancement purposes, even
though it would not suffice on direct appeal.58 7
The only permissible ground of objection to an offer of the record of
a prior conviction in a DUI enhancement proceeding had been that the
record did not show that counsel was present or waived at the pro-
ceedings that resulted in the prior conviction. In State v. Fraser,58 s
Fraser sought to prevent use of a record of a prior DUI conviction by
claiming that he had not, in fact, pleaded guilty to the prior charge.
Fraser admitted at the enhancement hearing that he had knowingly
waived his right to counsel at the proceeding that resulted in the prior
conviction. The county court record, a certified transcript of which
was offered to prove the prior conviction, included "the ticket, com-
plaint, journal entry and bench sheet from Fraser's... 1980 DUI con-
viction." The county court and district court enhanced the penalty on
Fraser's 1985 DUI conviction based upon the certified transcript of the
1980 conviction over Fraser's objection. The supreme court affirmed.
The settled procedural rule before State v. Louthan,58 9 was that
objections to the validity of prior convictions on grounds other than
the failure of the record to show counsel or waiver of counsel consti-
tute collateral attacks and must be raised either by direct appeal or in
587. See id. at 416-17, 355 N.W.2d at 516; see also State v. Jones, 219 Neb. 184, 184-
85, 362 N.W.2d 58, 58-59 (1985)(involving a record, which showed counsel pre-
sent when plea tendered and accepted regarding prior conviction used for DUI
enhancement); State v. Schaf, 218 Neb. 437, 441, 355 N.W.2d 793, 795-96 (1984)
(involving a checklist that showed defendant appeared with counsel, without
naming counsel for entry of plea on prior DUI conviction-checklist set out in
opinion). For more on surprising flexibility regarding foundation for record ex-
hibits, see State v. Tejral, 240 Neb. 329, 333-34, 482 N.W.2d 6, 9 (1992), which
involved a waiver of rights form without a filing stamp, date, or case number, but
otherwise identifiable with prior case and showing presence of counsel.
588. 222 Neb. 862, 863-64, 387 N.W.2d 695, 696-97 (1986).
589. 257 Neb. 174, 595 N.W.2d 917 (1999).
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separate proceedings commenced expressly for the purpose of setting
aside the alleged invalid judgment.5 9 0 A troubling paragraph in the
opinion stated: "At the [enhancement] hearing,... Fraser objected to
the use of exhibit 1 to prove the prior conviction because it indicated
that he had pleaded guilty. His objection did not go to the fact of the
prior conviction nor to the fact that he had waived the right to
counsel."591
State v. Slezak592 added a second ground for objection to the offer
of a prior conviction record:
We adhere to our earlier rulings.., that to prove a prior conviction the state
need only show that a defendant had, or waived, counsel. We add only that for
a prior conviction based on a plea of guilty to be used for enhancement pur-
poses in an action under § 39-669.07, the record must show that the defendant
entered the guilty plea to the charge.
5 9 3
The court left room for flexibility on the question of whether the defen-
dant must tender the plea personally or may ratify a guilty or no con-
test plea tendered by defense counsel in open court in the defendant's
presence. Slezak and Fraser seem inconsistent, but the degree of in-
consistency remains unclear.
Objecting to the fact of the prior conviction is an uncertain concept
at best. In State v. Laymon,5 94 defendant's only contention on appeal
was that the state had failed to prove two prior DUI convictions. He
did not object to the offer of the certified copies of the records of the
prior convictions. The court applied the doctrine of idem sonans in the
context of a DUI enhancement proceeding, observing:
The names Layman and Laymon are so similar in pronunciation and appear-
ance and the variation is so slight that they must be regarded as idem sonans.
Moreover, the defendant offered no evidence and has not claimed or demon-
strated that he is not the Tony I. Laymon who was twice convicted of drunk
driving.5 9 5
A mistake in the spelling of a name is immaterial if both modes of
spelling have the same sound and appearance under the doctrine of
idem sonans.59 6 A record of a prior conviction of a defendant with the
same name is prima facie sufficient to establish identity for the pur-
590. See State v. Jones, 219 Neb. 184, 185, 362 N.W.2d 58, 59 (1985); State v. Baxter,
218 Neb. 414, 416-17, 355 N.W.2d 514, 515-16 (1984). But see State v. Foster, 224
Neb. 267, 268-69, 398 N.W.2d 101, 102-03 (1986).
591. Fraser, 222 Neb. at 864, 387 N.W.2d at 697.
592. 226 Neb. 404, 407, 411 N.W.2d 632, 634 (1987).
593. Id. at 408, 411 N.W.2d at 635. If one adds to one's earlier rulings, does one really
adhere to them?
594. 217 Neb. 464, 465, 348 N.W.2d 902 (1984).
595. Id. at 465, 348 N.W.2d at 903.
596. See id.; State v. McGhee, 184 Neb. 352, 167 N.W.2d 765 (1969)(holding that the
record of prior conviction must show prior trial court had jurisdiction of crime
and of person of defendant). This is generally not a problem, although, as we
have seen, territorial and subject matter jurisdiction, in their traditional forms,
can pose considerable difficulty.
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poses of enhancing the penalty. Without evidence in contradiction, it
is sufficient to support a finding of a prior conviction.5 97 The issue
raised in Laymon is resolved easily by applying the burdens of proof
rules from Sherrod and Sardeson.
An objection to the fact of conviction would be a conceptually sound
approach by which to raise an objection, within an enhancement pro-
ceeding, to the sufficiency of the complaint upon which an alleged
prior conviction is based. If the complaint at the alleged prior convic-
tion was not sufficient to charge an offense, then, no matter what plea
the defendant tendered at that time, the plea was tendered to a non-
crime and the alleged conviction was a non-conviction, as we have
seen.
Whether the supreme court would allow such an objection in an
enhancement proceeding remains to be seen, but (1) the language
from Fraser, (2) coupled with the Slezak decision, and (3) bolstered by
the idea that jurisdictional challenges can be raised at any time and
stage of the proceedings, indicate a reasonable possibility the supreme
court would allow the objection. It might be necessary to allow such
an objection in order to prevent an obvious and manifest injustice.
Further, it would be consistent with the concept that the state bears
the burden of proving valid prior convictions. It is clear that such an
objection could be made in a separate proceeding brought expressly for
the purpose of setting aside the alleged prior conviction, if separate
proceedings have survived.
Another attack on the record of enhancement proceedings has
taken the form of a claim that the trial courts' findings relating to the
prior convictions were not specific enough. In State v. Snodgrass,598
the defendant had asked the trial court to make a specific finding con-
cerning two of defendant's prior convictions (whatever that meant),
which the trial court declined to do. The supreme court construed de-
fendant's contention to be a claim that the trial court's refusal to spe-
cifically designate or identify the prior conviction used for
enhancement purposes somehow vitiates the sentence imposed. The
trial court did "adjudge" that defendant had three prior convictions
and that the present conviction was his fourth conviction, but was a
third offense. The state only offered proof of three prior convictions, so
there could be no mistake as to which three prior convictions the trial
court relied upon in enhancing the penalty. The supreme court noted
the applicable statute required the trial court simply to make a find-
ing on the record as to the number of prior convictions.
The supreme court found the trial court's record contained the trial
court's finding relating to the number of defendant's prior convictions
597. See State v. Eagle, 182 Neb. 535, 538, 156 N.W.2d 131, 133 (1968).
598. 230 Neb. 119, 120, 430 N.W.2d 55, 56 (1988)(involving DUI third offense).
2000]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
and was sufficient to enhance the penalty, but went on make this
unanimous, troubling statement: "The county court's oversight or fail-
ure to make a specific and express finding that Snodgrass had three
prior convictions was harmless error."5 99 That statement classifies
the failure to make a specific finding of fact as a separate statement in
the judgment of conviction as an error, even though harmless in that
case.
The unstated distinction here is between express findings of fact
stated separately from the trial court's conclusions and implied find-
ings of fact necessary to the trial court's conclusions. The supreme
court implied, by the harmless error language, that in a case where
the specific finding would be important due to evidence of more prior
convictions than involved in Snodgrass, the error might not be harm-
less. Thus, in a proper case, specific findings of fact may be required,
with the failure to make them constituting a prejudicial error.
In State v. Wyatt,60 0 the defendant also argued the trial court made
no specific finding as to the dates of the prior convictions the trial
court relied upon in enhancing the penalty. Therefore, the defendant
claimed, the enhancement could not stand. The defendant based his
argument on Ellis.603 The supreme court rejected the argument,
pointing out Ellis only required that each of the prior offenses consid-
ered in the enhancement decision, other than the first offense, must
have occurred after a conviction for the previous offense in order for
such offenses to serve as a basis for recidivist treatment. Thus, the
trial court is not required to state specifically that it finds the defen-
dant's commission of the offense that precipitated the second convic-
tion occurred after the date of the conviction for the first offense and
that each of those convictions occurred prior to the defendant's com-
mission of the offense involved in the current case. Again, however,
the supreme court pointed out on the way to its holding that the en-
hancement proceeding record in Wyatt contained only two exhibits re-
lating to only two prior cases. Thus, no mistake was possible about
which prior convictions the trial court considered to form the basis for
the enhancement decision. Trial courts and counsel do need to exer-
cise caution and consider specific findings when the trial court is faced
with multiple prior convictions, some of which are valid and some of
which are not.
Further, trial courts and counsel must exercise special care to be
certain the conviction has not been set aside in separate proceedings
brought for that express purpose on the ground of invalidity of the
judgment of conviction or in any other form of collateral attack. A con-
599. Id. at 121, 430 N.W.2d at 57.
600. 234 Neb. 349, 357, 451 N.W.2d 84, 90 (1990)(involving a habitual criminal).




viction that has been set aside due to its invalidity ought not be used
to enhance penalties. There is a distinction between a set-aside for
invalidity of the judgment and a set-aside following successful comple-
tion of a sentence of probation. Even if a conviction has been set aside
(i.e., nullified) after successful completion of probation, that conviction
ought to be available for use for enhancement of penalties on subse-
quent offenses. 6 02
A conviction that has been pardoned on the ground of innocence
cannot be used for enhancement purposes under the habitual criminal
act, and logically cannot be used in any other enhancement proceed-
ings. Whether proof that a prior conviction has not been set aside for
invalidity or has not been pardoned for innocence will be required in
enhancement proceedings has not been raised or resolved in Ne-
braska, but wise prosecutors will be wary of such potential defense
tactics. The point, however, could become an important aspect of the
proof of prior convictions available for enhancement use because, in
State v. Davis,603 the supreme court did observe, in its statement of
the facts,6 04 that neither of defendant's prior convictions had been set
aside or pardoned.
E. Application of Enhancement Rules
State v. Ellis (1984),605 established that the Nebraska Supreme
Court will apply the Baldasar rule to all enhancement proceedings
and will require that prior conviction records used for enhancement
purposes show on their face that counsel was afforded or waived at the
time of the prior conviction. In this sense, Baldasar, as applied in Ne-
braska, has altered the traditional concept of the collateral attack as it
relates to enhancement proceedings.60 6 While an objection to use of a
602. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2264 (Reissue 1995 & Supp. 1999). Nullification orders
differ from expunction or expungement orders. Nebraska courts lack the author-
ity to expunge convictions.
603. 224 Neb. 518, 519, 398 N.W.2d 729, 730 (1987).
604. Theoretically, when an appellate court includes information in its statement of
the facts of each case, it is because the appellate court selects from the facts and
includes only those facts that the court considers material to their decisions.
Facts that are material to appellate decisions form an essential part of the deter-
mination of what the appellate court actually held, as opposed to what the court
said it held, for purposes of determining the precedential meaning of the appel-
late court's decisions. See RicHARD B. CAPPALi, THE AsRiCAN COMmON LAW
METHOD (1997). Of course, Professor Cappalli could be only assuming appellate
courts consciously choose which facts to include in their opinions due to the mate-
riality of the facts chosen to the decisions reached; he did not cite any authority
for the position.
605. 216 Neb. 699, 703-04, 345 N.W.2d 323, 326 (1984)(involving a bad check - en-
hanced to felony based on prior misdemeanor convictions).
606. The collateral attack tends to form a fairly loosely related, amorphous class of
activity. One classic description of collateral attack says a collateral attack is an
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prior conviction on the ground that the record does not disclose
whether counsel was present or waived would once have been pre-
cluded as a collateral attack or an attempt to relitigate a prior convic-
tion within an enhancement proceeding,607 the objection is now
allowed under Baldasar, as adopted in Smith for enhancement pur-
poses.608 That the court extended Baldasar to all enhancement pro-
ceedings through the factual basis requirement is obvious from State
v. Ellis (1984) and State v. Ozmun.60 9
State v. Slezak61o should have established that records used to
prove prior convictions for enhancement purposes need only show that
the defendant had or waived counsel and tendered a plea of guilty or
no contest at the proceedings resulting in a prior conviction in order to
attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade a judgment or to deny its force and effect, in
some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attack-
ing the judgment. See Cacek v. Munson, 160 Neb. 187, 69 N.W.2d 692 (1955). An
additional wrinkle advises that a collateral attack is an action brought in a court
other than the court in which the judgment was rendered and seeks to impeach
the challenged judgment using matters outside the record of the action resulting
in the judgment. See Elliott v. City of Auburn, 172 Neb. 1, 108 N.W.2d 328
(1961). Further, when a litigant challenges the validity of a judgment in any way
other than through a special statutory proceeding to have the judgment vacated,
reversed, or modified, or by a proceeding in equity to prevent enforcement of the
challenged judgment, the litigant has attempted a collateral attack. See Silven v.
Tesch, 212 Neb. 880, 326 N.W.2d 850 (1982).
So, as relevant to judgments of conviction, it appears that (1) if a defendant, in
the context of a repeat offender sentencing hearing, claims the prior conviction
the state seeks to use against the defendant was invalidly obtained, the defen-
dant has launched a collateral attack; (2) if a convict seeks post-conviction relief,
through a state post-conviction action, or through a federal prisoner petition chal-
lenging the validity of the convict's conviction, the convict has launched a collat-
eral attack; (3) if a convict files a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus,
challenging either a federal conviction or a state conviction, or a prisoner, federal,
state, or local, files a federal habeas action, challenging the validity of the pris-
oner's detention, the prisoner has initiated a collateral attack; (4) if a convict files
a declaratory judgment action or other equitable petition challenging the validity
of a prior conviction on Boykin-Irish grounds, the convict has launched a collat-
eral attack; and (5) if a convict files a separate proceeding raising Boykin-Irish
challenges to a prior conviction, the convict has launched a collateral attack.
As we work through the Nebraska Supreme Court's decisions relating to what
constitutes collateral attacks challenging judgments of conviction and relating to
permissible and impermissible forms of collateral attacks on judgments of convic-
tion, we will discover the court may no longer follow Cacek, Elliot, and Sileven.
607. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 212 Neb. 45, 47, 321 N.W.2d 80, 82 (1982); State v.
Voight, 206 Neb. 829, 832, 295 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1980); State v. Orosco, 199 Neb.
532, 542, 260 N.W.2d 303, 309 (1977), overruled by State v. Smith, 213 Neb. 446,
329 N.W.2d 564 (1983).
608. See, e.g., State v. Tonge, 217 Neb. 747, 750, 350 N.W.2d 571, 574 (1984).
609. State v. Ozmun, 221 Neb. 481, 482, 378 Neb. 170, 172 (1985)(involving a bad
check-felony-enhanced on prior misdemeanor conviction); cf. State v. Gonza-
les, 218 Neb. 43, 48, 352 N.W.2d 571, 574 (1984)(enhancing burglary conviction
due to prior conviction).
610. 226 Neb. 404, 411 N.W.2d 632 (1987).
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be admissible and to prove a prima facie case, assuming no issues on
the questions of identity and jurisdiction. A procedural aberration al-
lowed in State v. Gonzales,6 1 1 however, resulted in an interesting pe-
riod of federal and state court exchanges of opinions.
In State v. Gonzales, at the enhancement hearing, the state intro-
duced exhibits showing two prior felony convictions and showing the
presence of counsel at the time of the prior convictions. 61 2 Defendant
then introduced verbatim transcriptions of the arraignments resulting
in the two prior felony convictions, which the trial court received and
considered in determining defendant to be a habitual criminal. The
transcriptions revealed that defendant was not advised of all of the
rights required by Boykin and Tweedy. Confrontation and self-incrim-
ination were not discussed. The prior convictions involved were post-
Boykin, post-Turner (1971), but pre-Tweedy convictions.
A four-judge majority of the Nebraska Supreme Court said it was
permissible procedure for Gonzales to raise the constitutional validity
of his prior convictions in the enhancement proceeding by offering the
transcriptions in the trial court. That idea came as a surprise to most
Nebraska criminal law practitioners. A long line of decisions both
before and after State v. Gonzales was released substantiated the con-
curring judges' description of the status of the majority's Boykin-
Tweedy discussion in State v. Gonzales as simply dicta.61 3 The mis-
chief wrought by the Gonzales dicta, however, moved into the federal
courts on a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus.
In the federal courts, the Gonzales dicta became a holding on the
merits.614 The United States District Court concluded that Tweedy
should apply to all convictions used for enhancement purposes in Ne-
braska courts without regard to the date of conviction, as long as the
conviction was post-Boykin.6 1S5 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed: "The Nebraska Supreme Court's refusal to apply the
Tweedy mandate retroactively cannot be deemed constitutional er-
611. 218 Neb. 43, 352 N.W.2d 571 (1984).
612. See id. at 4748, 352 N.W.2d at 574-75.
613. Pre-Gonzales decisions in this line of cases include State v. Smith, 213 Neb. 446,
329 N.W.2d 564 (1983), and State v. Ziemba, 216 Neb. 612, 346 N.W.2d 208
(1984).
Post-Gonzales decisions through 1987 in this line of cases include State v. Bax-
ter, 218 Neb. 414, 355 N.W.2d 514 (1984)(unanimous decision announced less
than 3 months after Gonzales), State v. Schaf, 218 Neb. 437, 355 N.W.2d 793
(1984)(unanimous decision announced the same day as Baxter), State v. Jones,
219 Neb. 184, 362 N.W.2d 58 (1985), State v. Soe, 219 Neb. 797, 366 N.W.2d 439
(1985), State v. Benzel, 220 Neb. 466, 370 N.W.2d 501 (1985), State v. Hamblin,
223 Neb. 469, 390 N.W.2d 533 (1986), State v. Davis, 224 Neb. 518, 398 N.W.2d
729 (1987), and State v. Slezak, 226 Neb. 404, 411 N.W.2d 632(1987).
614. See Gonzales v. Grammer, CV84-L-691 & CV86-L-424, Memorandum, Order, and
Recommendation of Magistrate (D. Neb.)(unpublished, filed Dec. 19, 1986).
615. See Gonzales v. Grammer, 655 F. Supp. 1147, 1148 (D. Neb. 1987).
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ror."6 i6 The Eighth Circuit also ruled states are free to establish
whatever procedural requirements the states deem necessary for
processing challenges to prior convictions within enhancement
proceedings.61 7
The issue promptly reappeared before the Nebraska Supreme
Court, which then expressly disapproved its language in Gonzales al-
lowing defendants to raise the alleged constitutional invalidity
(Boykin-Tweedy-Irish-based allegations of invalidity) of prior convic-
tions in enhancement proceedings: "we . . .now hold that such...
issue[s] may only be raised in a direct appeal or in a separate proceed-
ing commenced for the express purpose of setting aside the judgment
alleged to be invalid."618 Thus, after Oliver, defendants could raise
the alleged constitutional invalidity of prior convictions in enhance-
ment proceedings on the sole ground of a lack of a showing of counsel
or waiver at the time of the prior conviction, subject to the rules dis-
cussed earlier in connection with factual basis and burdens of
proof.6 i 9
Predictably, enterprising defense counsel also moved the Nebraska
Supreme Court's Oliver approach into the federal courts on habeas re-
view, where the court's Oliver approach eventually found federal court
616. Gonzales v. Grammer, 848 F.2d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 1988).
617. See id. at 896 n.8.
618. State v. Oliver, 230 Neb. 864, 870, 434 N.W.2d 293, 298 (1989); see also State v.
Crane, 240 Neb. 32, 34-35, 480 N.W.2d 401, 403 (1992)(explaining Oliver). As
will be seen, Crane has been overruled, along with the rest of the separate pro-
ceeding cases. There were no reported appellate court or supreme court devia-
tions from Crane during the time it remained good law. Although, as will be
discussed in connection with separate proceedings, Crane formed part of the
groundwork for the separate proceedings rules. See State v. White, 244 Neb. 577,
508 N.W.2d 554 (1993); State v. Partee, 240 Neb. 473, 482 N.W.2d 272 (1992).
619. See, e.g., State v. Dyke, 231 Neb. 621, 437 N.W.2d 164 (1989); State v. Trammel,
231 Neb. 137, 435 N.W.2d 197 (1989); State v. Wakeman, 231 Neb. 66, 434
N.W.2d 549 (1989). The preceding three cases were all decided after Oliver. See
also State v. Miller, 6 Neb. App. 363, 574 N.W.2d 519 (1998)(holding that a collat-
eral attack based on Boykin, if it may be made at all, must be raised in a separate
proceeding commenced expressly for the purpose of setting aside prior convic-
tion); State v. Tunender, 4 Neb. App. 680, 548 N.W.2d 340 (1996)(holding that
challenges to priors based on claimed Boykin errors cannot be raised in enhance-
ment proceedings because such challenges constitute impermissible collateral at-
tacks); State v. Jackson, 4 Neb. App. 413, 544 N.W.2d 379 (1996)(holding that a
prior conviction obtained in violation of right to counsel cannot be used for sen-
tence enhancement); State v. Watkins, 4 Neb. App. 356, 543 N.W.2d 470
(1996)(holding that a defendant's objection to introduction of transcript which
fails to show on its face that counsel was afforded or right waived does not consti-
tute collateral attack on former judgment)(petition for review overruled); State v.
Dandridge, 1 Neb. App. 786, 511 N.W.2d 527 (1993)(holding that an enhance-




approval.62 0 That development made it crystal clear that post-Oliver
enhancements are not open to federal habeas challenges based on al-
leged Boykin defects until after the defendants have proceeded to final
state court judgments in separate proceedings brought for the express
purpose of challenging the prior convictions the state might seek to
use against them in enhancement proceedings.6 2 1
Because of the special statutory rights conferred with respect to
reviewing the records of alleged prior convictions, objecting to their
validity, and presenting mitigating circumstances in repeat DUI and
refusal to submit cases and, because of Baldasar-Smith, in all en-
hancement cases, it probably is no longer the better practice to accept
a plea of guilty or no contest to the charges of DUI second offense,
refusal to submit second offense, issuing a bad check second offense, or
any other charge including an allegation of prior conviction, with the
intention of deeming the plea sufficient to admit the prior conviction
or convictions. The DUI and refusal statutes require an extra advi-
sory statement with respect to the defendant's enhancement hearing
rights. The extra enhancement hearing rights have no application un-
til after a conviction on the underlying charge. This point must be
made clear to the defendant because the existence of a valid prior con-
viction is a question of law on which there is no right to a jury (or, trial
fact finder, as opposed to a post-trial fact finder) determination,6 22
while the guilt phase of the proceeding is for jury determination, if
requested.
In addition, ABA Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty section
1.4(c)(iii) and ABA Standards Relating to Function of the Trial Judge
section 4.2(a)(iv) clearly indicate the question of sentence enhance-
ment should not be taken up until after acceptance of the plea in the
current case, even though the defendant must understand the en-
hanced penalty possibility and the rights attendant to the enhance-
ment hearing before acceptance of the plea. Logically, based upon
these provisions and the Baldasar-Smith rules, the question of the de-
fendant's desire to admit or deny (i.e., object to) the validity of the
alleged prior convictions should be taken up after (and separately
from) the plea of guilty or no contest to the underlying charge, even if
dealt with in the same hearing. This suggested judicial procedure
would result in a cleaner arraignment record.6 23
620. See McCartney v. Vitek, CV 89-0-355 (D. Neb. May 25, 1989)(unreported memo-
randum of decision).
621. See McCartney v. Vitek, CV89-2047 (8th Cir. 1990)(unpublished opinion).
622. See Hafike v. State, 149 Neb. 83, 95, 30 N.W.2d 462, 469 (1948).
623. For a complete list of offenses that carried enhanced penalties on subsequent con-
victions as of August, 1988, see Alan G. Gless, ChapterXVIII, §§ b & d, NEBRASKA
JuDiciuL. SYsTEM BENCHBOOK. One offense, in particular, poses a special prob-
lem: possession of marijuana weighing one ounce or less, first offense, is an in-
fraction. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-416 (Reissue 1995 & Supp. 1999). Second
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The condition of the record can affect the points developed from the
record. Giving the record close attention can avoid some embarrassing
results. Appellate courts, the plain error doctrine aside, generally re-
act to counsels' assignments of error. When counsel do not call to the
courts' attention details from the record that could bear importance,
the courts may miss the details themselves, even though that rarely
happens. A glaring case in point is State v. Gibbs.624 The problem
presented to the supreme court was determining which of its stan-
dards for analysis of the validity of plea-based convictions applied to
Gibbs's plea-based conviction. Counsel took positions indicating ei-
ther Turner (1971) applied or Irish applied. The supreme court ap-
plied a Turner (1971) analysis on appellant's Turner (1971) argument
and decided the case on that basis. Neither the supreme court, nor the
attorney general, nor appellant's counsel noticed the date of the plea-
based conviction involved: while it was post-Turner (1971), it was pre-
Irish. Irish could not apply, unless declared to have retroactive appli-
cation. The conviction, however, was post-Tweedy. Thus, Tweedy def-
initely did apply, but since no one noticed, the case was argued and
decided under Turner (1971).
Finally, although a thorough discussion of their importance is be-
yond the scope of this article, appellate courts' standards of review can
make a difference in the assignments of error and arguments counsel
might wish to present and in the appellate courts' eventual decisions
as well. When reviewing sentencing court determinations with re-
spect to the constitutional validity of prior convictions within the con-
text of enhancement proceedings, all three of Nebraska's appellate
tiers will apply the clearly erroneous standard.625 The clear error ap-
offense is a special Class IV misdemeanor, with a possible jail sentence. Third
offense is a Class IIIA misdemeanor, but with a mandatory jail sentence. There
is no right to appointed counsel until a defendant has had one prior conviction.
There is no statutory authority for the appointment of counsel on the 1st offense
charge. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3902 (Reissue 1995 & Supp. 1999). An arraign-
ingjudge is left with only three options: 1) Appoint counsel on inherent authority
for first offense charges; 2) rest assured there will never be a second or third
offense conviction possible against any defendant who was indigent and whose
request for appointed counsel had to be denied at the time of the first conviction,
given the Baldasar-Smith rules; or 3) create a test case and prepare for reversal
on any of several grounds, or, hope that Nichols will prevail. The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, have both ap-
proved the use of uncounseled civil forfeiture convictions (DUI first offense in
Wisconsin) to enhance subsequent convictions to jailable offenses. See Schindler
v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341, 343-44 (7th Cir. 1983); State v. Novak,
107 Wis. 2d 31, 42-43, 318 N.W.2d 364, 369 (1982); see also Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 507 A.2d 57, 61 (Pa. 1986)(holding that an uncounseled first offense con-
viction for retail theft could be used to enhance a second charge of retail theft
from a summary offense to a misdemeanor).
624. 238 Neb. 268, 470 N.W.2d 558 (1991).
625. See State v. Reimers, 242 Neb. 704, 707-09, 496 N.W.2d 518, 521-22 (1993).
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pellate standard of review is not the only familiar procedural issue
that can pop up in sentence enhancement proceedings. Familiar
preclusive doctrines created to help insure the finality of the results of
litigation also can appear.
F. Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata
Both collateral estoppel and resjudicata can apply in enhancement
proceedings. 626 The doctrines are closely related. Collateral estoppel
means that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined
by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated be-
tween the same parties in fature litigation. It may be applied where
an identical issue was decided in a prior action, there was a final judg-
ment on the merits, the party against whom the doctrine is to be ap-
plied is a party or is in privity with a party to the prior action, and
there was an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue in the
prior litigation.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in is-
sue and directly adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or necessarily in-
volved in the determination of the action, before a competent 62 7 court
in which a judgment was rendered on the merits, conclusively is set-
tled by the judgment and may not be litigated again between the par-
ties, whether the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the
suits would or would not be the same.
A criminal defendant, seeking to invoke either collateral estoppel
or res judicata in opposing the use of a prior conviction against the
defendant in a present action, bears the burden of showing that the
particular issue the defendant seeks to raise in the present proceeding
was involved and necessarily determined in a prior proceeding. De-
fendant Gerdes did not meet his burden, but the opinion shows the
care that should be exercised in making findings of fact relating to the
validity of prior convictions.
Recall, in United States v. Tucker,628 a 1972 federal prosecution,
the United States Supreme Court reviewed a 1953 federal court sen-
tencing in which the trial judge expressly considered three prior fel-
ony convictions. Two of the three prior convictions were found
constitutionally invalid for violation of the right to counsel in unre-
lated state court habitual criminal proceedings. The majority referred
to the state court finding of invalidity as a conclusive determination.
The dissent did not take issue with the majority's characterization.
The government conceded the constitutional invalidity of the prior con-
626. See State v. Gerdes, 233 Neb. 528, 446 N.W.2d 224 (1989).
627. A "competent" court for this purpose means a court with subject matter
jurisdiction.
628. 404 U.S. 443 (1972)(5-2 decision)(Blackmun, J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting;
Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., not participating).
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victions. The Court remanded for resentencing (nineteen years after
the original sentencing) with directions that the sentencing judge
could not consider the invalid prior convictions.
The majority characterization of the conclusive nature of the unre-
lated state court finding of invalidity goes a bit beyond traditional col-
lateral estoppel and res judicata. There was no identity or even
privity of parties involved in the various cases. A California state
court had invalidated the convictions from state courts in Florida and
Louisiana. Based upon that ruling (and the government's concession),
the Supreme Court ordered the federal district court to honor the Cali-
fornia court's finding in California's state court proceedings. This was
not the Warren Court in action; this was the Burger Court. One rea-
sonably may conclude the United States Supreme Court would not
disagree with a state court applying collateral estoppel and res judi-
cata in recidivist proceedings.
G. The Rise of Separate Proceedings Challenging Prior
Convictions
For a number of years, recidivist defendants made numerous at-
tempts to overcome the procedural barrier to challenging the validity
of their prior convictions in the context of sentence enhancement pro-
ceedings. The Nebraska Supreme Court stated and restated its proce-
dural rule so often it must have become an automatic response.
Defendants generally are not permitted to relitigate former convic-
tions in enhancement proceedings and, to that extent, the former con-
victions cannot be collaterally attacked. Beyond the issue of whether
defendant had counsel or waived the right to counsel, objections chal-
lenging prior convictions offered for the purpose of sentence enhance-
ment constitute collateral attacks on the prior judgments. Such
objections must be raised either by direct appeal from the prior convic-
tion or in separate proceedings commenced expressly for the purpose
of setting aside the judgment alleged to be invalid.629 The problem
remained one of finding the proper context for the separate proceeding
commenced expressly for the purpose. The old supreme court finally
found a context and the new supreme court effectively has abolished
the separate proceeding, apparently intending to leave essentially
only direct appeals as an avenue of relief for people suffering unconsti-
tutional convictions as they relate to sentence enhancements.
Exercising a high, yet still proper, degree of judicial restraint, the
old supreme court did not provide even a hint for years about what
sort of action the court had in mind when insisting on the use of this
seemingly non-existent separate proceeding. Instead, the supreme
court waited patiently for someone to try something. Without a clear
629. See State v. Nowicki, 239 Neb. 130, 135, 474 N.W.2d 478, 483 (1991).
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statutory basis for the separate proceeding, finding the proper proce-
dural means to bring such an action left counsel adrift searching for
ways to use common law methods of creating causes of action to seek
constitutionally based relief. Creating causes of action by the common
law method is a slow, one case at a time, project. Standard common
law method requires counsel to initiate the exercise of creativity.
Judges do not occupy a position in the common law legal system that
lends itself easily to the initiation of new approaches. Even less re-
strained judges generally must wait for counsel to give them at least
an opening before the judges can exercise judicial creativity. The ac-
cepted common law judicial role remains reactive, not proactive. 63 0
The supreme court's patience wore thin waiting for counsel to initi-
ate something. The court signaled its growing impatience in State v.
Crane.63 1 First, from Crane, we learned that a violation-of-the-right-
to-counsel-based challenge to the prior conviction within the context of
a recidivist action (enhancement hearing, habitual criminal hearing,
etc.) was either a permissible collateral attack or not a collateral attack
at all, as long as the context was a sentence enhancement proceeding.
The supreme court posited that the local federal courts had misunder-
stood Oliver. The supreme court suggested the federal court read Oli-
ver to stand for the proposition that proof of the presence or waiver of
counsel suffices to establish the constitutional validity of plea-based
convictions offered later for sentence enhancement purposes. Accord-
ing to the Crane majority, that was not the holding of Oliver.
The majority explained Oliver was simply an application of the set-
tled Nebraska procedural bar to attacks on the validity of prior convic-
tions on any basis beyond the right to counsel question and that a
separate action was the proper scene for any other attack. Then, ever
so slowly, the court inched its way almost to telling us its idea of an
acceptable separate proceeding. The court offered this mind-ex-
panding thought: "One could also challenge the constitutional validity
of a prior conviction through a separate proceeding such as an action
for declaratory judgment."63 2 That statement provided a fairly large
hint.
Then, finally, when counsel took the hint and the initiative, the
supreme court did the rest. The supreme court finally identified its
separate proceeding and somewhat delineated its contours in State v.
Wiltshire.633 Mr. Wiltshire had filed two actions in the trial courts:
one a civil type of action, somewhat akin to a post-conviction relief
action; and the other, a challenge to the validity of his prior conviction
630. The Warren Court presents a recent example of a proactive court and the recep-
tion given to proactive courts.
631. 240 Neb. 32, 480 N.W.2d 401 (1992).
632. Id. at 35, 480 N.W.2d at 403.
633. 241 Neb. 817, 491 N.W.2d 324 (1992).
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within the enhancement proceeding in his new criminal case. In the
civil action, he challenged the record of his 1982 conviction. In the
enhancement case, he tried to expand the inquiry to include matters
beyond counsel/waiver, which he could not do. Both cases were ap-
pealed. The supreme court considered the appeals together and
taught again that un-Boykinized pleas are constitutionally invalid
pleas. They may be just as invalid as uncounseled pleas, but not neces-
sarily so. Violation of the right to counsel renders any resulting con-
viction unreliable with a nearly automatic declaration of invalidity as
the predictable result of a challenge. Other constitutional violations
might not be so basic to the validity of the plea resulting in a convic-
tion and require a review of the entire record.
The question all those years had not been a question of whether
the prior conviction was invalid due to Boykin violations, but in what
procedural context to raise the issue. The separate proceeding became
purely a state remedial action brought to vindicate constitutional vio-
lations within earlier plea proceedings. The action was created by
common law development methods, i.e., by court decisions without
legislative assistance.
The Nebraska Supreme Court went back to Oliver and explained
Oliver had provided the conceptual framework of a two-tiered ap-
proach to remedying constitutional violations in earlier plea proceed-
ings. The first tier of challenges relates to the right to counsel and
waiver of counsel issues determinable from the face of the record made
in the prior conviction cases. Those challenges could be raised in en-
hancement/recidivist hearings without the need of going beyond the
face of the record from the earlier proceedings. The second tier of chal-
lenges relates to Boykin-Irish non-compliance and theoretically every-
thing else beyond counsel/waiver issues.6 34 Those challenges could be
raised only in direct appeals from the prior convictions or in separate
challenge proceedings brought expressly to get at the alleged constitu-
tional violations in a procedural context that frees the trial court from
the constraints of new recidivist hearings within new criminal cases.
Of course, defendants could also raise first-tier challenges in separate
proceedings.
So, a defendant convicted on pleas of guilty or no contest that did
not appeal directly from that conviction, and whose arraigning judge
did not comply with Boykin-Irish, still could seek relief. The only ave-
nue lay in a new action, outside of the context of a new criminal case,
brought for the express purpose of challenging the prior conviction's
constitutional validity. This approach became possible, because the
separate proceeding was a permissible form of collateral attack.
634. Query whether the everything beyond counsel/waiver would include such basics
as the defendant's personal tender of the plea, or subject matter jurisdiction, or
finality of the alleged prior conviction -just what would the everything else be?
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Boykin-Irish challenges require the trial court in the separate pro-
ceeding to go behind the face of the conviction record, beyond the ques-
tion of counsel/waiver, and determine from evidence, which could be
the entire record of the prior conviction case and could be supple-
mented by additional extra-record evidence, whether the plea result-
ing in the earlier conviction was voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent.635 When the supreme court looked at Mr. Wiltshire's 1982
conviction through the separate proceeding lens, the court found less
in the record to validate Wiltshire's plea than had appeared in the
record of Tweedy's plea. The record contained nothing showing Wilt-
shire possessed any understanding of his plea and nothing showing
his plea was voluntary in the basic sense of "not coerced." The su-
preme court ordered the district court judge, who had considered a
showing of counsel, with nothing more, a sufficient record to vacate
the plea-based conviction.
While the supreme court had released the answers to the biggest
questions relating to the separate proceedings, many questions re-
mained for future resolution,63 6 including such questions as the
proper forum in which to initiate the separate proceeding, the source
of the court's authority to allow such actions, the allocation of the bur-
dens of proof, and a host of others. Still, the supreme court created
question marks in readers' minds with decisions that did not seem
wholly consistent with earlier decisions.
One such decision was State v. Reimers.6 3 7 Reimers appealed not
from an adverse separate proceeding decision, but from an adverse
1992 enhancement hearing decision and imposition of an enhanced
sentence. Reimers had three prior convictions, one from 1985, one
from 1982, and one from 1979. The state sought to use all of them.
First, the supreme court noted Reimers had counsel for his 1985 con-
viction; the conviction was thus valid for enhancement use. The re-
cord of Reimers' 1982 conviction, however, showed nothing relating to
635. Truly an irritating redundancy - a plea tendered without knowledge cannot be
"voluntary." A plea tendered without the information required to make an in-
formed, deliberate, choice of whether to tender the plea cannot be "voluntary,"
because it cannot be tendered intelligently in the special sense of "intelligent"
used in this construct. A knowing tender by definition is an intelligent tender
and vice versa. A coerced plea cannot be "voluntary," because it is not freely
tendered. "Voluntary" covers it all, but, of course, lawyers and judges seem
nearly always to prefer the redundant (as in "ordered, adjudged, and decreed")
over the simple and clear.
636. Even with a road map at hand, some folks continued their attempts at overcom-
ing the procedural barrier of the recidivist setting. See State v. Dandridge, 1 Neb.
App. 786, 797, 511 N.W.2d 527, 533 (1993)(holding that no matter how one
chooses to caption the pleading, a separate proceeding of some sort must be initi-
ated to collaterally attack a prior conviction if the issue is other than whether
appellant had counsel in the case).
637. 242 Neb. 704, 496 N.W.2d 518 (1993).
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advice of the right to counsel, waiver of counsel, or presence of counsel.
The state offered no additional evidence showing compliance with the
right to counsel. Thus, the supreme court invalidated the enhance-
ment use of the 1982 conviction. The court's treatment of the 1979
conviction presents the point of interest here.
The statute then in effect allowed the use of prior convictions
within the ten-year period preceding the current conviction for en-
hancement use. The supreme court found Reimers' 1979 prior convic-
tion was too remote (thirteen years) to use under the ten-year period
then in effect, and therefore invalidated that prior for enhancement
use. Remember, this was an enhancement hearing, not a separate
proceeding. The supreme court entertained the question of remote-
ness within the enhancement hearing context. Obviously, more can be
raised in the enhancement hearing than counsel/waiver, even though
the cases tend to indicate that is the only possible issue.
Even during the time when the second-tier collateral challenge was
available, more avenues of relief remained available to convicts still in
custody6 3 8 than were available for persons not in custody when initi-
ating challenges to the constitutional validity of their prior convic-
tions. For convicts not still in custody, it seemed that only the
separate proceeding might be available and, now, seems to have be-
come unavailable. Without the second-tier challenge available, per-
sons improperly convicted, but not in custody, have even less remedies
available to them. For one still in custody, a state habeas corpus ac-
tion provides an appropriate context for first-tier challenges so, pre-
sumably, second-tier challenges also might be available within the
context of state habeas actions. The same reasoning the supreme
court followed in Berumen would allow first- and second-tier chal-
lenges in post-conviction actions as well.
At least the supreme court answered two questions in State v.
LeGrand.6 39 First, a petition to set aside a prior conviction must be
filed in the court in which conviction was rendered, not in a different
court in which the defendant had been charged with a subsequent of-
fense. Second, the Nebraska Supreme Court realized states are free to
grant their citizens greater rights under state constitutions than are
required by the federal constitution. The separate proceeding is au-
thorized by Article I, section 13, of the Nebraska Constitution and is
not a matter of federal law (or federal concern).6 4o Moreover, Article I,
section 13 is a self-executing remedy provision that has no federal con-
stitutional analog. State court decisions based on Article I, section 13
have an independent state law ground of decision applying indepen-
dent state standards generally higher than federal standards, with
638. See Berumen v. Casady, 245 Neb. 936, 941, 515 N.W.2d 816, 820 (1993).
639. 249 Neb. 1, 541 N.W.2d 380 (1995).
640. See id. at 7-9, 541 N.W.2d at 385-86.
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which federal courts cannot tinker no matter how much they might
want to.
Because the separate proceeding route provided an independent
state constitutional remedy, and a state need not provide the remedy
at all, federal due process does not hamper a state's choices of proce-
dure. If, in a second-tier challenge to prior convictions, a state allo-
cates to the collaterally attacking petitioner the burden of producing
evidence after the state first proves the existence of prior convictions,
the state creates for itself no federal constitutional due process prob-
lem.6 41 Once again, under that same reasoning, federal due process
would allow allocation of the burden of production to an objecting de-
fendant in an enhancement proceeding, where only a first-tier chal-
lenge lies.64 2
Timing of the second-tier challenge action presented an intriguing
question until the Nebraska Court of Appeals answered it. A defen-
dant could not commence a separate proceeding raising second-tier is-
sues after the defendant was found to be a habitual criminal based on
the challenged convictions in an attempted separate proceeding after
the enhanced sentence already had been imposed.643 The separate
proceeding concept was developing well for a time. Then, the new su-
preme court effectively took over the scene.
H. The Decline of Separate Proceedings Challenging Prior
Convictions
Less than eight years after the old supreme court had finally cre-
ated its preferred form of separate proceeding in State v. Wiltshire,6 44
and less than four years after a transitional supreme court reaffirmed
the separate proceeding in State v. LeGrand,645 the new supreme
641. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29-30 (1992).
642. Nebraska's enhancement hearing burden of proof and burden of production allo-
cations should be acceptable under Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992).
643. See State v. Davenport, 5 Neb. App. 355, 364, 559 N.W.2d 783, 788 (1997)(peti-
tion for review overruled).
644. 241 Neb. 817, 827-28,491 N.W.2d 324, 330-31 (1992)(7-0 decision). The Wiltshire
court's membership included Chief Justice Hastings and Justices Boslaugh,
White, Caporale, Shanahan, and Grant, and Colwell, District Judge, Retired -
six old guard members plus a temporary service, retired, old guard, district court
judge.
645. 249 Neb. 1, 9,541 N.W.2d 380,386 (1995)(6-1-0 decision)(Connolly, J., not partic-
ipating). The LeGrand court's membership included Chief Justice White and
Justices Caporale, Fahrnbruch, Lanphier, Wright, and Gerrard - three old
guard members, one short-term replacement of an old guard member, and two
new guard members. Justice Connolly, as a member of the appellate court panel
deciding LeGrand at that level and the author of that opinion, did not participate
in the further review.
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court, in State v. Louthan,646 already has pushed the separate pro-
ceeding brought for the express purpose of challenging a prior convic-
tion on second-tier grounds into a state of decline. Supreme courts
generally do not express their goals when radically altering the direc-
tion of entire lines of case law. The task of identifying potential goals
falls to commentators. At least two plausible goals for the Nebraska
Supreme Court's direction-altering decision in Louthan readily come
to mind, either of which can be defended, although one plausible goal
is less defensible and subject to far more legitimate criticism on legal
grounds than is the other. The court may be seeking either to abolish
the separate proceeding or simply to limit the acceptable uses of the
separate proceeding. Abolition can be defended, but not as persua-
sively as limitation. Abolition also can be criticized more vigorously
for its weaker legal justifications than can limitation. We will ex-
amine abolition first.
In 1994, on tender of her guilty plea, Louthan was convicted of
DUI, first offense, in the Stanton County Court. She was sentenced to
probation with the mandatory fine, but without any imprisonment.
Then, in 1998, in Cuming County Court, Louthan faced a new charge
of DUI, which the state sought to enhance with the 1994 conviction.
Louthan returned to the Stanton County Court where she filed a sepa-
rate proceeding seeking the invalidation of her 1994 conviction for the
failure of the checklist to show express waiver, as most recently re-
quired in State v. Hays,6 47 of the rights to a jury trial, confrontation,
and to the immunities guaranteed by the federal and state constitu-
tions' self-incrimination clauses. The county court denied relief. The
district court granted relief. The supreme court accepted the case,
bypassing the court of appeals, reversed the district court, and dra-
matically altered the supreme court's own direction of the immedi-
ately preceding years. After Louthan, only challenges on the counsel/
waiver issue remain available in DUI prosecutions under section 60-
6,196(3) of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, and only within the context
of the enhancement hearing.
The report of the decision appearing in the Nebraska Advance
Sheets presents interesting reading for more than the legal substance
of the supreme court's reanalysis. On a single page of the advance
646. 257 Neb. 174, 595 N.W.2d 917 (1999)(7-0 decision)(overruling LeGrand, Wilt-
shire, Crane, Oliver, Davis, Hamblin, Fraser, and Baxter, to the extent those
precedents held a prior conviction sought to be used for enhancement in a DUI
prosecution could be collaterally attacked in a separate proceeding brought ex-
pressly for that purpose). The Louthan court's membership included Chief Jus-
tice Hendry and Justices Wright, Connolly, Gerrard, Stephan, McCormack, and
Miller-Lerman - all seven new guard justices.




sheet version of the opinion, the court made three statements of par-
ticular interest. The unanimous court said:
We therefore hold that the due process requirements of both the state and
federal Constitutions are satisfied by the right of direct appeal and the proce-
dure set forth in § 60-6,196(3), which permits a defendant to challenge the
validity of a prior DUI conviction offered for purposes of enhancement on the
ground that it was obtained in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. 648
But, then, in the very next sentence of the opinion, the court also said:
We need not, and therefore do not, reach the issue of whether such a challenge
is permissible where the prior conviction did not result in a sentence of im-
prisonment.... we conclude that Louthan's 1994 DUI conviction was not sub-
ject to collateral attack in a separate proceeding .... 6 4 9
The point of particular interest here is that Louthan challenged a
prior conviction that did not result in a sentence of imprisonment.
Yet, the court said it did not need to reach the question of the permis-
sibility of a second-tier collateral challenge to a prior conviction that
did not result in imprisonment, but went on clearly to rule second-tier
collateral challenges to prior convictions that did not result in impris-
onment in separate proceedings are not permissible6 50 or, at least,
"not subject to collateral attack in a separate proceeding" and "imper-
missible" seem quite similar matters. Thus, the court left for future
opinions or, perhaps, editors, the task of explaining or eliminating
that set of apparently contradictory expressions. Beyond those ex-
pressions, the court's reanalysis of the separate proceeding concept
presents several other interesting points.
The "new" supreme court engaged in what it described as a thor-
ough reanalysis of whether the federal and state constitutions' due
process clauses require that Nebraska provide to convicts an avenue of
relief from constitutionally invalid prior convictions in any procedural
context. The need to reanalyze that question in itself presents an in-
teresting question, since everyone knew or should have known from
earlier decisions that the due process clauses did not require that Ne-
braska provide the separate proceeding. The "old" Nebraska Supreme
Court knew due process did not require the separate proceeding ave-
nue for launching second-tier collateral attacks, but, in spite of that
point, chose to provide greater protection than due process requires at
the minimal level of the federal due process guarantee, which is the
lowest permissible level, i.e., the level below which no state may de-
scend. Every state remains free at all times to rise above that mini-
648. 99 Nebraska Advance Sheets 174, 188, which translates directly to 257 Neb. 174,
188.
649. Id. (emphasis added).
650. The court might want to pick just one its two totally inconsistent positions stated
within inches of each other on the same page of the Nebraska Advance Sheets.
And, perhaps, someone will ask them to do so, but I suggest a less directly con-
frontational approach than mine might be advisable in any such request.
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mal level. No state ever is obliged by federal due process to provide
only the least permissible levels of due process protections, but no
state may provide less than the least permissible.
For all those years, during which the "old" supreme court re-
strained itself from announcing its thoughts on the form of a separate
proceeding, an undercurrent was strengthening among the dissenting
justices about the constitutional underpinning of the idea. The "old"
majority held back its response until the court released State v.
LeGrand,6 5 1 when it finally instructed that the constitutional under-
pinning of the separate proceeding was neither the federal due process
clause nor Nebraska's state due process clause standing alone, but
was the self-executing remedy clause of the Nebraska Constitution's
Article I, section 13, acting in concert with the state due process
clause. That both state constitutional provisions were operating to-
gether presents the more reasonable reading of LeGrand, because of
the court's inclusion in its discussion of the remedy clause of this lan-
guage from earlier decisions under the remedy clause:
[This] constitutional provision is self-executing and controlling, paramount
and mandatory upon all courts of this state. When a constitution gives a gen-
eral power or enjoins a duty, it also gives, by implication, every power neces-
sary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other. The courts of
Nebraska, through their inherent judicial power, have the authority to do all
things reasonably necessary for the proper administration ofjustice, whether
any previous form of remedy has been granted or not. This holds particularly
true in the case of a void judgment. A judgment issued from a proceeding that
violates a citizen's right to due process is void. A void judgment may be set
aside at any time and in any proceeding.
6 5 2
Under that reasoning, which the new court did not assail (probably
because it is unassailable), but did essentially ignore, there is no need
for enabling or procedural legislation to support the separate proceed-
ing type of second-tier collateral challenge action. Due process alone
could not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the county court, but
Article I, section 13, standing alone, unaided by the state due process
clause and unaided by enabling and procedural legislation, confers ju-
risdiction and has done so for most of Nebraska's statehood and for all
of Nebraska's existence under the Constitution of 1875.
Further, failure of the record to reveal compliance with Boykin's
federal due process monitoring mechanism results in a presumptively
void judgment, without regard to whether federal due process requires
651. 249 Neb. 1, 541 N.W.2d 380 (1995), reversing State v. LeGrand, 3 Neb. App. 300,
527 N.W.2d 203 (1995). The supreme court's LeGrand opinion could also reason-
ably be read as applying Article I, section 13, of the Nebraska Constitution solely
to the question of the county court's subject matter jurisdiction to consider collat-
eral challenges to its prior judgments. If that reading is correct, then state due
process alone was likely the constitutional underpinning for the separate pro-
ceeding idea.
652. 249 Neb. at 6-7, 541 N.W.2d at 384-385 (emphasis added).
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the states to provide collateral challenge actions to prior convictions.
As a result, there was no need to reanalyze the due process question,
nor any way the reduction of the benefits available under the Ne-
braska Constitution's Due Process Clause could save federally invalid
convictions from their inherent invalidity, other than the less than
persuasive due process vs. finality of judgments justification, which,
translated from legalese to English, would read something like: "we
are not required by a higher authority to do this, so we will no longer
require ourselves to do this."
The court's reanalysis also provides the opportunity to digress for
the purpose of illustrating one of the less desirable effects of the feder-
alization of constitutional criminal procedure, i.e., the failure of state
courts to recognize their own constitutions' criminal procedure provi-
sions. The court's discussion of the right to counsel in Louthan re-
ferred specifically to the "Sixth Amendment" right to the assistance of
counsel. What about the Nebraska Constitution's guarantee of the
right to the assistance of counsel? Does compliance with the Nebraska
Constitution's guarantee of the right to counsel not need to appear in
the record? Under ruling precedent, a valid waiver of the federal con-
stitutional right to counsel also suffices as a waiver the state constitu-
tional right to counsel,65 3 but using that one right as an example
makes the point to be made here. The line of Nebraska precedents the
court discussed in Louthan does not refer to the Nebraska Constitu-
tion's right to the assistance of counsel, except in isolated instances.
Of course, it is correct that Boykin and its kindred United States
Supreme Court decisions applying against the states the United
States Constitution's criminal procedure rules, under present consti-
tutional theory, only can be justified under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. That does not mean, however, that the
constitutional criminal procedure protections found in the Nebraska
Constitution only apply to Nebraska in diluted form filtered through
the Nebraska Due Process Clause. Due process does not form the basis
for all of the state constitutional rules of criminal procedure. Specific
constitutional provisions provide for the most important ones.
The state constitutional criminal procedure rules found in the Ne-
braska Constitution, Article I, sections 11 and 12, directly apply to
Nebraska of their own force (to mention only two sets of such Ne-
braska constitutional provisions). The specific state constitutional
criminal procedure provisions need no assistance from the Nebraska
Due Process Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. Filtering constitutional criminal protections through the
"flexible lens of due process analysis" allows appellate courts to apply
653. See State v. Wilson, 252 Neb. 637, 564 N.W.2d 241 (1997).
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less stringent standards in reviewing less exacting trial court activi-
ties than does use of directly applicable constitutional provisions.654
Even though the case law rarely mentions the point, when a crimi-
nal defendant pleads guilty or no contest, that defendant simultane-
ously waives the compulsory self-incrimination immunity guaranteed
by both the federal and state constitutions, along with all the other
protections provided by both constitutions, and any protections unique
to the Nebraska Constitution.6 5 5 Table 2 depicts visually the Ne-
braska state constitutional rights criminal defendants waive when
pleading guilty or no contest and the record showing necessary to sur-
vive a direct appeal under current ruling case law. Yet, one can search
the state case law for a long time before finding any state court, and
certainly not the Nebraska Supreme Court, which has recognized in a
reported decision since Boykin that its own state constitution applies
directly to its work in the criminal procedure area without the need to
filter the state constitution's criminal procedure provisions through
the state due process clause.
The better justification for abandoning the separate proceeding ap-
proach, at least as it applies to the present audio recording system
used in county court, lies in the practical impossibility justification
advanced in Louthan. The supreme court noted its own rule on records
retention allows the erasure of county court tapes (so the tapes can be
re-used and need not be stored permanently) after the 30-day direct
appeal period has elapsed, as does the state's records management
schedule.656 Defendants who do not take direct appeals from their
county court convictions do not order and pay for the preparation of a
bill of exceptions. 6 57 If the tapes become erased, with the result that
the record available in a separate proceeding taken to challenge a
county court conviction from which no direct appeal was taken forever
would be an incomplete record, never able to satisfy the review of the
entire record available in the separate proceeding.
654. At least, that's the theory. Whether appellate courts actually behave that way
depends on the individual ideological makeup of the court's members.
655. Such a defendant also waives its right to confrontation, compulsory process,
speedy trial, jury trial, notice of the charge, a copy of the charging instrument,
compulsory self-incrimination immunity, and most due process protections.
Guilty and no contest pleas also waive a very large collection of rights conferred
by Nebraska statutes and common law, which lie beyond the scope of this article.
656. See State v. Louthan, 257 Neb. at 187, 595 N.W.2d at 926.
657. "Bill of exceptions" is Nebraska's label for the special format of the printed ver-
sion of the testimony in the trial court used on appeal. The federal system and
many other state systems refer to this document as the transcription, certified
transcription, or even the transcript. As used in Nebraska practice, "bill of excep-
tions" does not refer to the historical common law procedure used to seek review
of rulings of the trial court before court reporting was widely available to trial
courts.
[Vol. 79:293
2000] NEBRASKA PLEA-BASED CONVICTIONS
TABLE 2.
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** Such as denials of suppression based on constitutional claims (i.e. search & seizure, confes-
sions, etc.) & other preliminary admissibility rulings (i.e. admissibility of prior convictions, other
uncharged bad acts, scientific evidence, etc.).
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The court left itself open to criticism for the way it described the
practical impossibility justification in Louthan. The Nebraska Su-
preme Court, in Louthan, did not make clear a particularly important
point limiting the applicability and resulting value of its practical im-
possibility justification to county court convictions. The thirty-day re-
tention rule that allows destruction of the tapes that otherwise could
provide the material for transcription of the plea proceedings applies
only to audio recording tapes of county court proceedings and does not
apply to district court plea proceeding records.
Obviously, the supreme court itself could solve part of the problem
with county court records by the simple expedient of adopting a record
retention period longer than thirty days after entry of judgment
elapses without the filing of a direct appeal. The practical problems
relating to county court plea proceeding records, however, cannot be
resolved fully by simply lengthening the supreme court's mandated
retention period, nor by any other form of action the supreme court
can take. Other, far more intractable, physical problems relating to
information storage media stability, which the supreme court did not
describe or discuss in Louthan, have considerable bearing on the ques-
tion of record retrievability.
The magnetic tape medium of audio recording imposes currently
unavoidable information storage medium stability problems.658 The
stability of sound recordings on magnetic tapes is quite limited. Na-
tional Media Laboratory studies have established, and the industry
generally accepts the proposition, that recordings made on magnetic
tape can be expected to survive for periods of no more than ten to
thirty years, even assuming ideal storage methods have been used.65 9
Temperature and humidity, dirt, dust, and other indoor air pollutants,
and the chemical composition of the tape itself, along with handling,
lead directly to magnetic tape degradation and the unavoidable loss of
the information stored on the tape, unless it is copied periodically onto
new storage media.660 Few, if any, Nebraska trial court operations
have access to, or could afford, archival facilities in which the temper-
ature and relative humidity levels and dirt, dust, and indoor air pollu-
tants can be kept within acceptable archival limits. No matter which
information storage tools one considers, the inherent stability or insta-
bility of the medium creates problems of retrievability. Physical im-
658. Magnetic tape used for audio tape recording is one form of the class of products
called information storage media among archivists and others outside the legal
profession.
659. See JOHN W.C. VAN BOGART, MAGNETIC TAPE STORAGE AND HANDLING" A GUIDE
FOR LIBRARIES AND ARCHrVEs (The Commission on Preservation and Access and
The National Media Laboratory 1995). The newer microfilm, microfiche, and
movie film, on the other hand, have become known for their stability, at least




possibility cannot be overcome simply by adopting long record
retention schedules. The same storage medium problems beset records
made by electronic official reporters in the district court.6 61 However,
district court records retention and retrievability pose less problems
than county court records present, because Nebraska district court of-
ficial court reporters must comply with a different set of records man-
agement rules and cannot erase or discard their trial records quite so
quickly.6 6 2 Thus, the practical impossibility justification, while accu-
661. As recently as 1980, many of the state's county courts were still using the old reel
to reel tape recording systems. I cannot cite to a written or published source for
this statement, but must rely on my own personal observations made while
warming the benches in six of those county courts, beginning in September of
1980. Four of those six were using the reel to reel tapes when I arrived on those
benches in late 1980 and continued using them for several years after that. Us-
ing the old reel to reel tapes as an example, even if the old reel to reel tapes still
exist and could be transcribed (since tapes retain sound for only so long, even
when the tapes themselves have survived physically), the necessary equipment to
transcribe from reel to reel tapes may no longer be available. Unless the equip-
ment used in creating the magnetically taped records has been stockpiled and
stored safely (and the repair parts and technical manuals, as well), the recorded
information inevitably will become irretrievable. The pace of technological devel-
opment indicates that even the currently used cassette tapes soon will become
obsolete, as will the equipment presently used in transcription from cassette
tapes.
662. In civil cases, Nebraska's official court reporters' notes must be retained for at
least ten years after the last case activity. In criminal cases, fifty years must
elapse after the last case activity before disposal is permitted, if then. See Ne-
braska Records Management Division Schedule 8-1-11 (1989). Notice that the
10-year period fits within the minimum expected life of magnetic recordings, but
the criminal case retention period extends 20 years beyond the maximum possi-
ble longevity for magnetic tapes. If a criminal case has been appealed from dis-
trict court, the transcription (anachronistically referred to as the "bill of
exceptions" in Nebraska) may be disposed of one year after the courts' records
show no unfinished matter pending in the case, or one year after the defendant
has paid the fine, served the sentence, or has been released from probation or
parole, whichever is later. See Schedule 8-1-5. Other states use other retention
rules. The nation-wide average retention period in civil cases is 8.4 years, with
three states requiring retention for fifteen years and only one state requiring re-
tention for only three years. In criminal cases, the average retention period is
15.7 years, with four states requiring retention for fifty years, only one state re-
quiring retention for only five years, and no state requiring retention for less
than five years. For a full state-by-state breakdown, see National Court Report-
ers Foundation, 1997 Survey of the Official Court Reporting Industry, 13, A-44, &
A-45 (1997). A graphic representation taken from the 1997 survey was repub-
lished at 59 J. CT. REPORTING 44 (1998).
Nebraska district court official electronic reporters' audio tapes remain sub-
ject to the same degradation problems as any other magnetic tapes. At least, if
one checks one's magnetic tapes, the loss of stored information will become evi-
dent before it becomes total. Computer diskettes share with magnetic tapes a
short life expectancy, but, even worse, share with digital recordings generally the
digital recordings' characteristic, sudden, catastrophic loss of information, with-
out giving any warning before the total loss occurs. Diskettes also are much more
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susceptible to information losses attributable to dirt and mishandling than are
magnetic tapes.
If a district court official court reporter leaves service, one of the final tasks
required of the reporter is to catalog, index, and deliver to the appropriate district
court clerks all of the reporter's trial records, including paper stenopads, tapes,
computer diskettes, and exhibits. The district court clerks having custody of the
trial records of departed official reporters and active duty official reporters them-
selves retain the trial records under state records management rules.
At this point, we find a potential human error problem that can cause diffi-
culty retrieving district court records. Official court reporters leaving service do
not always satisfy their final task of cataloging, indexing, and delivering to the
clerks their trial records, nor do their judges always satisfy their obligation to
assure compliance with proper reporter departure procedure. That failure alone
can leave successor judges and reporters, to say nothing of litigants in need of
retrieval, facing simultaneous, major record retrieval problems in several coun-
ties in potentially hundreds or even thousands of cases, depending upon the indi-
vidual court reporters' and judges' years of service and the caseloads handled
during the years of service. My first official court reporter and I can personally
testify to the frustrations involved in the problem of finding the records theoreti-
cally left behind by a departing official court reporter and contemporaneously de-
parting judge.
With respect to machine shorthand reporters and transcription after the pas-
sage of several years, machine shorthand has differing systems, or theories, just
as manual shorthand does. Persons in need of transcriptions of the reporters'
stenopads long after the decisions became final, especially if finality arrived
without an appeal, cannot count on being able to obtain transcriptions from the
reporters' paper pads or diskettes, cost-effectively or efficiently, without the re-
porters who took the sessions of court doing the job or at least reporters whose
machine systems use the same or closely related theories. That is, one machine
writer will not necessarily be able to read the work of another machine writer.
Nor will one machine writer's computer necessarily be able to read the work of
another machine writer's computer.
Theories considered conflict-free, or nearly conflict-free, have been developed
in recent years and taught to the more recent graduates of court reporting
schools. Less recent graduates use theories not considered conflict-free. A con-
flict-free theory uses a special set of symbols to produce notes not cluttered by the
appearance of words that look alike or sound alike in court, leaving the reporter
to sort out during the transcription process the correct words used in the context
of their use. Notes produced using one of the older non-conflict-free theories
means in practice that transcriptions will require more time to prepare and will
be more likely to suffer from the presence of the wrong one of the many sound
alike words people use while testifying. Obviously, transcriptionists working
from audio and video recordings but who were not the recording machine opera-
tors will stand little chance of picking the right soundalikes.
In addition, over the course of their service, machine court reporters create
individual computer dictionaries comprising their own personal renditions of
words each of them individually translates into their systems' alphabets. One
reporter's personal renditions need not match another's, nor can they reasonably
be expected to match another's. Thus, while district court's official stenographic
court reporters have the capability to create records that can survive, physically,
for at least 50 years after the last case activity, transcription could become a
problem with those records as well. While paper and ink records can survive for
centuries and magnetic and digital recordings cannot, the problems of capability
to transcribe after the passage of sufficient time remains. Stenographic equip-
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rately portraying county court reality in Nebraska, does not apply to
district court's official stenographic reporters' paper stenopads nor to
electronic reporters' tapes, at least as long as their tapes remain phys-
ically intact and stable.
Instead of totally withdrawing the only avenue of post-conviction
relief available to persons not in custody, but remaining potentially
damaged from the imposition of constitutionally invalid convictions,
the supreme court could take three relatively inexpensive steps that
would ease the problem somewhat: (1) lengthen its county court tape
recording retention period to a period closer to the most reasonable
time that magnetic tape can survive physically as a stable information
storage medium, (2) shorten district court retention periods to match,
then (3) set the outer limit of second-tier collateral challenges at that
same time period. With a considerably higher cost, the supreme court
could staff the county court with official stenographic court report-
ers,6 63 almost totally solving the record retrieval problem with the re-
tention of the stenopad records.
One cannot imagine a goal for the record erasure system, other
than saving money through tape reuse 664 and saving more money
from not paying official stenographic court reporters to serve in county
court. Attempts of this sort to save money can distort justice in the
present and deprive future participants of potentially invaluable in-
formation. Saving money in the present tends to obtain a higher pri-
ority in government budget deliberations than facilitating appellate
justice in the present and preserving records for posterity, especially
ment, theory, and alphabets change over time. Whether a court reporter of the
year 2050 would be able to transcribe the contents of the paper stenographic pads
made in 1999 could pose a daunting problem. Finally, incompatible hardware
and software create insurmountable problems, as any computer user well knows.
663. This idea would be expensive. The supreme court presently pays district court's
official court reporters a compensation package that consistently ranks Ne-
braska's court reporter pay among the lowest 5 states in the country, with the
result that district court cannot attract easily enough qualified court reporters to
fill the need. To attract enough court reporters to fill both courts needs would
require a substantial increase in court reporter compensation.
664. This also saves storage costs. Under the present state/local division of the costs
of court operations, the tape and storage cost savings inure to the benefit of the
counties' budgets, while the savings from not hiring official stenographic report-
ers for county court inure to the benefit of the state budget.
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in Nebraska government work.665 The intrinsic value of lost informa-
tion frequently earns no place in the budgeting process. 666
The intrinsic value of the potential damage to victims of constitu-
tionally invalid convictions seems not to have been estimated very
heavily in the supreme court's Louthan balance. The court said:
[dletermining the validity of prior DUI convictions for purposes of sentence
enhancement implicates evolving principles of law by which we must define
the point at which the interest of the State in the finality of judgments of
conviction must yield to the due process rights of an accused.6 67
The supreme court, when attempting a balance in Louthan, appar-
ently was thinking only of the situation of a person accused of a repeat
DUI offense seeking to erase or obstruct the use of the prior conviction
the state seeks to use for sentence enhancement.
Many other, more compelling, situations than the plight of recidi-
vist offenders, admittedly a less than sympathetic group, readily come
to mind. Consider a few of the others. What weight does one assign in
the Louthan court's due process balancing to a young person's inabil-
ity to obtain a teaching job or other professional license, because the
young person suffered a constitutionally invalid conviction of minor in
possession of alcohol that the young person did not directly appeal and
now cannot collaterally attack in a second-tier challenge action? What
weight does one assign to the inability of another young person to ob-
tain a required level of security clearance for promotion within the
armed services or to obtain employment in the national security agen-
cies, or to a slightly older person who cannot qualify for judicial ap-
pointment, because of the (once) young person's now unchallengeable,
yet constitutionally invalid, conviction for, say, the serious offense of
possession of less than one ounce of marijuana? Young people fre-
quently commit silly and even stupid offenses as part of growing up
without considering potential future collateral consequences of convic-
665. The state constitutional convention of 1871 was reported by penwriting steno-
graphic reporters. The constitutional convention of 1875 chose to save the ex-
pense and declined to report its proceedings. As a result, posterity lost forever
the records necessary to determine what the delegates to that convention had in
mind in their proposals for constitutional changes. Many of the provisions from
the earlier convention were retained by the later convention, leaving retrievable
the ideas of the earlier convention delegates on the retained proposals, for what
they may be worth. See JAvms C. OLSON, HISTORY OF NEBRASKA 182-183 (2d ed.
1974).
666. This observation is not a criticism of the Nebraska Supreme Court. The supreme
court lacks appropriation powers. The Nebraska Legislature is the source of the
lack of proper funding, and, ultimately, the source is the people themselves. Dis-
cussing Nebraska's constitutional history, Professors Miewald and Longo ob-
served: "In a tradition that carries down to the present day, [all the way from
Nebraska's first constitution] the watchword of Nebraska government became:
'cheap.'" ROBERT D. MIEWALD & PETER J. LONGO, THE NEBRASKA STATE CONSTI-
TUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 6 (1993). Nothing has changed in that regard.
667. State v. Louthan, 257 Neb. at 178, 595 N.W.2d at 921.
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tions. Young people frequently prefer avoiding court appearances and
frequently waive rights they might not waive were they able to think
ahead to potential collateral consequences of even invalid, but unchal-
lengeable, convictions.
Perhaps a better cure for the practical problems motivating the
court's apparent desire to eliminate second-tier challenge actions
might lie in providing better trial court, especially county court,
records retention procedures or even systems, rather than depriving
people of an avenue for potential relief from constitutionally invalid
convictions. 66 8 That cure would be more coherent with the other char-
acteristics of our legal system, especially our professed beliefs in the
sanctity of constitutional rights and the claimed preference that peo-
ples' constitutional rights generally should not be violated.669
It is true enough that the state has an interest in promoting the
finality of judgments of conviction. But the state's interest should be
in promoting the finality only of valid convictions. After all, the addi-
tional principle of law had evolved fully many years ago that a convic-
tion obtained in violation of the constitutional rights of the accused is
a void conviction. A void conviction can never become a final convic-
tion, because it has never been a conviction. From its inception, the
void conviction has always been a nullity. The passage of time does
not transform a nullity into a valid final judgment. Just where, ex-
actly, the state's interest in promoting the finality of a nullity lies
presents jurisprudential and public policy questions beyond the scope
of this article, but which the Nebraska Supreme Court needs to mull
over before it carries the Louthan idea much farther. One can only
speculate on such questions as whether further evolution can develop
a legal principle defining the state's interest in promoting the finality
of a nullity.670
What lies ahead for second-tier challenge actions could be a risky
predictive enterprise. The supreme court easily could restrict
Louthan to driving under the influence and refusal to submit to chem-
ical test convictions, to county court convictions, or even to misde-
meanor convictions, without regard to the court in which the
conviction occurred. In Louthan, the court relied, in what seems to
have been a major part of its due process justification, on the statutory
recidivist procedure applicable only to DUI and refusal to submit to
668. The best cure would lie in creating a breed of arraignment judges who always do
it right the first time, but that option tends not to be available in a world run by
humans.
669. The practical impossibility justification also does not necessarily commend itself
to a society that rhetorically places high values on constitutional protections.




chemical test convictions. 6 71 The statutory procedure involved applies
only to prior Nebraska convictions of those two specified offenses. If
the court is serious about not allowing anything to be done in Ne-
braska criminal procedure that is not provided by specific remedial or
procedural statutes, then the court cannot expand that part of the
Louthan reasoning to cover prior convictions of any offenses not speci-
fied in sections 60-6,196(3) and 60-6,197(5) of the Nebraska Revised
Statutes. Nebraska statutes present an extensive list of enhanceable
offenses not covered by any recidivist procedure. 6 72 In addition, the
671. Sections 60-6,196(3) and 60-6,197(5) of the Nebraska Revised Statutes both pro-
vide that, with respect to each prior conviction the state relies upon for sentence
enhancement, the defendant shall have the opportunity to review the record of
the prior conviction, bring mitigating facts to the attention of the court before
sentencing, and make objections on the record to the validity of the alleged prior
convictions. These statutes apply only to DUI and refusal to submit to chemical
test convictions. No other prior convictions are open to objections to their validity
in this manner.
672. The list of offenses under Nebraska law that carry enhanced penalties on repeat
offenses already is a long one, as of December 31, 1999, with the Legislature
warming up yet another session:
Neb. Rev. Stat. § General Felonies
29-2221 Habitual Criminal, 3d & subsequent convictions, with qualifica-
tions
Specific Felonies Enhanced to Higher Classification Felonies
28-111 Stalking, "Hate Crime-type," subsequent convictions within 7
years
28-319 First Degree Sexual Assault, 2d offense
28-320.01 Sexual Assault of a Child, 2d & subsequent offenses
28-416 Controlled Substances Offenses in or Near Youth Facilities, 2d
& subsequent offenses
28-1102 Promoting Gambling in the First Degree, 3d & subsequent of-
fenses
28-1463 Child Pornography, 2d & subsequent offenses
28-1222 Using Explosives to Commit Felony, 2d & subsequent offenses
60-6,196 Driving During 15 Year Revocation for DUI, 2d & subsequent
offenses
60-6,197 Driving During 15 Year Revocation for Refusal to Submit to
Chemical Test, 2d & subsequent offenses
71-6329 Lead Abatement Project & Residential Lead-based Paint Profes-
sions Certification Act Violations Subsequent to Levy of a
Civil Penalty, 2d & subsequent offenses
Misdemeanors Enhanced to Felonies
9-262 Bingo Act Violations, 2d & subsequent offenses
9-352 Pickle Card Lottery Act Violations, 2d & subsequent offenses
9-434 Lottery & Raffle Act Violations, 2d & subsequent offenses
9-652 Violations of County & City Lottery Acts, 2d & subsequent of-
fenses
28-311 Child Enticement with Prior Convictions for Specified Offenses
28-311.04 Stalking, subsequent convictions within 7 years




28-518 Theft, more than $200 but less than $500, 2d & subsequent of-
fenses
28-518 Theft, less than $200, 3d & subsequent offenses
28-611 Issuing Bad Check under $500.00, 2d & subsequent offenses
28-631 Insurance Fraud, $200.00 or more but less than $500.00, 2d &
subsequent offenses
28-904 Resisting Arrest, 2d & subsequent offenses
28-1005 Dogfighting, cockfighting, bearbaiting, etc., 2d & subsequent of-
fenses
28-1102 Promoting Gambling in the First Degree, 2d & subsequent of-
fenses
28-1202 Carrying a Concealed Weapon, 2d & subsequent offenses
28-1469 Operating Aircraft While Under the Influence of Alcohol or Any
Drug, 3d & subsequent offenses
60-6,196 DUI, 4th & subsequent offenses
60-6,197 Refusal to Submit to Chemical Test, 4th & subsequent offenses
66-1226 Selling Automotive Spark Ignition Engine Fuels Not Within
Specifications, 2d & subsequent offenses
71-6312 Asbestos Project Violations Subsequent to Levy of a Civil Penal-
ty, 2d & subsequent offenses
81-3442 Violations of Engineers & Architects Regulation Act, 2d & sub-
sequent offenses
Misdemeanors Enhanced to Higher Classification Misdemean-
ors
2-10,115 Violations of Plant Protection & Plant Pest Act, 2d & subse-
quent offenses
2-2647 Violations of Pesticide Act, 2d & subsequent offenses
9-230 Unlawful Prizes at Bingo Games Violations, 2d & subsequent
offenses
9-513 Violations of Small Lottery & Raffle Act, 2d & subsequent of-
fenses
28-416 Possession of Marijuana, 1 Oz. or Less, 3d & subsequent of-
fenses
28-445 Manufacture, Distribute, Deliver, or Possess Imitation Con-
trolled Substances, 2d & subsequent offenses
28-514 Theft of Lost, Mislaid, or Misdelivered Property, more than
$200 but less than $500, 2d & subsequent offenses
28-514 Theft of Lost, Mislaid, or Misdelivered Property, $200 or less,
3d & subsequent offenses
28-514 Theft of Lost, Mislaid, or Misdelivered Property, $200 or less,
2d offense
28-516 Unauthorized Use of a Propelled Vehicle, 2d offense
28-518 Theft, less than $200, 2d offense
28-523 Littering, 2d, 3d & subsequent offenses
28-1009 Cruelty to Animals, 2d & subsequent offenses
28-1346 Unauthorized Access to or Use of a Computer to Obtain Confi-
dential Information, 2d & subsequent offenses
28-1347 Unauthorized Access to a Computer, 2d & subsequent offenses
28-1468 Operating Aircraft While Under the Influence, 2d offense
39-310 Depositing Material on Roads & Ditches, 2d, 3d & subsequent
offenses
39-311 Placing Burning Materials or Items Likely to Cause Injury on
Highways, 2d, 3d & subsequent offenses
39-6,106.01 Illegal Operation of Motor Vehicle By Minor, 2d & subsequent
offenses




Nebraska statutes contain a number of offenses enhanceable within
the classifications of Class IV and V Misdemeanors and Infractions,
none of which carry possible imprisonment, so they have not been
listed. And, there exist the general habitual criminal statute and the
DUI and refusal to submit procedure dealt with in Louthan, for which
no statutory enhancement hearing procedure whatever exists. When
the court gets to those offenses it will not even have the enhancement
53-180.05 Creation/Alteration of I.D., under Liquor Control Act, 2d & sub-
sequent offenses
53-186.01 Permitting Liquor Consumption in Unlicenced Public Places, 2d
& subsequent offenses
53-187 Nonbeverage Licensee Selling Liquor Fit for Beverage Purposes,
2d & subsequent offenses
53-1,100 Violations of Liquor Control Act, 2d & subsequent offenses
54-796 Violations of Animal Importation Act, 2d & subsequent offenses
54-861 Violations of Commercial Feed Act, 2d & subsequent offenses
54-2288 Violations of Pseudorabies Quarantine, 2d & subsequent of-
fenses
54-22,100 Violations of Pseudorabies Control & Eradication Act, 2d & sub-
sequent violations
60-430.01-.05 Driving Under Suspension/Driving During Suspension, etc., 2d
& subsequent offenses
60-6,196 Operating Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol
or Any Drug, 3d offense
60-6,196 Operating Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence, 2d offense
60-6,197 Refusal to Submit to Chemical Test, 3d offense
60-6,197 Refusal to Submit to Chemical Test, 2d offense
60-6,217 Reckless Driving, 2d offense
60-6,217 Willful Reckless Driving, 2d offense
60-6,218 Reckless Driving, 3d & subsequent offenses
60-6,218 Willful Reckless Driving, 3d & subsequent offenses
60-6,343 Violations of Snowmobile Provisions, 2d & subsequent offenses
within I year
60-6,362 Violations of All-Terrain Vehicle Requirements, 2d & subse-
quent offenses within 1 year
71-167 Uniform Professional Licensing Act Violations, 2d & subsequent
offenses
71-1,132.36 Violations of Nursing Practice Regulations, 2d & subsequent of-
fenses
71-2512 Violations of Poison Regulations, & Adulterated & Misbranded
Drugs Provisions, 2d & subsequent offenses
71-3,174 Cosmetology Act Violations, 2d offense
81-3535 Unauthorized Practice of Geology, 2d & subsequent offenses
84-1414 Public Meetings Law Violations by Public Body Members, 2d &
subsequent offenses
89-1,101 Violations of Packaging, Weights, Measures & Quantities Act,
2d & subsequent offenses
In addition, the Nebraska statutes contain a number of offenses enhanceable
within the classifications of Class IV and V Misdemeanors and Infractions, none
of which carry possible imprisonment, so they have not been listed.
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hearing to consider as a tool to ensure due process has been accorded
the defendant, only the direct appeal will be available.673
Acting under the Nebraska trial court records retention system as
presently constituted, the supreme court reasonably could use the
practical impossibility justification to expand the demise of the sepa-
rate proceeding in DUI cases to disallow second-tier challenge actions
in separate proceedings from all prior county court convictions, but
not to cover district court convictions. So, consistency would then mil-
itate in favor of prohibiting second-tier challenges to all misdemeanor
convictions, based upon whatever justification the court might want to
express and without regard to the court of conviction. Of course, con-
sistency674 also would require the court to continue ignoring the exis-
tence of the Nebraska Constitution's Article I, section 13, as it did in
Louthan, in any future efforts to broaden the demise of second-tier
challenge actions from the DUI theater to other offenses.
Instead of restricting the Louthan demise of second-tier challenge
actions to DUI cases, the court could expand Louthan to cover second-
tier collateral challenge actions to all prior convictions in all Nebraska
trial courts.675 Expansion to all prior convictions without regard to
the courts of conviction and the seriousness of the offenses involved
673. A brief digression to cover a point introduced earlier becomes appropriate here
relating to the creation of law by courts in the absence of legislation on any given
point. State supreme courts are not required to abstain from law making, as
state supreme courts have been known to claim (the present Nebraska Supreme
Court has not shown an eagerness to take that position, but its predecessors felt
no unease in taking that position). Stating the obvious, if courts could not make
law and have not made law, there would have been no English common law upon
which to base American law, nor until the late nineteenth century, any contract
law, nor any property law, nor any tort law, ad inifinitum. The claim that the
litigants cannot obtain judicial relief in the absence of statutes allowing such re-
lief sounds good in the political arena, appeals to the politically less sophisti-
cated, and completely ignores or denies the force of Article I, section 13, of the
Nebraska Constitution. Thus, despite its popular charm, the claim that state su-
preme courts cannot make law remains a disingenuous, but politically correct,
way for courts to avoid making decisions they do not want to make or to avoid
hearing litigation they do not want to hear. State supreme courts cannot avoid
law making, procedural as well as substantive, especially in states with constitu-
tional provisions like Article I, section 13, which was a crucial part of the
LeGrand decision, but, it seems, was not seriously considered as having any real
application in Louthan. The Wiltshire court very well may have made procedural
law from nothing more substantial than positively charged legal ions, but the
Louthan court just as dramatically made procedural law from nothing more sub-
stantial than negatively charged legal ions.
674. State supreme courts labor under no binding obligation to be consistent. State
supreme courts enjoy the freedom of being as consistent or as inconsistent as they
wish and define each state's degree of legal consistency for themselves. Consis-
tency serves one of the overall goals of Anglo-American legal systems but also
provides a handy tool for the purposes of justifying decisions.
675. Another way of expressing the expansion of Louthan is to refer to the further
restriction of the means of vindicating violations of peoples' constitutional rights.
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could be the court's eventual goal, but along the way the court would
lose its practical impossibility justification and its statutory enhance-
ment hearing procedure leg of its Louthan due process justification.
That would leave the court with whatever justification the court could
wring from thoughts along the lines of: "no higher authority requires
us to hear these claims so, since we do not want to deal with these
issues, we will not hear these claims." I should emphasize that a great
deal of positive policy can lie in such a justification, such as the re-
moval of meritless claims dissipating legal and judicial resources,
while other more pressing matters simply must sit and wait for atten-
tion. Despite the fact that strict observance of horizontal stare decisis
would require that the court expand Louthan no farther than to cover
prior convictions of refusal to submit to chemical test offenses, and
given the opposition to second-tier challenge actions several of the jus-
tices have expressed in supreme court opinions, majority, concurring,
and dissenting, or in court of appeals opinions,6 76 expansion of the
Louthan rule seemed the more likely alternative course the court
would take when the court released Louthan.
Expanding Louthan at its first opportunity became the supreme
court's preferred alternative. In State v. Kuehn,6 77 the court added
prior convictions the state seeks to use to obtain habitual criminal
sentence enhancements to the list of convictions no longer open to sec-
ond-tier challenge actions for the purpose of stalling or avoiding their
enhancement use. Again, the court referred to the difficulty of retriev-
ing records from convictions entered long ago and the likelihood there
will be no plea acceptance colloquy available for review in a separate
proceeding. The proffered justification that "[a]t some point, judg-
ments of conviction must become final and the State should not be
required to 'rummage through frequently nonexistent or difficult to
obtain.., transcripts or records' in order to defend them against col-
676. Supreme Court Justices Connolly and Miller-Lerman were part of the unanimous
Louthan supreme court and also members of the unanimous court of appeals
panel in State v. LeGrand, later reversed by the "old" supreme court. Supreme
Court Justice Wright concurred separately in the supreme court's reversal of the
court of appeals' LeGrand decision. His opinion makes quite clear he was dis-
senting from the court's reasoning and joining only in the result in that particular
case. Supreme Court Justice Gerrard arrived on the supreme court in time for
the LeGrand decision, but did not write separately. He also was part of the unan-
imous Louthan court. That's four. Justice Stephan wrote Louthan. That's five
whose positions on the legal questions involved have been declared overtly and
officially.
677. 258 Neb. 558, 604 N.W.2d 420 (2000). In Kuehn, the supreme court overruled the
following cases, to the extent they concluded that separate proceedings were
available to launch second-tier challenges of prior felony convictions sought to be
used for habitual criminal enhancements: State v. Johns, 233 Neb. 477, 445
N.W.2d 914 (1989), State v. Davis, 224 Neb. 518, 398 N.W.2d 729 (1987), and
State v. Benzel, 220 Neb. 466, 370 N.W.2d 501 (1985).
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lateral attack,"67s factually cannot apply in habitual criminal proceed-
ings. This time, the supreme court was dealing with cases in which
the difficulties of obtaining adequate county court misdemeanor con-
viction records have absolutely no relevance. Habitual criminal en-
hancements cannot be based on prior misdemeanor convictions. Only
felony convictions count. Only district courts enter felony convictions.
As we have seen, district court plea proceeding verbatim records must
remain available for fifty years after the last case activity. Not only
can the litigants involved in habitual criminal enhancement hearings
easily obtain the court files (if not the originals then, if need be, the
state's archived microfilm copies), they also easily can obtain verbatim
transcriptions of the plea proceedings in the overwhelming number of
felony cases, including those not appealed directly. Further, the
state's interest in promoting the finality of nullities (i.e. void judg-
ments such as felony convictions obtained in violation of the United
States Constitution) remains undefined. No one reasonably could dis-
pute the proposition that valid felony convictions must become final at
some point. One reasonably can dispute the proposition that void fel-
ony convictions must become final at some point. As noted, void con-
victions cannot ever become final convictions, due to their total
invalidity from the moment of their entry.
In Kuehn, the supreme court commented again on the existence of
a statutory hearing procedure applicable to habitual criminal proceed-
ings as the only statutorily authorized procedure for challenging prior
felony convictions sought to be used for enhancement - only convic-
tions pardoned for innocence can be challenged under the statute for
habitual criminal enhancement use. The statute does not authorize
challenges to the priors for lack of a record showing of counsel or
waiver, yet those challenges must be allowed. Of course, as a constitu-
tional and jurisdictional requirement, that matter differs and does not
require a statutory authorization, or so it seems. Again, the court re-
lied on the absence of a statutory criminal procedure authorizing the
second-tier challenge action as a basic premise of its eventual holding.
Of course, the court is correct.679 No separate statute or set of stat-
678. Kuehn, 258 Neb. at 564, 604 N.W.2d at 425.
679. But the authority the court cited for the proposition, State v. Miller, 240 Neb. 297,
481 N.W.2d 580 (1992), might not have been the strongest authority for purposes
of analogical reasoning. In analogical reasoning, the closer the match, or the
greater the number of matching characteristics or similarities between the prece-
dent case and the case under consideration, the stronger the analogical argu-
ment. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUmE TO CLEAR LEGAL
THINKING 49-51, 91-96 (1989). The "procedure7 involved in Miller, which the su-
preme court ruled was unauthorized by statute and therefore not available in
Nebraska criminal procedure, was a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict in a misdemeanor prosecution, a post verdict, pre-judgment motion chal-
lenging a jury verdict found in Nebraska civil procedure, but nowhere to be seen
2000]
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utes placed within the code of criminal procedure by the Revisor of
Statutes authorizes the separate proceeding.
One reasonable question that can be raised in thinking about the
weight to accord the lack of statutory authorization justification for
the demise of the separate proceeding relates to the characterization
of the separate proceeding as a criminal proceeding. The petition in-
volved in State v. Wiltshire6SO alleged only civil bases for relief in a
proceeding brought separately on the county court's civil docket with
its own civil filing case number, initiated by petition, alleging numer-
ous causes of action, but petitioner Wiltshire used a criminal heading
on the petition. The two actions involved in State v. LeGrand6sx were
initiated by the filing of petitions asking the convictions in the two
earlier criminal cases be vacated and set aside. Wiltshire and
LeGrand, to the extent dealing with the second-tier collateral chal-
lenges, were civil actions attacking the validity of criminal judgments.
Collateral attacks on void judgments, whether civil or criminal, tradi-
tionally tend to be civil actions and do not have any single, mandatory
format.
Wiltshire's separate proceeding illustrates the point. The causes of
action alleged in Wiltshire's petition, which sufficed in the old su-
preme court's judgment to present a second-tier challenge, included
these types of actions: habeas corpus, postconviction relief, declaratory
judgment, motion for new trial, mandamus, petition in error, petition
for a writ of error in coram nobis, petition for a writ of audita querela,
a federal civil rights action under section 1983, and a State v. Oliver-
type proceeding.68 2 Eight of those ten causes of action or theories of
relief, whichever they are, originate in civil, not criminal, procedure;
one hails from criminal procedure, and one from an untraceable
lineage.
The legal justifications the court offered in support of its Louthan
decision seem less than compelling for abolition of a remedial cause of
action. Still, despite that value-laden assessment, the court's legal
justifications are adequate, especially the decision to offer no more due
in the criminal procedure code. A motion for a J.N.O.V. does not seem an espe-
cially close match with a second-tier collateral challenge action.
680. 241 Neb. 817, 491 N.W.2d 324 (1992), overruled by State v. Louthan, 257 Neb.
174, 595 N.W.2d 917 (1999). The appeal Wiltshire presented to the supreme
court actually was an appeal in each of two separate actions joined before the
supreme court. One was the civil action. The other one was the criminal case in
which Wiltshire attempted to raise his second-tier challenge at the enhancement
hearing.
The petition in the civil action reads like a "who's who" of collateral attacks.
681. 249 Neb. 1, 541 N.W.2d 380 (1995). It merits noting that Justice Gerrard joined
the majority in LeGrand, but also joined the unanimous opinions in Louthan and
Kuehn.
682. Petition for Relief in a Separate Proceeding, State v. Derald B. Wiltshire, Lancas-
ter County Court, Docket 184, Page 787 (filed January 8, 1991).
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process protection under the state constitution than the federal consti-
tution offers. One does have some difficulty explaining a basis for
reading language in a state constitution differently than exactly the
same language appearing in the United States Constitution. The
court's choice to ignore the existence and operation of Article I, section
13 of the Nebraska Constitution, while perfectly accepted judicial be-
havior,683 still leaves the presentation of the courts decision a bit
lacking. It also could be that the court does not seek to abolish the
second-tier collateral challenge, but only to limit the class of litigants
to whom that avenue of relief might remain available.
The supreme court's language choices in both Louthan and Kuehn
have limited the effect of its rulings, so far, to cases in which defend-
ants charged in new criminal cases with repeat offenses seek to stall
or avoid enhancement use of their prior convictions. The limiting lan-
guage in Louthan has already been noted. The limiting language in
Kuehn appears in these statements, among others: "we hold that
prior convictions sought to be used for penalty enhancement under the
habitual criminal statute cannot be attacked in a separate proceed-
ing;"68 4 "Nbecause we hold that separate proceedings to challenge
prior felonies used to establish habitual criminal status. . . ;"685 and,
"we conclude that the two prior felony convictions the State sought to
use as a basis for establishing Kuehn's habitual criminal status were
not subject to attack in ... separate proceedings . . ."686
If the court truly wanted to abolish the separate proceeding for a
launching pad for second-tier collateral challenges, the court easily
could have left out the language tying the use of the separate proceed-
ing to the existence of a new criminal case in which the state seeks to
use a prior conviction for sentence enhancement. While the flavor of
the opinion indicates an intention to abolish the separate proceeding
outright and for all purposes, the court has not said so directly, except
in pointing out that, for the purpose involved in Louthan and Kuehn,
the separate proceeding is not authorized by statute.
Limiting the class of potential litigants entitled to use a second-tier
challenge or limiting the permissible purposes of second-tier chal-
lenges have the policy objectives of reducing the torrent of generally
meritless second-tier challenges by people generally not terribly de-
serving of a break. Limiting the class of users, but maintaining the
avenue of relief, still provides protection for the more deserving and
far fewer people suffering from the effects of void convictions outside
of the context of repeat offender litigation. In addition, that approach
683. See LAwRENCE M. SoLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993).
684. State v. Kuehn, 258 Neb. at 565, 604 N.W.2d at 425.




does not suck the life from the Nebraska Constitution's Article I, sec-
tion 13.
Among the myriad middle ground approaches the court can take
after Louthan and Kuehn lies the restriction of the demise of the sec-
ond-tier collateral challenge action to the factual contexts of Louthan
and Kuehn. That is, the challenge was taken to a prior conviction the
state was proposing to use in seeking sentence enhancement for a re-
peat offense. Abolish the use of the second-tier collateral challenge
action when, but only when, the motivation for the challenge is that a
prosecutor wishes to use the prior conviction for sentence enhance-
ment on repeat offenses. Many deserving reasons exist that could mo-
tivate good people to challenge their prior convictions on second-tier
grounds, other than blocking, or at least stalling, sentence enhance-
ment proceedings. Those people could retain their action to challenge
void judgments in any court and proceeding, while cutting off the
seemingly endless supply of meritless efforts to avoid or stall sentence
enhancements. Simply ridding the court system of the challenges
filed in efforts to avoid or stall sentence enhancements would go a long
way toward removing a source of clogs in many courts' dockets. The
limiting language already appeared in the court's Louthan opinion
and reappeared in Kuehn. The practical problems of producing the
record evidence would remain, of course, but a larger share of the cost
of seeking the record evidence could be shifted from the state's prose-
cutors to the litigants claiming their prior convictions are void. That
cost shift alone would cut back on the number of meritless second-tier
collateral challenge actions brought into court.
Attempting to predict the direction most likely to be chosen by a
state supreme court whose two most senior members have been there
only five years and only one of its seven members possesses any first-
hand, insider knowledge of trial court processes, does not set one up
for inevitable success as a legal prognosticator. The safest, and least
informative, prediction is that changes will continue to come. 68 7 The
most predictable result of Louthan and Kuehn will be an inevitable,
hopefully temporary, increase in the number of direct appeals from
DUI and refusal to submit to chemical test convictions and from habit-
ual criminal enhancements, at least from the counseled ones, and es-
pecially from the indigent, publicly defended ones.6 8 8 An increase in
687. That prediction simply states what jurisprudes have expressed for years: "The
rules and principles of case law have never been treated as final truths, but as
working hypotheses, continually retested .... Every new case is an experiment;
and if the accepted rule which seems applicable yields a result which is felt to be
unjust, the rule is reconsidered." MuNR E SmrrH, JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1909).
688. Unfortunately, a large segment of the body of the court user public will be left out
of the ensuing Louthan-Kuehn inspired appellate case bulge, because they lack
the discretionary income to appeal and they are not poor enough for someone else
to pay their way.
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appeals is predictable because, whenever appellate courts make even
small changes in ruling case law, lawyers respond with added appeals
to probe the meanings of the changes. Louthan and Kuehn present no
small change in an area of Nebraska law that had created a deluge of
its own appeals before reaching the state of somewhat settled doc-
trine. Now the doctrine once again has become unsettled. The appel-
late caseloads will reflect the result soon enough.68 9
Given the emphasis the Nebraska Supreme Court placed on the
direct appeal as a means of assuring convicts they have obtained the
full benefits of due process attendant to plea-based conviction practice
in Louthan and Kuehn, prosecuting attorneys and trial court judges
need to exercise even more care in the conduct of arraignments than
they ever have exercised previously. The new supreme court's
Louthan-Kuehn emphasis, plus the indications already observable in
the supreme court's decisions in direct appeals themselves, such as
State v. Hays69 0 and State v. Paul,69 1 announced well before Louthan-
Kuehn, should have signaled us all of the supreme court's apparent
wish to insist upon an exacting precision in arraignment procedure,
another laudable intention. If the direct appeal is to serve as the bul-
wark of due process assurance the supreme court seems to intend, the
supreme court has taken upon itself the duty to demand exacting pre-
cision from the trial courts. Thus, one reasonable prediction lies in the
belief the supreme court will become far more exacting in direct ap-
peals. Another reasonable prediction is that more than a few federal
habeas corpus test cases can be expected.
X ELEMENTS OF NEW OFFENSES
Nebraska, and most other American jurisdictions, long ago chose to
create various crimes that contain within their definitions a prior con-
viction as an element of a new offense.6 92 Such criminal laws result
from the idea that people who have committed earlier crimes present
689. This would be an excellent time for a statutory change rerouting county court
appeals in criminal cases directly to the appellate tier, bypassing district courts
acting as intermediate appellate courts, thereby pushing the bulge in caseload up
the ladder at least one rung. The misfortune that will flow from Louthan for
district court as presently constituted lies in hearing a large overdose of frivolous
challenges to prior convictions in its own criminal caseload, supplemented by the
overdose of frivolous appeals from county court's criminal caseload on their way
up the hierarchy. Few people can realize the frustration more than trial court
judges of hearing seemingly endless waves of non-meritorious collateral chal-
lenges to prior convictions, far more such challenges than appellate judges hear,
but the judicial frustration alone cannot justify the demise of the second-tier col-
lateral challenge.
690. 253 Neb. 467, 570 N.W.2d 823 (1997).
691. 256 Neb. 669, 592 N.W.2d 148 (1999).
692. E.g., felon in possession of firearm, driving during fifteen year license revocation
period, etc.
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more of a danger than others, especially when committing new crimes.
Prosecutors must prove the prior convictions as they must prove the
existence of all the other essential elements of such crimes. A number
of critical points arise in attempts to prove prior convictions, but the
rules have been worked out fairly well, with few, if any, gaps left to
fill.
The rules relating to admissibility and sufficiency of the prima fa-
cie showing are the same as the rules for sentence enhancement
use.6 93 When using plea-based prior convictions to prove an element
of a new offense, the state may prove the prior conviction by offering
in evidence certified copies of the complaint or information, the judg-
ment rendered on the plea, appropriate evidence of finality, and evi-
dence of the identity of the accused as the person previously convicted,
or the state may attempt to prove the prior conviction in any other
permissible manner without necessarily violating Rules 403, 404(2),
and 609 of the Nebraska Rules of Evidence.694
Challenges to the prior conviction on constitutional bases other
than counsel/waiver are impermissible when the prior conviction evi-
dence is offered to prove the defendant's status as a person previously
convicted of a felony. This use of the prior conviction does not present
the same context as a direct appeal from the prior conviction nor the
same context as a collateral attack challenging the prior conviction.6 95
In State v. Lee,6 9 6 the old Nebraska Supreme Court declined to extend
Oliver, Crane, Wiltshire, and LeGrand to allow second-tier collateral
challenges to prior convictions used to prove an element of a new of-
fense, even in separate proceedings or any other collateral attack con-
text. Given the creation of the new Nebraska Supreme Court and the
coming of the Louthan and Kuehn decisions, in hindsight, it may have
been just as well that the old court did not choose to make the
extension.
XI. CONCLUSION
As is characteristic of general rule statements, the Boykin-Hays
formula left out so many details as to be a woefully incomplete
description of the requirements for the entry of valid plea-based con-
693. See State v. Ristau, 245 Neb. 52, 511 N.W.2d 83 (1994); State v. Groves, 239 Neb.
660, 477 N.W.2d 789 (1991).
694. See State v. Linn, 248 Neb. 809, 539 N.W.2d 435 (1995); State v. Perrigo, 244
Neb. 990, 510 N.W.2d 304 (1994); State v. Watkins, 4 Neb. App. 356, 543 N.W.2d
470 (1996). Rule 403 renders inadmissible relevant evidence whose probative
value is substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect, among other
things. Rule 404(2) relates to admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
and acts. Rule 609 deals with impeachment use of evidence of prior convictions.
695. See State v. Castor, 257 Neb. 572, 599 N.W.2d 201 (1999); State v. Blankenfeld,
229 Neb. 411, 427 N.W.2d 65 (1988).
696. 251 Neb. 661, 558 N.W.2d 571 (1997).
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victions as the discussion in this article has demonstrated. In consoli-
dating the rules into a single, easily retrievable, short statement,
however, the Nebraska Supreme Court followed the lead of Chief Jus-
tice Warren and Justice Douglas and demonstrated a small stroke of
genius, applying a very old lawyering idea to current needs.6 9 7 In the
Boykin-Hays formula, the supreme court provided trial court judges
with a mnemonic device sufficiently detailed to prevent many inadver-
tent plea acceptance errors. The assumption behind the Boykin-Hays
formula as an effective mnemonic device is that trial court judges tac-
itly know the mass of detailed requirements behind the general state-
ments in the formula.
The same preventive step can be accomplished with the rules relat-
ing to prior convictions, both those used for sentence enhancements
and those used to prove the prior conviction in prosecutions for new
offenses in which proof of a prior conviction forms an element of the
substantive offense. The supreme court has not yet provided us with a
consolidated statement of the scattered rules for these purposes. The
court has simplified the task with its recent limitations on the second-
tier collateral challenge action. While a consolidated statement for-
mulated by a simple country trial court judge, acting unofficially in
the role of a legal commentator, will carry far less weight than one
adopted by the supreme court in its official capacity, the effort can still
serve the purpose of providing a handy mnemonic device until the su-
preme court adopts a formula. So, based upon the case law discussed
in this article, here goes:
Evidence sufficient, if believed, to support, but not to compel, a
flnding9S that the accused before the trial court in the current case
has incurred a (1) prior (2) final conviction (3) within the applicable
limitation period (4) for a an offense within the required class of of-
fenses (5) at proceedings in which the defendant's right to counsel was
fully respected (6) entered by a court having subject matter, territo-
rial, and personal jurisdiction, and, (7) if resulting from a plea of
guilty or no contest, entered on a plea tendered personally by the de-
fendant or personally ratified by the defendant, proves a prima facie
case for enhancement of penalty or proof of an element of a new of-
fense in which a prior conviction is an element.
697. See Richard J. Ross, The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers:
Memory as Keyword, Shelter, and Identity, 1560-1640, 10 YALE J.L. & HuMAN.
229 (1998). Much like the legal maxims of the seventeenth century, the Hays
formulation constitutes but a skeleton of the applicable law and serves its pur-
pose as a memory prompt, not as a repository of the entire body of applicable law.
698. The descriptive language, "evidence sufficient, if believed, to support, but not to
compel, a finding of fact" simply states a serviceable definition of "prima facie




The Nebraska Supreme Court has harmonized most of its post-
Boykin case law with the case law produced by the United States Su-
preme Court. Still, a few adjustments seem to be required to bring
Nebraska into full harmony with the United States Supreme Court's
pronouncements. Most notably, the Nebraska Supreme Court's
Tharp699 rule, which deems sufficient only one advisement of the
right to counsel, seems to violate the federal standardOO and even to
push against the spirit, if not the limit, of the Nebraska statutory
right to counsel.70 1 Further, the court needs to re-examine its crimi-
nal venue cases and its criminal statute of limitations cases to clarify
those currently foggy areas of Nebraska law. Also, the supreme court
should re-examine and clarify the case law relating to the need to ad-
vise defendants of their statutory jury trial right and the need for a
record showing of a waiver. Finally, additional development of state
constitutional law as it relates to plea-based convictions would be
desirable.
Returning now to the idea that trial court judges ought to be able
to accept guilty and no contest pleas flawlessly, as a matter of second
nature, if one thinks only about donning one's robe, going into the
courtroom, and taking a guilty or no contest plea, one envisions a pro-
cedure that might take ten minutes or less in a moderately difficult
felony arraignment scenario and three to five minutes in a moderately
difficult misdemeanor scenario. That vision would adequately depict
most arraignments.
The preceding pages have demonstrated, however, that an arraign-
ing judge needs a surprisingly broad knowledge base in order to con-
duct even the average plea proceeding in such manner as to produce
not only a valid plea-based conviction, but also a record that supports
the validity of the conviction in all of the postconviction contexts in
which the record must suffice. While one certainly can master all of
the information presented in this article so that arraignment proce-
dure becomes a matter of second nature, the areas of Nebraska law
remaining unclear cannot be mastered until clarity in the law can be
achieved. For that to happen, the cases presenting the issues that
would allow the supreme court to clarify the law need to reach the
supreme court. Unlike the United States Supreme Court, Nebraska
appellate courts cannot easily reach out and clarify the law.
Appellate courts, plain error aside, only can respond to the issues
presented, or at least suggested, to them. Practitioners and academic
699. 224 Neb. 126, 395 N.W.2d 762 (1986).
700. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3
(1954). The Tharp rule may even be inconsistent with State v. Paul, 256 Neb.
669, 592 N.W.2d 148 (1999).




lawyers can assist by building on the information presented in this
article in analyzing their cases, looking in their cases for the issues
that need work, and then, in the case of practitioners, properly raising
the issues in court and, in the case of academic lawyers, researching,
writing, and teaching about them. At the trial court level, as at the
appellate level, courts can only respond easily to the issues the parties
raise or, at least, to the issues reasonably suggested and, perhaps,
sometimes pushed by judicial suggestion when the parties have not
noticed an issue lurking in the background that needs to be dealt with
in the interest of rendering a complete decision.70 2 Both the appellate
and the trial levels seek to accomplish the purpose of ensuring, to the
extent courts can, that criminal defendants have been treated fairly
by the non-judicial participants in the plea process, as well as by the
judicial participants in the plea process. Fair treatment is an impera-
tive of the judicial system and the primary public policy goal of the
detailed record requirements the Nebraska Supreme Court has
adopted since Boykin. The United States Supreme Court has accorded
the presumptions of validity and regularity for many years to state
trial court judgments. 70 3 The primary systemic goal should be attain-
ing validity and regularity in fact.7 0 4
702. Appellate courts can suggest issues to be argued as well, but it is not quite as
easy for them, with the exception of the United States Supreme Court and that
court's freedom to order what issues will be argued.
703. See Alexander v. O'Grady, 137 Neb. 645, 290 N.W. 710 (1940).
704. Compare today's attitude toward the contents ofjudicial records with the attitude
of days past from Beale v. The Commonwealth, 25 Pa. 11, 18 (1855), quoted with
approval in Dodge v. People, 4 Neb. 220, 228-229 (1875):
[W]e are not to expect too much from the records ofjudicial proceedings.
They are memorials of the judgments and decrees of the judges, and con-
tain a general but not a particular detail of all that occurs before them.
If we must insist on finding every fact fully recorded before a citizen can
be punished for an offense against the laws, we should destroy public
justice, and give unbridled license to crime. Much must be left to intend-
ment and presumption, for it is often less difficult to do things correctly
than to describe them correctly.
Ah, for the good old days...
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